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PREFACE
One of the most important developments in recent
United States history has been the overwhelming impact of
defense expenditures on American society. Several indus-
trial areas of the country apparently have become economi-
cally dependent upon federal government contracts, and it
has been widely suggested that the military and aerospace
spending 'program has engendered significant national poli-
tical and philosophical changes. It is generally assumed
that the San Francisco Bay Area depends heavily upon defense
and space contracts; yet no study has fully analyzed the
historical growth, development, and economic impact of
defense spending in this region. To what extent the Bay
Area's industrial base relies upon defense expenditures is
not clear. Nor is it evident what factors caused the
growth of the region's defense-oriented economy. Herein is
the story of the development of the Bay Area's present
industrial base and an analysis of the real impact of
federal contracts upon the regional economy.
Whereas my original intention was to explore the
political and philosophical attitudes propagated among the
residents of a region largely dependent upon nati-anal
defense programs, I found that this was not feasible until
iii
the economic foundation had been established. What follows
is that groundwork. Unfortunately, the limits set upon a
paper of this nature made it inappropriate to proceed
further. In future work, however, I hope to pursue the
political and philosophical aspects of this problem.
I should like to express great appreciation to
Professor BenjaminF. Gilbert of San Jose State College for
his patience and sound advice. Additionally, my thanks go
to Professor James W. Pratt, Who originally inspired me to
embark upon this journey, and to Professor Lawrence B. Lee
for his comments.
During the research period I solicited the assist-
ance and advice of many persons. My thanks go particularly
to Professor H. Brett Melendy of the University of Hawaii;
Professor Guenter M. Conradus of San Jose State College;
Miss Christine Simpson, Documents Librarian at San Jose
State College; Mr. George Aldridge, Librarian of the San
Jose Mercury-News; and Miss Cheryl Rife, who assisted me
during the summer of 1969. For those err0rs which may be
found in statistical information presented in this work, I
am alone responsible.
To my Wife, Sandra, I owe the most, for her under-
standing and encouragement have made this adventure possible
and worthwhile.
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INTRODUCTION
In recent years California has been accused of being
economically dependent upon national military and space
spending. Although the state's economy is highly diversi-
fied, an element of truth is carried in this allegation.
Since the beginning of the Cold War, perhaps earlier, the
economic growth of the gold rush state has certainly owed
much to the United States defense program. Before the
outbreak of World War Two, defense spending was a relatively
small part of federal-state relationships. Federal programs
were designed to overcome natural environmental obstacles,
such as that presented in the Colorado River flood threat,
and to assist in the establishment of "resource-based
industries." However, the federal government's increasing
involvement in the economy since the 1930's and specifically
after World War Two has led to new fields of relationships,
notably national defense. l Eugene C. Lee, a prominent
California political scientist, suggested that, "..• in
1965, half of the jobs in California were related, directly
or indirectly, to defense and space activities. II One
lErnest Engelbert, "The Federal Government and Cali-
fornia's Growth, II in The California Governmental Process:
Problems and Issues, ed. by Eugene C. Lee (Boston: Little,
Brown & Co., 196GT; p. 29.
1
2million Californians or more, he continued, were employees
of the federal government or one of its contr~ctors.2 If
this is a valid observation, and it appears to be, then it
would seem also that the ramifications of such a large
dependency upon defense and related programs merit serious
study.
It would be risky, perhaps foolhardy, for this
writer to attempt to make a thorough study of all the rami-
fications of California's alleged economic dependency upon
defense ?nd related spending. The literature dealing with
this very problem is surprisingly vcluminous, and it leads
in many directions through the fields of psychology, soci-
ology, economics, philosophy, political science, and history.
Yet the many studies which have so bravely i'lrestled with the
development and effects of this new phenomenon, often
labeled the "military-industrial complex," have either been
extremely broad and incomplete or confiningly specific and
minute. An adequate history of the development of this
leviathan and its subsequent impact on society is still
unwritten. Therefore, it is hoped that this work may pave
the way to such a history, although it is not intended to
fill the void itself.
It is the ultimate contention of this writer that
the economic dependency of an area upon military-related
2Ibid., p. 28, edltor's comments.
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programs will be reflected in the political attitudes of the
community as well as in economic impact. Before the
political and philosophical aspects may be explored, however,
one must show obviously that an area is dependent upon
defense expenditures. It is to this preliminary thesis that
this paper is devoted, for without this foundation further
work in the political history of' defense expenditures would
be incomplete.
I. THE WAR PERIOD
California's growth as a defense contracting area
has a relatively short history. Prior to World War Two
her economy was most heavily based on agricultural and
related pursuits, and even today agriculture remains a most
important asset. However, in 1940, California began an
economic transformation resulting primarily from the outbreak
of global conflict. During the next half-decade, her eco-
nomic gains were based largely on the demands of the war,
and war and related lndustY'ies accounted for almost all
expansion in manufacturing. While agriculture and food
processing pursuits continued to expand, major manufactur-
ing industries invaded California on a large scale. Cali-
fornia's harbors became great embarkation centers and ship-
bUilding sites, and her southern metropolitan areas became
a national center for aircraft constructlon. Indeed, the
war greatly augmented the "human and economic resources" of
the state, expanding infant industries as well as bringing
new ones and adding large numbers of people to her popula-
ti.on. l Further;nore, the federal government, particularly
lCalifornia, State Reconstruction and Reemployment
Commission, Report and Recommenda ti.ons f_or the Peri:)d
Ending Decembp.r 31, 1944 (Sacramento, 194)1 J p. 11 \ Herein-
after referred to as Report J 1944).
mrrn
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its military department, became the leading single investor
in the state, and California became third in the list of
s tates receiving defense contrac ts. The blrth of a defense-
oriented region was occurring during these war years, for,
unlike earlier war periods, national defense spending was
not to return to a pittance during the postwar years.
Furthermore, a decline in conventional ordnance and auto-
motive products as a large part of postwar defense buying
was caused by a gradual rise in the importance of electronics,
aircraft, and missiles. The result was a shifting of defense
contracts from the older manufacturing firms in eastern
states to newer firms in the rejuvenated New England states
and the recently industrialized states of California, Texas,
and Washington. 2
California was experienclng her first "real" indus-
trial boom; and though wartime industrial expansion may have
only "accelerated a long-term trend ll that would have led to
the expansion eventually, the type of growth it brought
might never have occurred without the war. 3 "The vast
2Merton J. Peck and Frederic M. Scherer, The Weapons
Acquisition Process: An Economic Analysis (Boston: Harvard
University Press, 1962), pp. 110-12. For California's rela-
tive position as a defense contracting state during World
War II, Korea, and fiscal 1959-60, see infra., Table A,
Appendix I, p. 189. For estimated government security expen-
ditures in relation to the GNP, 1939-52, and trends of U.S.
post-war defense spending after major wars, see infra.,
Tables Band C, Appendix I, pp. 190 and 191.
3Carey McWilliams, California: The Great Exception
'; 7'; r P I7rsmt71.tfftfjttftW'nffJ"~'u,,,,
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expenditures of the National Government for these war
materials," observed the State Chamber of Commerce in its
Economic Survey :for 1942, "are the controlling factor. 'l'he
present war production program is revolutionizing the
industrial economy of the State.,,4 In addition to the air-
craft and shipbuilding boom, military expenditures expanded
industries dealing with nonferrous metals and products,
electrical machinBry and products, other machinery, iron
and steel products, rubber, chemicals, and petroleum. 5
Larger plants tended to force the smallest companies to
disband, as an increase of 46 percent occurred 1n the
number of companies employing from 10 to 200 persons. 6
For unlike most other war production areas, California did
not convert peacetime industries to war production. Indeed,
there were few to convert. Therefore, new industries were
built overnight, gearing themselves solely to wartime needs. 7
(New York: A. A. Wyn, Publisher, 1949), pp. 233-34, agrees
in part with this analysis.
4California, State Chamber of Commerce, "Economic
Survey of California and Its Counties, II in Ca1ifornia Blue-
book, 1942 (Sacramento, 1942), p. 338 (Hereinafter referred
to as Bluebook, 1942).
5Maurice I. Gershenson, '~artime and Postwar Employ-
ment Trends in California, II rt..onthly Labor Revie\'l, LXIV
(April, 1947), p. 578. See also the employment figures in,
infra., Table A, Appendix II, p. 195.
6Report, 1944, p. 18.
7McWilliams, California, pp. 233-34.
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During the course of the war, the federal government
invested $150 million in aircraft production facilities,
$409 million plus for shipbuilding facilities, $117 million
for iron and steel production facilities, and many more mil-
lions for other industrial and military facilities. Private
investments trailed far behind the government's in these
three major industries, totaling only $141 million;8 and,
while this was not unusual in many states during the war, it
was indeed unique for California. Table 1 gives some indi-
cation of government wartime outlays in the state during
the first years of the war. The two major areas receiving
the bulk of these vast expenditures and those that followed
through 1946 were the Los Angeles-San Diego and the San
Francisco Bay areas, the latter, of course, being the topic
of this work.
Industrial growth brought with it a rush of people
to California which, according to Carey McWilliams, 'I •••
rsnrrr
produced an impact not unlike that of the gold rush." In-
deed, it was greater since the wartime migrants flooded the
alI~ady crowded metropolitan areas. 9 Coupled with a wartime
8California, State Chamber of Commerce, "Economic
Survey of California and Its Counties," in California Blue-
book, 1946 (Sacramento, 1946), pp. 437-39 (Hereinafter
referred to as Bluebook, 1946).
9McWilliams, California, pp. 12-14. The first chap-
ter of this work contains a particularly good though brief
analysis of California's wartime population growth.
8TABLE 1
MAJOR WAR SUPPLY AND FACILITY CONTRACTS AND ALLOCATIONS,
1 JUNE, 1940 - 1 JUNE, 1942
00,338,688.1 0008.646,944,1 .... 9,000Total if. •••••
%US
California Total US Total
Nonml1itarl········· $ 186,427,000 6.65 $ 2,822,296,000
Mili tary•.•••••••.•• 6,757,692,000 8.72 77,516,392,000
Supply Contracts •• 5,407,263,000 9.76 55,417,328,000
Air'craft & Parts 3,590,826,000 18.35 19,571,842,000
Cargo & Naval
Vessels ••.•••• 1,509,094,000 16.35 9,232,176,000
All other war
supplies •••••• 307,343,000 1.15 26,613,310,000
Facilities Projects 1,350,429,000 6.11 22,099,064,000
Industrial Plants 607,741,000 4.44 13,700,358,000
Military Facili- .
t lee .......... 742,688,000 8.84 8,398,706,000
0 t "
Source: California, State Chamber of Commerce, "Economic
Survey of California and Its Counties, II in
California Bluebook, 1942 (Sacramento, 1942),
p. 340.
birth increase, the growing population had a profound impact
on California. The San Francisco area, for example, almost
doubled its population during the war years (Table 2). And,
as Table 2 indicates, the growth did not stop after the
war's end. The California State Reconstruction and Reemploy-
ment Commission explained that the postwar departure of war
workers and their families was offset by "••• many
9
TABLE 2
SAN FRANCISCO BAY AREA WARTIME POPULATION INCREASE
3,J9J559,,95 ,...............a
County 1940 1946 1950
Alameda ••••••••••••• 513,011 743,000 734,740
Contra Costa •••••••• 100,450 257,000 297,IWO
Marin............... 52,907 76,200 84,739
Napa •.•••••••••••••• 28,503 42,700 46,373
San Francisco .•••••• 634,536 800,000 760,381
San Mateo ••••••••••• 111,782 183,000 234,030
Santa Clara ••••••••• 174,949 229,000 288,852
Solano .............. 49 Jl18 127,000 102 J191.j.
Total ............... lJ 665,256 2,457,900 2,548,709
St te 6 o 000 000 10 64 000
Source: California, State Chamber of Commerce, Economic
Survey of California and Its Counties," in
California Bluebook, 1942 (Sacramento, 1942),
pp. 360, 392, 4Br, 504, 570, 591 J 603, and 627;
ibid. (1946 edition), pp. 468, 496, 576, 604,
Q7D; 696, 708, and 728; and ibid. (1950 edition),
pp. 816, 834, 898, 920, 980, 1000, 1010, and
1028.
thousands of servicemen, pre-war residents of other states,
who decided to live in California after release from the
armed forces."10 Also, as government defense contracts
continued to find their way to the state, the more highly
trained and educated worker was encouraged to come to
California and combine his research talents and intellectual
10California, State Reconstruction and Reemployment
Commission, Report of the State Reco~struction and Reemoloy-
ment Commission for the Period from Au~ust, 1943 through
December, 1945 and for the Year 19~5acramento, 1947),
p. 13 (Hereinafter referred to as BEport, 1946).
10
interests with a Mediterranean climate. 11 Thus, from 1940
to 1950, the state's popUlation grew from 6,907,387 to
10,586,233. 12 (Table 3 gives annual growth figures.)
TABLE 3
APPROXIMATE ESTIMATES OF NATURAL INCREASE
AND NET r4IGRATION INTO CALIFORNIA
BY YEARS, 1940 - 1949
Increase over
year before
April 1, 1940 .••••••••••
July 1, 1941 •••••••.•••
July 1, 1942 •.•••••••••
JUly 1, 1943••••.•••••.
July 1, 1944••.••••••••
JUly 1, 1945•.••••••.•.
JUly 1, 1946 •.••.•••.••
July 1, 1947 ••••.•••••.
July 1, 1948.•••••.••.•
July 1, 1949 .••.••.••••
o
423,000
430,000
438,000
236,000
288,000
292,000
206,000
397,000
170,000
Source: California, Depart-
ment of Employment,
Proceedings of the
Governor's Conference
on Employment, Decem-
ber 5-6, 1949 (Sacra-
mento, 1950), p. 244.
As a part of the population and industrial growth,
all sections of California's society and economy were
llEugene Burdick, "From Gold Rush to Sun Rush, 'I in
The California Governmental Process: Problems and Issues,
ed. by Eugene C. Lee (Boston: Little, Brown, & Co., 1956),
p. 244.
12Bluebook, 1942, p. 336; and California, State
Chamber of Commerce, "Economic Survey of California and Its
Counties," in California Bluebook, 1950 (Sac::-amento, 1950),
p. 765 (Hereinafter referred to as Bluebook, 1950).
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stimulated. Over 100,000 new permanent private family
dwellings and some 21,000 new permanent public housing units
were constructed during the war years. 13 The number of
government employees increased twofold in the five years
after 1940, as communities expanded their public services. 14
While the number of manufacturing establishments increased
from about 12,000 in 1939 to 18,000 in 1947, wholesale trade
firms increased from 14,000 to 18,000 and retail trade firms
grew from 112,000 to 120,000. Even more significantly, total
wholesale and retail trade sales increased $9 billion and
$7.5 billion respectively from 1940 to 1948. 15 Perhaps the
war's economic impact can be best illustrated by the growth
in employment illustrated in infra., Chart 1, p. 32, and
Table A, Appendix II, which shows California's total growth
experience.
The San Francisco Bay Area16 naturally shared in the
state-wide economic transformation, as can be seen in the
13Report, 1944, p. 19.
14Bluebook, 1946, p. 422.
15Bluebook, 1942, p. 358; and Bluebook, 1950, p. 806.
16For the purposes of this work the San Francisco
Bay Area includes Alameda, Contra Costa, Marin, San Francisco,
San Mateo, Santa Clara, and Solano Counties. Sonoma and
Napa Counties have generally been excluded, as statistical
information for them is not readily available. Another
county grouping often used by sources cited in this work and
sometimes used herein is the San Francisco Industrial Area,
composed of Alameda, Contra Costa, Marin, San Francisco, and
San Mateo Counties.
12
wage and employme~t trends illustrated in Table D, Appendix
II, and .!~nfra, Chart 2, p. 36. The area became the embarka-
tion center for the war effort in the Pacific, with more
than 30,000 military personnel assigned in the region at the
warts peak. 17 Tremendous port facilities were needed for
such a center, and federal funds were poured into the con-
struction of these. The result was the development and
expa~sion of facilities such as Mare Island Naval Yard,
Solano County, with more than 20,000 civilian employees;
the U.S. Naval Air Station, Alameda; the U.S. Naval Supply
Depot, Oakland; Fort Mason, the center of San Francisco's
embarkation effort; the U.S. Army Embarkation Base, Oakland;
the BOOth U.S. Army Air Force Depot, Alameda; Fairfield-
Suisun Air Force Base, Solano County; the U.S. Naval Air
Station, Moffett Field, in Sunnyvale; and many other military
installations. 18 Additionally, millions of dallal's came into
the area in the form of supply contracts and through the con-
struction of industrial facilities. In San Jose, by June,
1942, $8,496,000 was invested by the government in new
plants for magnesium, ferro-silicon, and plastics production.
rrJames W. Hamil ton and Vlilliam J. BoIce, Gatevlay to
Victory (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1946), p. 193.
18:Bluebook, 1942, p. 627; Bluebook, 19116, p. 467; and
Bluebook, 1950, p. 10~ See also, Mel1ier Goodin Scott,
The San Prancisco Bay Area: A Metropolis in Perspective
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1959), PP. 245-46.
13
An additional $31,370,000 was also given the San Jose area
in contracts, while Napa County received $l~60,692,000 in
defense contracts during the same period. Obviously, the
investment for the total war period was much greater, as
illustrated by Alameda County's experience in receiving
$59,379 J OOO for industrial facilities and $909,628,000 in
supply contracts. 19 Yet the first years of the war brought
the most significant impact and began the transformation
of the economy. Overall, the San Francisco Industrial Area,
plus Solano County, received $738,368,000 in primary
defense contracts by September 21, 1941, not quite one-
fourth of the total contracts for the war period. (See
Table 4.)
By June, 1945, the Bay Area had received a total of
$3,053~119,000 in shipbuilding contracts alone--59.2 percent
of the total awarded to the state. 20 The impact of such
contracts was enormous. The Richmond shipyards of the Todd-
California Shipbuilding Corporation (owned by Henry J.
Kaiser), for example, had constructed 563 Liberty-type cargo
vessels between January, 1941 and mid-1944--a task requiring
thousands of workers, millions of dollars, and involving
many other industries. 21 It has been estimated that, of an
19B1uebook, 1942, pp. 572, 604, and 606-607; and
Bluebook, 1946, p. 460.
20Bluebook, 1946, p. 438
2lJoseph C. Whitnah, A History of Richmond, California
14
TABLE 4
VALUE OF U.S. GOVERNMENT CLEARED PRIMARY DEFENSE CONTRACTS
AWARDED TO SAN FRANCISCO BAY AREA FIRMS TO
SEPTEMBER 21, 1941, BY INDUSTRY-GROUPS
zrE
Industry-Groups
Transportation Equipment •.•.•..•
Shipbuilding.••••••...••......
Facilities .......•............
Other••••••.•.••••••••••••••••
Construction, Nonship ••••••..•..
Products of Petroleum..•..•.••..
Iron & Steel & Products ....•....
Machinery ...••••••••.•••..••••••
Food & Kindred Products .......••
Textiles & Products .......•...•.
Forest Products ..•• w.•• w •••••••••
Chemicals & Allied Products ....•
Miscellaneous •..•••.....•.•...••
Nonferrous Metals ••..••.•••.....
Stone, Clay & Glass ••..••.....•.
Paper & Allied Products .•....•..
Rubber Products ..•.....•.•......
Leather & Products ..•.•.••....•.
Work Projects Administration•...
U.S. Housing Administration..•..
Defense Loans •••••••••••••••••••
Total .............•.............
Value
(In thousands)
$668,808
629,178
39,618
12
17,669
11,261
7,838
3,020
1,628
1,148
606
603
423
90
89
36
35
l~
6,282
2,400
16,428
738,368
%of Total
90.5
85.1
5.4
---
2.4
1.5
1.1
.4
.2
.2
.1
.1
.1
---
---
---
---
---
.9
.3
2.2
100.0
Source: California, State Planning Board, An Economic and
Industrial Survey of the San Francisco Bay Area,
by Robert DeBois Calkins and Walter E. Hoadly, Jr.
(Sacramento, 1941), p. 226.
average of more than 75 industries sharing each shipbuilding
contract, a majority of these subcontracts went to Bay Area
firms. Thus, between June 1, 1940 and January 31, 1941, an
(Richmond, California: Richmond Chamber of Commerce, 1944),
PP. 119-20.
15
average of 59 percent of payments by Bay Area prime con-
tractors to subcontractors went to firms in the region.22
Shipbuilding led the new and expanded industries in
the Bay Area, growing from almost an idle industry of three
plants to the largest in the area, consisting of twelve
companies. As an example of the impact of this growth on
employment, consider that Contra Costa County had 361
shipyard workers in January, 1941, whereas, in December, it
had 17,880. 23 Following the shipbuilding industry, which
was the leader in both employment and wages paid in 1944,
were the machinery industries. Though slightly trailing the
combined industries of chemicals, petroleum, coal, and
rubber in wages paid--$73,291,000 compared to $73,510,000--
the machinery industries were clearly second in employment
growth. The chemicals, petroleum, coal, and rubber indus-
tries ran a close third. These were followed by the growth
in ferrous and nonferrous metals and products, the latter's
growth being much assisted by the expansion of the Columbia
Steel Company plant in response to demands of the shipyards.
22California, State Planning Board, An Economic and
Industrial Survey of the San Francisco Bay Area, by Robert
DeBois Calkins and Walter E. Hoadly, Jr. (Sacramento, 1941),
pp. 241-43 (Hereinafter referred to as Calkins and Hoadly,
Survey).
23California, Department of Employment, Research and
Statistics Division, California Employment and Payrolls in
1941: A Study of Workers (and Wa~es) Covered by the Califor-
nia Unemployment Insurance Act. Classified by Industry and
Ex Count~, Rept. No. 127, Pt. 4\Sacramento, undated), pp. 13-
14 {Hereinafter referred to as ~mployment and Payrolls in
[appropriate date], Crept. and pt. designation] }.
16
And ordnance and instruments also developed slightly. In
addition to these military-related industries, one of the
chief beneficiaries of the war effort was the construction
industry. In Richmond, for example, $35 million had been
spent for 21,843 dwelling- units by the end of 1944, and
similar amounts were spent throughout the Bay Area. Fur-
thermore, the food industry showed some growth, as govern-
ment contracts for foodstuffs served to offset the industry's
wartime loss of foreign trade. Finally, among other indus-
tries receiving primary effects of defense spending were
those dealing with apparel, furniture, and paper and allied
products. Table D, Appendix II, illustrates the overall
growth in wages paid, whereas Table 5 indicates the growth
in terms of employment. 24
The secondary effects of the defense effort were
equally as important as the primary in the Bay Area's eco-
nomic transformation. From 1939 to 1944 payrolls grew 68.3
percent and the number of wage-earners increased 41.5
percent. 25 In December, 1940, the business index of the San
Francisco Chamber of Commerce was at the highest level on
record, except for a short time in 1929, 167 percent of its
1923-1925 average; and, in October, 1941, the index was
24Infra, Table B, Appendix II, p. 196; Calkins and
Hoadly, Survey, pp. 230-41; and Whitnah, Richmond, pp. 124-25.
25Calculated from, infra, Tables Band D, Appendix
II, pp. 196 and 198.
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TABLE 5
EMPLOY~ffiNT TRENDS IN MILITARY-RELATED MANUFACTURING
IN THE SAN FRANCISCO BAY AREAa
Industries 1939b 1944b 1949
Nonmilitary-related Manufacturing 84,026 82,019 99,700
Ferrous & Nonferrous Metals and
Products ....................... 17,783 23,963 30,026
Chemicals, Petroleum, Coal, and
Products ....................... 14,510 25,006 25,226
Machinery....•..•.........•.....• 8,579 23,492 20,332
Transportation Equipment ••.••..•• 7,5 JW C 156,262 10,693
Ordnance & Instruments ...•....••. --- 2,007 9l.J6
Total ..... '....................... 1 2 4 8 1 4 6
aCalculated from, California, Department of Employ-
ment, Research and Statistics Division, California Employment
and Payrolls in 1939: A Study ofT.'!orkerU and \'iae;es) Covered
~he California Unemplo'ment Insurance Act. Classified b
Industry and by County, Rept. No. 127, Pt. 2 Sacramento,
August, 1941), and Pts. 7 and 12 for the years 1944 and 1949.
bFigures are adjusted to compensate for change in
insured employment coverage in 1946, from only firms employ-
ing four or more workers to firms employing one or more
workers. Percent increase for each industry and original
figures used in adjustment are in Tables A and B, Appendix
II.
CData for 1939 unavailable, therefore 1940 data is
used.
steady at 152. Roughly $200 per capita was added to San
Francisco Industrial Area plus Solano County when, between
June 1, 1940 and January 31, 1941, $268.3 million of $444.5
million in contracts awarded to Bay Area firms were expended
there. Despite tax increases and augmented cost of living
standards during the period, the net rise of' purchasing
power was great among all segments of the community and
~
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helped to increase employment in other fields. 26 While
Table D, Appendix II, gives an indication of growth through
wages paid, Table 6 illustrates the growth of major non-
manufacttlring and nonconstruction industry groups through
employment figures. Indeed, the wartime growth of the Bay
Area was almost phenomenal. This, however, was merely the
beginning, for the growth was not to end wi th the war.
TABLE 6
NONMANUFACTURING AND NONCONSTRUCTION INSURED EMPLOYMENT GROWTH
IN THE SAN FRANCISCO BAY AREAa
Industries 1940 1943 1946 %Change
Transportation, Commu-
nication, & Utilities 44,697 59,078 69,651 +35.4
Wholesale & Retail
Trade ................... 113,829 166,236 200':796 +43.3
Finance, Insurance &
Real Estate ....•••..• 28,624 36,425 43,742 +34.5
Service Indus tries .•... 81,372 52,731 83,414 + 2.4
Governmentb ....••••••.. 51,500 111,400 121,600 +57.6
aExc1udes Marin and Solano Counties, except for
"Government, If \vhich includes fv1arin and excludes Santa Clara
and Solano Counties. Data for 1940 and 1943 is adjusted
(see Table 5, n.b). Calculated from, California, State
Chamber of Commerce, "Economic Survey of California and Its
Counties," in California Bluebook, 1946 (Sacramento, 1946),
p. 688; California, Department of Employment, Research and
Statistics Division, California Employment and Payrolls in
19l~0: A Study of Workers (and Hages) Covered by the CalifOr-
nia Unemployment Insurance Act. Classified by Industry and
by County, Rept. No. 127, Pt. 3, (Se.cramento, November, 19'-+2),
and Pts. 5, 6, and 9 for the years 1943 ar.d 1946.
bData is not adjusted for 1940 and 1943, does not in-
clude only insured employment, and appears to be only approxi-
mate.
26Calkins and Hoadly, Survey, pp. 241-51.
II. THE POSTWAR PERIOD
Unlike other postwar periods in American history,
the events or the years immediately following World War Two
prompted United States leaders to continue defense programs
on a large scale. As noted in Table C, Appendix I, expendi-
tures directed toward the military, veterans, and i~terest
on the national debt--the latter owing its existence pri-
marily to war-related borrowing--made up 59.8 percent of
government expenditures between 1946 and 1949. On a per
capita basis, as shown in Table 7, the average military-
related spending was approximately 60.5 percent of total
government spending, from 1947 through 1950--33.9 percent
greater than the percentage of military-related spending as
a part of total government spending in 1939.
The tension throughout the world, which seemed to
increase at an ever-quickening pace after V-J Day (August 14,
1945), understandably gUided the nation's defense spending
policies. With the memory of the lost peace of Versailles
in mind and the rather sudden outbreak of the Cold War
occurring, America's leaders refused to withdraw from the
world's problems. Instead, they prepared to keep the peace,
through force of arms if necessary. On March 12, 1947,
Preside~t Truman requested Congress to support militar~ and
19
TABLE 7
FEDERAL EXPENDITURES, PER CAPI'l'A, IN 1926 PRICES, 1939-1952
A B C Cols. A, B, C
Year Military Veterans Interest 'rotal %Col. b Foreign Civil Total
1939 $10.66 $6.10 $8.05 $21L 81 26.6 $ • J.9 $68.03 $93.03
1940 14.49 6.10 8. llS 29.04 31.2 .ll8 63.04 92.92
1941 59.11 5.65 8.28 73.04 56.2 1. 31 55.55 129.90
1942 210.48 4.47 7.68 222.61 82.3 4.96 42.90 270.49
1943 506.36 4.14 10.23 510.73 89.8 1.20 46.70 568.63
1944 585.39 4.48 14.45 604.32 92.0 1. 71 50.57 656.60
1945 576.12 7.45 19.22 602.79 92.9 4.61 41.03 648.43
1946 295.83 21.33 24.36 341. 52 84.3 9.58 53.56 404.66
19 l17 62.09 33.18 18.97 114.24 62.9 31.03 36.20 181. 47
1948 51.66 28.95 16.46 97.07 62.4 24.53 33.70 155.30
1949 50.00 28.88 16.10 94.98 56.5 27.48 45.47 167.93
1950 53.39 39.85 18.62 111.86 60.2 20.26 53.60 185.72
1951 75.95 22.07 15.25 113.27 67.1 16.33 39.11 168.71
1952 143.03 20.69 14.87 178.59 73.1 20.41 45.29 244.29
Source: Calculated from, M. Slade Kendrick, "A Century and a Half of Federal
Expenditures," Occasional Paper 48 (Revised) (New York: National
Bureau of Economic Research, Inc., 1~55), pp. 84-86.
f\)
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economic aid for Turkey and Greece in opposition to Commu-
nint pressures, a request which was soon fulf~lled. Short-
ly afterwards, at Harvard University on June 5, 1947, George
C. Marshall (later President Truman's Secretary of Defense)
called for a program to assist western European countries in
gaining economic recovery from the war. In April, 1948, the
Berlin Airlift more deeply co~~itted America to the Cold
War. Then, two years later, the United States found herself
involved once again in an actual war, following the Communist
Iinvasion.of South Korea, on June 25, 1950.
Steady defense spending, in response to inter-
national tensions, was to become national policy; and it
would continue to affect the California economy and society.
At the close of the war, suggested Eugene Burdick, the
California economy was "•.• impossibly out of balance.
• [Hovlever,J it was saved by the cold \'Jar.••• Today [1963J
California gets more defense contracts than any other single
state.,,2 This observation is probably correct; for the
California electronics, communications equipment, aircraft,
and space industries obviously benefited from continued
government defense contracting.
The resurgence of vast military-related research
ltll. Slade Kendrick, "A Century and a Half of Federal
Expenditures," Occasional Paper 48 (Revised) (New York:
National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc., 1955), p. 52.
2Burdick, "Gold RUSh," p. 5.
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and development (R & D) by private industry and private
institutions was particularly significant. I~~ediately
after the war the federal Office of Scientific Research and
Development was disbanded, military research (except in
atomic energy) reverting almost exclusively to the services.
A joint R&D board coordinated military-related research,
but it initiated few new programs. However, the creation
of the National Defense Establishment under the 1947
National Security Act prompted new research. The birth of
inter-service competition for financial resources with the
Air Force-Navy conflict over supremacy for a long-range
strategic bombing or for an aircraft carrier oriented
defense policy added to the growth clR & D.3 Obviously,
large amounts of federal funds were going to be invested
in new defense policies, whatever the policies were to be.
California's war-born and war-nurtured aircraft,
electronics, and tiny scientific instrument industries were
tailor-made for such government expenditures; moreover, her
research institutions, particularly the California Institute
of Technology, were already receiving R&D contracts. 4
3peck and Scherer, ~eapons ACQuisition, pp. 70-77.
See also, Werner Z. Hirsch and Richard N. Baisden (eds.),
California's Future Economic Growth (Berkeley: Diablo Press,
1965), p. 21.
4Alfred D. Chandler, "Development, Diverslfic2tion,
and Decentralization," in Post\'/ar Economic Trends in the
United States, ed. by Ralph E. Freeman (New York: Harper &
Brothers, Publishers, 1960), pp. 237-38, suggests that, since
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Carey McWilliams suggested that this institution received
more than $80 million in contracts during the war years and,
furthermore, that this amount vias just the beginning of even
greater postwar contract awards. 5 In any event, California
Institute of Technology carried out considerable government
R&D. Also responding to the technological revolution and
demands for research facilities, Stanford University estab-
lished the Stanford Research Institute in November, 1946,
appointing as its director Dr. William F. Talbot, president
and technical director of Fine Chemicals Division of the Sun
Chemical Corporation. Soon afterwards the State Reconstruc-
tion and Reemployment Commission recommended that a "...
nonprofit research organization to be known as the Pacific
Research Foundation be established in California, function-
ing in full cooperation with western universities, sharing
research programs and supplementing their facilities. II The
Commission also recommended that the Foundation undertake
projects sponsored by individual companies; groups of
companies; and federal, state, and local governmental
agencies. 6 Hence California responded to the postwar growth
World War Two, these three industries have been dependent on
government spending in excess of 50 percent, particularly in
R&D. He also lists, as somewhat dependent on government
spending, the automobile, power machinery, chemicals, petro-
leum, and rubber industries.
5McWilliams, California, p. 262.
6Report, 1946, pp. 46-48.
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of technology and perhaps as well to the continued presence
of rederal derense R&D contract awards.
Clearly, government contracts were desirable to the
war-born California manufacturing industries, for the close
of the war promised to bring economic problems to the state.
In 1944 war production began to decline, and employment in
manufacturing dropped 76,712 throughout the state and 18,618
in the San Francisco Bay Area. 7 This 1944 decline was less
than serious, as it primarily involved the withdrawal of
women ",Iar workers from the labor market. 8 However, declines
in 1945 had a definite detrimental impact upon California
and Bay Area employment. War expansion had mainly occurred
in the aircraft and shipbuilding industries, and in 1943 and
1944 one-half of the manufacturing employment throughout
the state and the Bay Area was accounted for by these indus-
tries. 9 Therefore, the rapid decline of war contracts to
these industries after V-J Day had a substantial effect on
employment. Between 1945 and 1946, the cessation of mili-
tary contracts coupled with a work stoppage of machinists
and shipyard workers from November, 1945 to March, 1946 caused
an average yearly employment drop in the Bay Area'S
Pt. 7
7Infra, Tables A and B, Appendix II, pp. 195 and 196.
8EmPlo)ment and Payrolls in 1944, Rept. No. 127,
(undated, p. 2.
90ershenson, "Employment Trends, 1I p. 584; and infr~,
Tables A and B, Appendix II, pp. 195 and 196.
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transportation equipment manufacturing industries of 62,538.
Additionally, small decreases were experienceu in machinery,
metals, rubber, chemicals, and petroleum manufacturing
employment--although these are not clearly reflected in the
average yearly totals. Finally, the cancellation of military
facility construction contracts resulted in a 1945 construc-
tion employment loss of 2,834 jobs over the previous year's
average. 10
Four months after V-J Day, California began what the
Department of Employment termed "... one of the most cri-
tical years in the history of the State. 1111 As noted by the
state government, California did not have, after the war, a
large manufacturing industry complex to reemploy its many
war workers at the onset of peacetime reconversion. Some 85
percent of the employees in the shipbuilding and aircraft
industries alone, it was estimated, would need new jobs; and
as contract cancellations continued, a drop of 62.4 percent
did occur between 1945 and 1947 in the average yearly Bay
Area transportation equipment industry employment. 12 The
lOEmployment and Payrolls in 1945, Rept. No. 127,
Pt. 8 (undated), pp. 1-3; and infra, Table B, Appendix II,
p. 196. Wage payments also reflect this drop as shown in
infra, Table D, Appendix II, p. 198.
llEmployment and Payrolls in 1946, Rept. No. 127, Pt.
9 (undated), p. 1.
12California, Reconstruction and Reemployment Com-
mission, Report and Recommendations for the Period Ending
December 31, 191.j.5 tSacramento, 1946), p. 21; and infr~,
Table B, AppendiX II, p. 196.
..
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loss of government contracts threatened the economic welfare
of the state.
Ernest Englebert observed in 1963 that California's
strong national voting power and great diversity of inte-
rest groups--even more powerful and more diverse when com-
bined with other western states--gave the state tremendous
political bargaining power. 13 As the war ended in 1945,
California leaders appeared to recogQize this power. The
State Chamber of Commerce had observed and applauded the
fact, as early as 1942, that California was the third
largest state in the volume of war contracts. Furthermore,
the group suggested, if all ". • • smaller contracts were
included in the tabulation, California would be shown as the
leading war supply producing state, as well as first in the
production of aircraft and ShiPS."llt Whitnah, in his 1944
Richmond Chamber of Commerce-sponsored history of that city,
wrote that this community was ". . • one of' the outstanding
industrial and war production centers •.• " of the West
Coast. He also related that "••• it merely remained for
the community and the industrial leaders •• • " to take
advantage of the wartime economic good fortune in order to
secure the future. 1S Meanwhile, the state had formed the
13Englebert, "California's GrO\'~th," pp. 32-33.
l4Bluebook, 1942, p. 339.
l5Whitnah, Richmond, pp. 117 and 128.
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Reconstruction and Reemployment Commission to act as a
". • • rallying point for industry, labor, agriculture, and
government agencies •.• " in planning for peacetime eco-
nomic adjustments. 16 Then, in 1949, as the decade ended,
the Governor's Conference on Employment vaguely hinted that
employment could be stimulated by national defense spending
or at least by "adding to the budget" at both the state and
national levels. 17
Although the presence of political interest and
influence in California toward obtaining military contracts
for private industry is alluded to, one must not assume it
was, during the postwar years at least, of great importance.
Indeed, caution must be employed here. It is extremely easy
to misinterpret statements or to extract only those phrases
which will support one's case. The State Chamber of Com-
merce, in 1942, was obViously not advocating continued large
military spending. Whitnah did not define what he meant by
taking advantage of wartime gains. It is probable that he
never conceived that Richmond's future industrial strength
would be based on continued government contract awards, nor
does this community's economic strength presently seem to be
grounded upon such a basis. The Reconstruction and
16Report, 1946, pp. 1-2.
17California, Department of Employment, Proceedings
of the Governor's Conference on Employment, December 5-6,
1949 (Sacramento, 1950), pp. 221-26.
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Reemployment Commission obviously was not designed to stimu-
late industry and government agencies in the realm of
military spending, and the Governor's Conference was not
furtively proposing defense spending as a cure for unemploy-
ment. In fact, government contracts existed because of
national policy based largely on international issues, and
not state political pressures; moreover, contracts came to
California primarily because it was the core of the new
technological industries. In other words, political
pressures did not direct the contract flow. However, a mood
was expressed in these four examples of official and semi-
official statements--a mood recognizing the strength of the
state and the potential of government spending.
To explore this point further, some general observa-
tions seem relevant. A few writers, such as Englebert,
believe that political influences on the defense contract
flow are extremely important in determining where and to
whom the awards shall go.l8 On the other hand, Peck and
Scherer suggest that "••• the direct effect of politics
in the weapons acquisition process tends to be exaggerated
• • • • The political factor [isJ so intermixed with other
l8Englebert, "California's Growth," PP. 32-33.
Among other spokesmen for this view are, Paul Goodman, "A
Causerie at the Military Industrial," The :-.leN York Review
of Books, IX (November 23, 1967), 14-19; .ft~red J. Cook, 'l'he
Warfare State (New York: The MacMillan Co., 1962), passIm;
and Donald A. \.JeI1s, The vlar r,ryth (New York: Pegasus, 19b7),
chaps. XI-XV, passim.
-~------~
29
issues that it is difficult to discern its importance in
shaping the outcome . • ." of any particular contract
decision by the government. 19 In studying the contract
process, Peck and Scherer were led to conclude, first,
The spoor of alleged political influence in
weapons acquisition ••• is to be found everywhere.
But a fair shot at the breast itself is rare. It
was common, for example, to hear about claims of
political influence from a losing bidder. \~hat he
did not recite was the countervailing political
influence which he attempted to exert, unsuccess-
fully. The net of these countervailing forces up-
pears, often, to approach zero. 20
And, secondly,
•.. the sheer size of the weapons industry, its
widespread dispersion throughout the country, and
its crucial importance to certain regions inevi-
tably means that changes in the weapons acquisition
process have widespread economic consequences. As
a result there will be at least some political
pressures upon weapons development and production
decisions. There is simply too much at stake for
weapons acqUisition to be an entirely private affair
between the services and their contractors. 21
It would seem that this tempered judgment, so succinctly
expressed by Peck and Scherer, is a most logical one. In
this sense, it is important to note that state officials
had some conception of California's position of strength in
the nation and the pO\'1er of federal spending during the
war decade of the forties.
Between 1940 and 1946, labor and expenditures were
19Peck and Scherer, Weapons Acquisition, p. 114.
20Ibid., p. x.
21~., p. 107.
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channeled into war industries. Whereas the growth in
service and, to some extent, trade industries responded less
to increasing population. 22 Service and trade industries
fell off considerably between 1939 and 1940. While the
latter partially revived, both tended to maintain relatively
stable employment until 1945. After 1944 their growth rate
quickened until 1948, leaving trade above the 1939 average
and service about even. War industries and construction, on
the other hand, grew considerably between 1940 and 1944, and
while war-related industries fell off quickly at the warts
end, their employment and wages nonetheless remained con-
siderab1y higher than the 1939 average. Employment in the
chemicals, petroleum and coal, rubber, metals, and machi-
nery industries was 40,872 in 1939. In 1944 it was 71,548;
and, in 1949, adding 946 workers in the small instruments
industry, it stood at 75,584. Thus an overall percentage
increase of 42.8 occurred between 1939 and 1949. Similarly,
wages paid in these industries in 1949, including instru-
ments, stood at $273,618,000. This figure was in contrast
to $71,130,000 in 1939, and it represented an increase of
73.9 percent. 23 Another illustration of the war motivated
22Davis McEntire, The Labor Force in California: A
Study of Characteristics and Trends in Labor Force, Employ-
ment, and Occupations in California, 1900-1950 (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1952), pp. 39-40.
23Infra, Tables Band D, Appendix II, pp. 196 and
198.
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manufacturing growth in the Bay Area is seen in the employ-
ment comparisons in Chart 1. Graphically, onp sees that of
three industries exceeding 60 percent growth from 1939 to
1950, two were nurtured greatly by the war--chemicals and
instruments. Both of the industries with between 50 and
60 percent growth were in the war-related group--machinery
and electrical machinery. Finally, metal grew 36 percent,
rubber climbed 34.4 percent, and petroleum and coal reached
32.5 percent. Only transportation equipment declined, and
this can be explained by the shipbuilding decrease and the
fact that aircraft production remained in southern Cali-
fornia. Among those industries not primarily nurtured by
the war, only the motor vehicles, paper, and lumber indus-
tries grew in excess of 30 percent.
McWilliams challenged the importance of the war's
influence on the industrial growth of the state during the
fortiesj24 however, the evidence would seem to substantiate
the great impact of the war. Certainly geography, climate,
eastern industrial plant obsolescence, and the desire of
eastern companies to establish branches in the West were
important growth factors. Yet it would appear that without
the war the attractiveness of the first two factors, the
realization of the third, and the desirability of the fourth
might not have been so quickly nor simultaneously recognized.
24McWilliams, California, pp. 235-44.
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Granting that continued expansion during the postwar period,
1946 to 1950, was important in itself, nevertheless, the
impetus for such growth unquestionably came largely from the
"wartime boom. "25
The remarkable postwar reconversion of the California
economy has prompted many to comment upon the state's excel-
lent resiliency,26 for reemployment snags and investment
snags were much less than seemed to have been anticipated.
The tone of the Reconstruction and Reemployment Commission's
report covering the period to 1944 Showed deep concern about
the coming reconversion period, and the State Chamber of
Commerce was equally worried. The latter group observed,
during the second year of the war, that reconversion was
indeed a "challenging problem"; and it hoped the war-born
industrial facilities, labor force, and raw material
resources would provide the ingredients for a solution to
the expected problem. 27 The anticipated problems were pro-
fusely stUdied. The Reconstruction and Reemployment Commi-
sion, for example, conducted hearings throughout the state
25Michael A. Goldberg and Gerald R. Walter, "Fore-
casting Employment and Industrial Location in the San Fran-
cisco Bay Area," California Management Review, XI (Summer,
1968), 23, characterize \"1orld \'lar Two as a "take-off period"
for the Bay Area economy.
26McEntire, Labor Force, p. 41; McWilliams, Cali-
fornia, chap. i, passim; Gershenson, "Employment 'l'rends,"
pp. 584-85; et al.
27Report, 1944, passlm;and Bluebook, 1942, p. 349.
---
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to assist local communities in their efforts to meet recon-
version. The Bay Area results were good. In response to
hearings held in Oakland in August, 1944, local leaders
established the San Francisco Bay Region Council to coordi-
nate a united reconversion effort between government and
business. The new organization's first meeting in December,
1944, was followed by planning sessions by a large number
of official and unofficial Bay Area groups in 1945,28 and
this effort undoubtedly had a favorable impact on the
actual reconversion.
The void left by the decline of war manufacturing
allowed an unfilled demand for housing and consumer goods to
be realized in the postwar era. 29 In the state, for example,
residential investment was 45.6 percent higher in 1946 than
in 1939, and by 1949 it had increased 41 percent over 1946.
Nonresidential construction also experienced similar growth,
climbing 84.8 percent between 1945 and 1946. At the same
time, the state began a program of highway, residential, and
public construction which added millions of dollars to these
industries. Finally, the military departments of the
28Scott, Bay Area, pp. 261-70.
29w. 'VI. RostO\'l, "The Dynamics of Jlmerican Society,"
in Postwar Economic Trends in the United St~tes, ed. by
Ralph E Freeman (New York: Harper & Brothers, Publishers,
• \ rr "1960), p. 6. See also, Gershenson, Employment Trends,
Pp. 576-88, which contains a good discussion of California
recovery.
94.
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federal government continued a high level of construction
spending in the state--a level which was 15.5 percent of the
national total in 1949.
The San Francisco Bay Area, naturally, was bound to
share the state's economic experience. Here, too, the pent-
up demand for houses, industrial plants, schools, and com-
munity centers existed. 30 Construction spending, particu-
larly military, showed a burst of energy. Instead of
returning to a small scale operation, the San Franciscc Port
of Embarkation was a mainspring of the new Army Transporta-
tion Corps, active because of both the Pacific military
occupation forces and the need for readiness in the atomic
age. 31 Therefore, all types of military expenditures came
to the Bay Area (see Table 8 for construction expenditures).
Particularly interesting was the continued investment in
industrial facilities from 1945 to 1949, as branches of
eastern companies moved into the area to accelerate local
industrial investment. As Table 9 reflects, almost $1.3
billion was invested in 7,502 new and expanded plants, and
39 percent of this was expended in the Bay Area.
Consumer manufacturing coupled with the trade,
service, and the remaining nonmanufacturing industries far
30Scott, Bay Area, Pp. 271 ff, contains a good discus-
sion of Bay Area postwar developments.
3l Hamilton and BoIce, Gateway to Victory~ pp. 193-
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TABLE 8
NEW CONSTRUCTION INVESTMENT IN CALIFORNIA
1939-1949 '
(In millions)
Year Residential Nonresidential State MilitarY
1939 $ 411.2 $ 94.0 $261.1 $25.2
1940 413.3 133.5 258.6 *1941 458.0 227.4 523.2 *1942 239.5 69.8 794.8 ....
1943 108.9 40.7 514.5 *1944 206.0 51.8 462.5 *1945 247.8 70.9 417.6 *1946 758.3 465.1 261.4 *1947 1,145.1 417.2 320.9 41.9
1948 1,723.8 445.9 411.0 22.8
1949 1,267.9 364.3 541.9 21.2
*Data not available
Source: California, State Chamber of Commerce,
"Economic Survey of California and Its
Counties," in California Bluebook, 1 50
(Sacramento, 1950 , pp. 7 0- 1.
exceeded construction in employment and wages paid. As
shown in Chart 2 .and in Tables A and B, Appendix II, employ-
ment growth took place in all these areas. In the Bay Area,
:
trade, manufacturing, service, and the transportation-
utilities groups all exceeded construction in postwar employ-
ment, and a similar relationship is seen in wages (Table D,
Appendix II). But, the continued growth of the state
economy can, perhaps, best be judged by the total net income
payments to restdents. These followed an upward trend,
increasing 80.4 percent during the decade (Table 10).
~....... .....-..:======================::::~------------------
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TABLE 9
POSTwAR INDUSTRIAL FACILITY EXPANSION AND COST,
CUMULATIVE TOTALS, 1945-1949
Ne\<} Plants Expansions Total
Number Costa Number Costa Number Costa
San Francis-
co Bay
Areab 1,881 $204.0 1,478 $315.4 3,359 $ 515.5
Los Angeles
County 1,074 237.1 1,844 292.7 2,918 529.8
California 3,783 580.3 3,764 718.4- 7,502 1,298.8
-
aAmount expressed in millions of dollars.
bIncludes twelve counties according to source; how-
ever, these are not enumerated and no other sources could be
found using this county breakdown for the Bay Area or giving
similar figures for the standard 7 county Bay Area.
Source: California, State Chamber of Commerce, "Eco-
nomic Survey of California and Its Counties,"
in California Bluebook, 1950 (Sacramento,
1950), p. 785.
During the postwar period, then, a moderate climb
was evidenced in all areas of employment, except manufactur-
ing. Those Bay Area manufacturing jobS which fell into
obsolescence by 1945 were replaced by 24,422 positions in
the construction industry, 7,725 in the transportation-
utilities group, 23,514 in wholesale and retail trade indus-
tries, 18,533 in the finance-insurance-real estate group,
39
TABLE 10
CALIFORNIA NET INCOME PAYMENTS
1939-1949(In millions)
5,047
5,606
7,044
9,348
12,444
13,739
13,882
15,180
16,043
17,003
17,005
1939 $
1940 .
1941 .
1942 .
1943 .
1944 .
194.5••.•.••...•.••••••.•
1946 .
194,7 .
1948 .
1949. e , •••••••••••••••••
Source: California, State
Chamber of Commerce,
"Economic Survey of
California and Its
Counties," in Califor-
nia Bluebook, 1950
(Sacramento, 1950),
p. 769.
and 10,467 in the service industries. 32 The postwar recon-
version period was, indeed, quite free of hardship. In
fact, in Santa Clara County, at the south end of the bay,
growth was exceptionally favorable. According to one county
planning report business analysts contended the county would
maintain and probably improve its wartime employment level.
Its location to the Pacific coast; good transportation
faCilities; low power, water, and fuel rates; low tax rates;
and reasonable land rates were quite attractive to new
32Infra, Table B, Appendix II, p. 196. Figures are
the difference between employment in 1945 and 1950.
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industry. The establishment of the National Advisory Com-
mittee ror Aeronautics research and testing facility at
Moffett Field, at the close of the war, suggested that the
county would have a bright industrial future. 33 The influx
of industry was rather good. Between 1945 and 1949, 47
new industries invested $24,545,000 in the previously agri-
culturally dominated county. In addition to this new
industry, 123 plant expansions led to the investment of
$11,938,775 in facilities. 34 The impact of industrial
growth was so great that the county's agricultural interests
began to express significant fears that their land would
soon disappear and that pollution would soon inundate the
valley. Of course, the county supervisors and the San Jose
Chamber of Commerce did their best to assure the apprehen-
sive citizens that the new industry was not incompatible
with desirable living conditions. 35 Regardless of the fears
of agricultural interests, postwar growth in all fields con-
tinued at a moderate pace.
The decade ended when preparedness for the Korean
33Santa Clara County, Planning Commission, Master
?lan of Airports, Santa Clara County, California (San Jose,
California, 1946), pp. 6 and 10.
34Santa Clara County Chambers of Commerce, Research
Committee, Data Sheet, Santa Clara County, 1967-1968 (San
Jose, California, 1966), unpaginated (Hereinafter rzferred
to as Data Sheet).
35Scott, Bay Area, p. 273.
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war launched another rise in manufacturing. 36 The effect of
the war was similar to World War Two's impact on the economy,
though it \-laS not as disruptive, for the state and the Bay
Area had the industrial base for expansion. From July 1,
1950 to December 31, 1956, California was the leading reci-
pient of defense contracts in the nation, obtaining 16.4
percent of the total primary awards. In the five years
between the two wars the state had managed to secure 7.7
percent more of the nation's defense contracts, placing both
Michigan and New York into the second and third positions.
Furthermore, as the nation increased defense expenditures
in number and Size, California's percentage of the awards
grew. Rising another 7.6 percent, California's percentage
of the nation's awards totaled 24.0 between 1959 and 1960. 37
World War 'l'wo had given California and the Bay Area
the industrial potential necessary to capitalize upon the
skyrocketing Cold War defense budget that came in the fif-
ties. Likewise, the forties had prompted a tremendous
population influx to which all segments of the state and Bay
Area economy responded by steady growth. As defense-oriented
industry beomed in the late fifties and early sixties, many
realized, as had Engelbert, that "••• if changes in the
international situation should result in a decline in
36McEntire, Labor Force, p. 41.
37Infra, Tables A and B, AppendiX I, pp. 189 and 190.
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defense expenditures, the western economy \'Iould be hurt. 1138
In response to any dismay over a decline in the Californta
economys federal officials and others associated with the
military-industrial complex suggested that the Cold War and
consequential defense spending would continue for many
years. In a study of the Bay Area's prospects in 1959, the
Department of Commerce noted that the ". • • Bay Area will
retain its well-recognized position as the regional head-
quarters .for many government and military functlons."39
In 1960, Abraham J. Siegel and Charles A. Meyers stated
total peace and total war were equally remote possibilities
for the relatively near future. 40
38Engelbert, '~alifornia's Growth," p. 31. Also see,
Emile Benoit, "Economic Adjustments to Disarmament," in
Disarmament and the Economy, ed. by Emile Benoit and Kenneth
E. Boulding (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1963),
Pp. 2"{2-80, ~ssim; Kevin Keane, "The Cost of t~e Arms Race,"
!merlca, October 2, 1965, PP. 372-75; and, partlcularly,
miscellaneous testimony before, U.S., Senate, Committee on
Foreign Relations" Control and Reduction of' Armaments, Hear-
.lngs, berore a sub-committee of the Committee on For8ign
Relations, Senate, 84th Cong., 2d sess., 1956, and 85th Cong.,
1st sess., 1957.
39U.S., Department of Co~~erce Future Development of
the San Francisco Bay Area, 1960-2020 (washington, D.C.:
Government Printin~ Office, 1959), p. 8 (Hereinafter referred
to as ~ay Area, 1960-2020).
40"Continuity and Char.ge in American Labor Problems,"
in Postwar Economic Trends in the United States, ed. by
Ralph E. Freeman (New York: Harper and Brothers, Publishers,
1960), p. 215.
III. THE FIFTIES--A PERIOD OF GROWTH
The California economy has been sustained by a
number of economic revolutions. The gold fields of the mid-
1800'sj the rise of wheat farming in the latter half of the
1800'sj the turn of the century growth in diversified agri-
cUlture, food processing, l~mber, and petroleum; the movie
industry of the 1920's; the aircraft industry of World War
Two--all have made their impression on the state. These
were the surges, according to a report from the California
State Planning Office, that raised the state's economy to
its present level. This 1968 report stated:
Each surge phased into the economy in its own time
and each has followed a somewhat different path over the
years. Each was therefore important--and the contribu-
tion each made to California's development would have
been difficult, if n~t impossible to predict at the
onset of its growth.
During the postwar years, the growth of durable manufactur-
ing neared 30 percent. If aircraft and shipbuilding are not
included in the percentage, the growth rate rises to 40
percent or more. However, speCUlation about the development
of the state economy without the defense industries is
purely academic, for the course of events gave the aircraft
1California, State Office of Planning, California
State Development Plan Program: Phase II Report {Sacramento,
1968), p. 32 {Hereinafter referred to as Phase II Report).
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industry a dominating role in the economy.2
The outbreak of hostilities in Korea precipitated
the surge which controlled the California economy in the
1950's. The state employment pattern underwent a major
change reflecting the growth in aircraft and other defense-
related industries. 3 Manufacturing employment increased
23.2 percent between 1949 and 1951--an increase not experi-
enced since the beginning of World War Two. Transportation
equipment, primarily aircraft, led the manufacturing sec-
tor's increase~ its employment growing 39.1 percent. Follow-
ing transportation were nonelectrical machinery (31.2%),
lumber and wood (20.7%), electrical machinery (26.9%),
primary and fabricated metals (26.7%), and chemicals (26.3%).
Nonmanufacturing employment increased only 8.2 percent
during the same period. Representative of the changing
requirements of defense technology, the chemicals industry
experienced a much smaller employment increase between 1949
and 1951 than the 32.6 percent increase which had occurred
in the industry between 1939 and 1942. 4 By the 1960's,
2Ibid., p. 71.
3california, Department of Industrial Relations,
Division of Labor Statistics and Research, Employment Trends
in California (Sacramento, November J.j., 195~), p. 4 ( f·iJimeo-
graphe-d); and "t1obi1izing for National Defense, If Survey of
Current Business, February, 1952, pp. 1-4, point up the
economic impact of the Korean War.
4Computed from infra, Table A, Appendix II, p. 195.
Statistics on growth in only the aircraft industry can be
according to Paul W. Crappuchettes of Litton Industries"
chemicals was" in fact, no longer considered a defense
industry.5 As a defense industry, it had reached its apex
during World War Two.
The Bay Area, too, shared the growth prompted by the
Korean War. Employment changes similar to those noted at
the state level were reflected in the local region. Manu-
facturing employment increased 14.6 percent between 1949 and
1951; and, while not as great an increase as at the state
level" the growth was significantly larger than the local
6.5 percent rise in the nonmanufacturing sectors. Transpor-
tation, however, did not lead the growth in defense-related
industries in the Bay Area. Its 11.8 percent increase
trailed far behind the 38.4 percent rise in electrical
machinery employment and was also smaller than the 21.4
percent growth in nonelectrical machinery and 23.1 percent
rise in metals employment. 6
found in California, Department of Industrial Relations,
Division of Research and Statistics, Employment and Earnings
in the California Aircraft Industry, 19)W-?3 (Sacramento, ..
1954), Pp. 1-5, passim" which graphically points out the
279% Korean War increase in the industry's employment (Here-
inafter referred to as ~ircraft Industry, 1940-53).
5California, Employment Relations Agency, Engineer-
ing Employment in California: A Conference by the Californi~
Society oi' Professional Engineers and the California State
Employment Relations Agency. Transaction~ (Sacramento, 19b6),
p. 88 lHereinai'ter referred to as En~ineering Employment).
6Computed from infra, Table B, Appendix II, p. 196.
The impact of the Korean conflic"t has been recognized in
MQ ,M.".LX;
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Unlike the southern portion of the state, the bay
region did not appear to have one mushrooming defense
industry. As G. E. Pitts, analyst for the State Department
of Employment, noted in 1953, the major Bay Area defense
industry was shipbuilding and repair, and few contracts had
been let in that particular sector.7 In Solano County, of
course, shipbuilding was the major industry; and the State
Department of Employment realized that the county's future
economic prosperity depended to a large extent on the volume
of activity by its largest employer, Mare Island Naval
Shipyard. Yet the World War Two shipbuilding boom was not
to be repeated. The impact of national defense needs were
felt elsewhere. In Contra Costa County, war needs were
reflected in the steel, chemical, and rubber industries--the
first by far the most important--and the State Department
of Employment noted that "••• the national defense program
will result in increased industrial activity in the
several reports, including one which appeared in the San
Jose News, March 8, 1968 (Hereinafter referred to as News,
regardless of issue); and in Santa Clara County, Planning
Department, A Study of the Economy of Santa Clara County,
California, Parr-r-r,san Jose, California, 195fT, p. ~ere­
inafter referred to as Economy of Santa Clara County); and
U.S., Department of Labor, Bureau -of Employment Security,
Area ManDower Guidebook: 174 Metropolitan Labor Market Areas
1Washington, tJ:C.: Government Printing Office, 1957), p. 26
Hereinafter referred to as Area Manpower Guidebook).
7Urban Land Institute, Findings, Recommendations and
Record of Proceedings of the Industrial Development Stu~
for San Mateo County, California (Washington, D.C.: Urban
Land Institute, 1953), p. 24.
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community.IIB Elsewhere in the bay region the growth in the
electronics industry was recognized, particuI~rly in the
Palo Alto area. The industry, which had sprouted in Santa
Clara County in 1940, had experienced significant growth as
a result of new defense requirements. 9 Aircraft production,
which during vloI'ld War Two had been small and primarily
centered about modification work by the Matson Navigation
Company, did not grow significantly. The only producer was,
1n fact, the Hiller Aircraft Company in Palo Alto, which
produced· helicopters for the commercial market. This
company did experience a shift to the military market; but,
as it was the leading commercial helicopter producer, the
increase prompted by defense requirements was probably qUite
small during the Korean War period. lO
In a 1961 report the State Chamber of Commerce
noted: "The phenomenal expansion of the industries oriented
to national defense was clearly the key to the rapid growth
8Ca1ifornia, Department of Employment, Research and
Statistics, Cornmunity Labor Market Surveys, California, 1952
(Sacramento, 1953), unpaginated. (Mimeographed.)
9Ibid.j and, Santa Clara County, Planning Department,
Backgroun~antaClara Countl California, A Summary Over-
view of the Location, Topograpny, Climate, Population,
Income Economic History, Principle Ecor.~mic Activities,I.abor~'orce, Economic Problems, and Resources for Develop-
~t in Santa ~lara County, California (San Jose, California,
December, 196b), p. 3 (Hereinafter referred to as Background:
Santa Clara County).
lOdil1iam Glen Cunnin~ham, The Aircraft Industry: A
StUdy in Industrial Location (Los Angeles: Lorrin L. f'Iorri-
sor1;Publisher, 1951), pp. 95, 156, and 164.
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of California since 1947." The Chamber also reported that
the increased employment in these industries ". • • plus the
stimulus it provided to employment in the trades, services,
and other similar industries, was responsible for at least
half the total growth occurring in the state over the 1947-57
period."ll The state's manufacturing employment, which had
grown 44 percent during the decade following 1947, certainly
had prompted the 16.9 percent growth in nonmanufacturing
employment. Similarly, the 21.2 percent Bay Area manufac-
turing employment increase during this period had much to do
With the 31.6 percent increase in local nonmanufacturing
industries. The San Francisco area's prominence as a finan-
cial and tourist center can, perhaps, account for the great
difference in relative nonmanufacturing increase compared
to statewide changes. Yet this factor should not discount
the importance of the impact of manufacturing growth. Ac-
cording to a report by the Santa Clara County Planning
Department in 1960, a single industrial job at that time
theoretically attracted eight to ten new residents and
generated about 1.5 nonmanufacturing jobs. 12 As Table 11
llCallfornia State Chamber of Commerce, Summary of
"The California Economy, 1947-1980" (San Francisco: Cali-
fornia State Chamber of Commerce, 1961), pp. 4, 7: and 18.
12Santa Clara County, Planning Department, Facts and
Forecasts: A Supplement to the General Plan of Santa Clara
County (San Jose, California, October, 1950), p~. 2d and 40
(Hereinafter referred to as Facts and Forecasts). Other
studies cited later in this study also suggest the 1 to 1.5
ratio of jobs generated.
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TABLE 11
NONMANUFACTURING EMPLOYMENT INCREASE IN ~~LIFORNIA
AND THE BAY AREA, 1947 - 1957
State 1947 1957 %
Nonmanufacturing Industries .... 1,743,923 2,362,238 16.9Contract Construction ....... 202,274 282,870 28.4
Transportation & Utilities .•. 218,937 296,665 25.8
Wholesale & Retail Trade ..•.. 778,938 1,016,017 23.3Finance, Insurance, Real
Estate ..................... 132,336 206, 11~2 35.8Services Industries ..•....•.. 348,435 501,289 30.9
Other........................ 63,003 59,255 --
Manufacturing Industries ....•.• 715,607 1,208,094 44.0
Bay Area 1947 1957 %
Nonmanufacturing Industries ..... 337,906 603,324 31.6
Contract Construction•.•...... 35,425 77,077 53.6
Transportation & Utilities .... 60,984 100,859 39.4
Wholesale & Retail Trade ..•... 142,400 246,180 41. 3
Finance, Insurance, Real
Estate ...................... 30, ] 24 66,008 54.2
Services Industries .••.•...... 52,504 108,410 51.2
Other......................... 6,496 4,790 --
Manufacturing Industries ••..•... 176,729 249,113 21.2
Source: Comouted from infra, Tables A and B, Appendix II,
pp.·195 and 196.
indicates, all major nonmanufacturing employment rose
appreciably between 1947 and 1957, both in the state and
the bay region.
The end of the Korean conflict did not have nearly
the Same economic effect on California and the Bay Area as
had the cessation of World War Two. Although defense spend-
ing fell off, it remained at a much higher level than it had
50
in the late 1940's. "The major reason that California's
defense-oriented industries were not reduced in size by the
cease-fire in Korea," stated one state report, "was to be
found in the rapidly developing revolution in weapons
technology.,,13 The birth of the Interc'ontinental Ballistic
Missile (ICBM) and the 1957 launching of the Russian
Sputnik prompted a great leap upward in United States
defense expenditures, and California became a national
center for this ne\'l defense production. The Bay Area, of
course, followed the statewide trend. Cutbacks in Korean
War contracts perhaps hit the region harder than the state
as a whole, but labor surpluses remained moderate through
the 1954 adjustment period. 14
There is J.ittle question that the aircraft industry
was a sustaining factor in statewide manufacturing employ-
ment. Though individual companies might have slumped occa-
sionally, overall military spending plus corr~ercial business
was generally growing. Even the national policy to disperse
key industries geographically as a precaution against enemy
attack did not appreciably hurt California's airframe
industry's growth, although it did slow slightly as compared
to the nation's aircraft industry growth. The airframe
l3Phase II Report, p. 71. See also Economy of Santa
Clara County, p. 10; and ~, March 9, 1968.
l4Area Manpower Guidebook, p. 26.
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industry was not unaware of technological changes, and Cali-
fornia's concerns were the first to leap on to the so-called
"bird bandwagon. 1115 Missiles became a common California
production item, and not only did the large aircraft concerns
benefit. California's more than 10,000 airframe industry
subcontractors and suppliers felt the prosperity boom as
we11. 16 It was in this new industrial field, missile
components and related equipment, that the Bay Area pros-
pered; and it was this field which overtook the once promi-
nent manufacturing position of the area's more conventional
defense industries.
In a 1963 study of the Bay Area, Orville F. Poland
of the University of California observed that ". . . the
most significant economic development during the 1950's was
the rapid rise of the electronics industry and other indus-
tries related to the new defense and space programs. ,,17 The
make-up of the entire bay region began a rapid change. The
older central core of the area--San Francisco, Oakland, and
Contra Costa County--continued to have a diversified economy,
based more on trade, finance, and conventional manufacturing
15Aircraft Industry, 1940-53, pp. 1 and 5; and "West
Coast Aviation: Higher and Higher, Faster and Faster," Fort-
pight, May, 1956, pp. 22 and 26.
16California, Senate, Fact-Finding Committee on
Commerce and Economic Development, Final Report (Sacramento,
1957), p. 56.
170rvi1le F. Poland, Economic Trends in the San Fran-
cisco Bay A~ (Berkeley: Institute of Governmental Studies,
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than on the new derense industries. Southern Alameda, San
Mateo, and Santa Clara Counties now became the centers of
growth. The young electronics industry, which had early
formed a nucleus around Stanford University in Palo Alto,
was sparked by the post-Korean ICBM boom and was ready for
further expansion when Sputnik's launching gave the United
States space program a high priority.18 Led by Lockheed's
new Missiles and Space Division, which came to Palo Alto
in 1954, an enormous number of new firms flocked to the
area. Between 1947 and 1961, San Mateo and Santa Clara
Counties gained 835 new industrial plants valued at
$296,139,600 and had 2,073 expansions valued at $437,628,040.
Throughout the seven county Bay Area, in fact, such growth
was experienced with 8,913 total plant projects valued at
$2,430,545,202. However, the high value electronics firms
located primarily in the south bay area. l9
Franklin K. Lane Project, University of California, 1963),
pP. 1 and 5.
18Car1 Lindner, "Diversification Progress and the
San Francisco Bay Area Electronics Industry" (unpublished
MA theSis, San Jose State College, 1967), PP. 23-25, notes
that Stanford began tv teach electrical engineering in 1891.
The university pioneered the high voltage engineering field
and, in the 1930ts~ fathered the Klystron tube. During the
years folloWing World War Two, research was renewed with new
fervor, and many new firms were attracted to the area. "Dur-
ing this period [1949-1962], the Bay Area developed the
largest single concentration of microwave tUbe manUfacturing
in the world The larger share of this growth was attributed~ . "to increases in military business ••••
19Bay Area Council, Guide to Industri~l Locations in
the San Franc isco Bay Area (San Franc lsco, 1904), p. 30; and
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Santa Clara County's growth perhaps mirrored that of
the entire south bay region. The 1950's brought a spectacu-
lar shift away from agriculture and canning as the chief
industries. No longer was the county to be known as the
"Prune Bowl" of the nation. The San Jose Mercury of January
27, 1963 stated: "An industrial explosion transformed one
of the world's best known farm-orchard centers into an
exciting space-age industrial complex. ,,20 Between 1953 and
1956, three giants of industry settled in the area. Inter-
national Business Machines (IBM) invested $32 million in a
new plant to the south of San Jose, Lockheed spent $91
million in the northern portion of the county, and Ford
Motor Company constructed a $60.5 million facility to the
northeast of San Jose. 2l Combined with homegrown industries
Data Sheet. Sources referring to the change in Bay Area
industrial composition and the growth of the electronics
industry during this period are much too numerous to include
in a single reference. The News and San Jose Mercury (Here-
inafter referred to as Mercury, regardless of issue), contain
many articles in issues duri~g these and subsequent years
which refer to this topic. Many articles in periodicals
have also referred to the changes and growth. Therefore,
the reader is referred to the bibliography of this paper.
According to Lindner, "Diversification Progress," p. 25,
167 electronics firms were in the Palo Alto area in 1962.
20Se e also Mercury, April 29, 1964 and November 15,
1960; and Robert W. Travis, A Study of Industrial Site
Development and Site Choice in Santa Clara County--1950 to
1959 (San Jose, California: San Jose State College, Real
Estate Research Bureau, n.d.), pp. 1-4. (Mimeographed.)
2lMercury, November 17, 1960.
II
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such as Ampex, Varian Associates, and FMC, the impact was
bound to be great. The area was characterize~, not sur-
prisingly, by a great number of firms merging, splitting,
disappearing, and arriving. The San Jose area gained recog-
nition at the national level by being designated a standard
metropolitan statistical area, and this new SMSA found
itself less linked to local market industrial demand than
other areas of comparable size--an indication of the impor-
tance of the new aerospace industries to the locality.
Drm'ln by, the firmly established scientific complex centered
about Stanford University, national firms and federal funds
poured into the area. 22 In 1958, the dollar value added by
Santa Clara County (San Jose SMSA) industry was $671,982,000,
as compared to the United States county average of'
$45,112,000. Ninety-nine percent of the nation's counties
were below the Santa Clara County level. 23
Despite the many aerospace industries settling in
the south bay region, there always seemed to be room for
more. For example, the San Jose Mercury commented: "Each
electronics or missile firm which locates in the North
22Santa Clara County, Planning Department, "A Study
of the Local Impacts of Research and Research-bas~dManufac-
turing: Santa Clara County, California. Summary, by Charles
T. Stewart, Info Commenta~ (San Jose, March, 1967), ~p. 3,
6, and 16 (Hereinafter referred to as Info Commentary).
23Background: Santa Clara County, p. 37.
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County helps to strengthen the magnet . . . .1124 The indus-
try continued expanding, and local optimism w~s repeatedly
expressed by the local press as the area looked "•.• for-
ward to a breathtaking panorama of future development. "25
As long as military spending continued, growth certainly
seemed inevitable; and the regionts share of the federal
defense expenditure had never been larger. "Not even at the
height of the Korean War, when military buying was at a much
higher level than it is today," said Lieutenant Colonel
Oliver D.• Burden, Chief of the San Francisco Air Force
Procurement District, in early 1956, "was the Air Force
equaling todayts volume of business on the Peninsu1a."26
The funds expended by NACA for facilities at Moffett Field
Naval Air Station were also indicative of the overall levels
of government defense spending in the area. From the first
years of World War Two to June, 1954, a total of $37,282,412
was let for facilities and equipment at the Ames Aerospace
Laboratories. In 1954, construction valued at $38,807,376
was underway, and an additional $8,979,930 was paid in
salaries and expenses in FY1955 alone. 27 "All of this
24Mercury, September 11, 1959.
25Mercury, January 15, 1956. Many other articles
praising the aerospace industry and the area's industrial
future are too numerous to mention here.
26Mercury, March 5, 1956.
27Sa n Jose Mercury-New~, untitled fact sheet in the
Mercury-News clipping files for 1955. (Typewritten.)
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construction work has provided employment for hundreds of
our friends in the local building trades," c l ..timed the
manager of the Greater San Jose Chamber of Commerce;28 and,
without question, most other sectors of the economy shared
in the added economic activity.
A study of industrial expansion in a small unnamed
community outside the Bay Area was conducted in 1959 by the
United States Chamber of Commerce, and it is perhaps illus-
trative by comparison of the type of impact relt in the
south bay area in the 1950's. A hundred new factory workers,
it was concluded, brought tremendous changes to the entire
community. Population increased by 296, and personal
income rose $590,000. A total of 112 new households were
established, 4 new retail stores opened, $270,000 more bank
deposits added, and retail sales grew $360,000. Altogether,
74 nonmanufacturing jobs were added--a figure close to the
1:1.5 ratio mentioned earlier for jobs generated by manu-
facturing employment increase. 29 An attempt to compute
growth for the south bay area based on this study would be
a less than accurate exercise, for the region undoubtedly
28Russell E. Pettit, "Moffett Field" (San Jose,
California: San Jose Chamber of Commerce, March l~, 1955),
unpaginated MS, San Jose Mercury-NevIs, clipping files for
1955. (Typewritten.)
29Chamber of Commerce of the United States, Economic
Research Department, What New Industrial Jobs M:an to a.Com-
,!tlunity (\oJashington, D. C.: Chamber of Commerce 01" the UnJ. ted
States, 1959), PP. 4-5.
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differed greatly from the area studied by the Chamber of
CommerCe. As an example, however, this study gave one an
indication of the impact of the 1950's manufacturing growth
on the south bay region economy.
The south bay region, in fact the whole bay area,
experienced growth quite comparable to that ShOl-m 1n the
Chamber of Commerce's study. The total population of the
Bay Ar~a increased from 2,504,542 in 1950 to 3,461,000 in
1960, a growth of 38 percent compared to the aV8rage national
metropolitan area growth rate of 26 percent. However, the
south bay region monopolized the increase, as the San Jose
SMSA expanded from 288,852 to 658,700 for an increase of
127 percent. An average annual increase in population of
apprOXimately 90,000 flooded the Bay Area. 30 Obviously, the
majority of this increase was the result of in-migration and
not natural increase, although figures were not readily
available to substantiate the exact breakdOWn. A 1964 stUdy
by the Bank of America suggested that some 76 Percent of the
growth in the San Jose SMSA was due to in-mig~ation between
the mid-forties and mid-sixties, and this woulQ appear to be
a reasonable figure. 31
30 Poland, Economic Tren~, p. 1, suggests the Bay
Area population increased 35 percent and that 0f Santa Clara
County grew 121 percent between 1950 and 1960.
31Bank of America National Trust and Savings Associa-
tion, Focus on Santa Clara County: An EconomiC study 2re.eared
~'1.k of America NT &. §.A (3ariF"rancisco, :f951ry, p. 2 (.Here-
inafter re~erred to as Focus ~anta Clara County, 1964).
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TABLE 12
SAN FRANCISCO BAY AREA POPULATION INCREASE, 1950 - 1965
-
County 1950 1960 1965
%Increase
1950 - 65
Alameda • •
·
734,740 912,600 1,032,600 40.5
Contra Costa 297,lWO 413,200 509,600 71.4
Marin •
· ·
• 84,739 148,800 188,600 122.5San Francisco 760,381 71u,500 743,100 -2.3
San f'ia teo •
·
234,030 1~49,100 526,900 125.1
Santa Clara
·
288,852 658,700 159,800 209.5
Solano •
·
• 104,400 137.100 159,800 53.1
Total .
· · ·
2,504,542 3,461,000 4,054,400 61.8
State . •
· ·
10,643,000 15,863,000 18,726,000 75.9
Source: California, Department of Finance, Cal1forn5.a
Population, 1967 (Sacramento, 1967), Table 15,
p. 18 and Table 17, pp. 20-21.
The influx of population during the decade of the
fl:Cties naturally prompted other growth. "Population
shifts," noted the Bank of America, "are closely tied to
changes in economic conditions."32 Employment, as we have
already seen, expanded rapidly. The economic structure of
the Bay Area, particularly the new industrial prospects,
acted as a great magnet. As families arrived, the construc-
tion industry responded to the demand for homes. New home
construction figures for the first half of the decade were
scarce; however, data covering the years after 1955 indi-
cated the i~~ense building boom that occurred. The Bay Area
32Ibid.
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added 189,316 new homes to its landscape between the end of
1955 and the start of 1961. Santa Clara County, alone,
accounted for 70,483 of the dwellings--37 percent. 33 The
overall employment in the bay region construction industry
increased from 64,416 in 1950 to 78,725 in 1960. While a
drop or almost 10,000 occurred in 1953 and 1954, the overall
growth nonetheless stood at almost 20 percent. The San Jose
SMSA, of course, experienced even less a set back in 1953
and none at all in 1954. This area's construction industry
employment raced upward from 8,236 in 1951 to 16,278 in 1960,
an increase of almost 98%. The finance, insurance, and real
estate sector of the economy experienced comparable growth,
employment increasing 21 percent in the Bay Area and 125
percent in Santa Clara County, between 1951 and 1960.
34
The trade and service industries of the area also
expanded, their growth closely tied to the improved personal
income of area residents. The significant rise in income
was probably caused in large part by the expansion of the
higher paying aerospace industries, particularly in the San
Jose SMSA. 35 The total personal income of the bay region
in 1950 amounted to $5.3 billion and had risen to $10.3
33S
a
n Jose Mercury-News, Advertising Plans Depart-
ment, Facts About Metropolitan San ~ose and the B~~
(San Jose, Cali:Cornia, February, 1903), unpaginated.
34Infra, AppendiX II, Tables Band C, pp. 196 and
197.
35Focus on Santa Clara County, 1964, p. 3.
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billion by 1960. In the San Jose SMSA income rose even more
rapidly, from $518 million in 1950 to $1,776 million in
1960. 36 The per capita net buying power in the Bay Area
increased $901 during the decade, and it grew by $893 in
the San Jose SMSA. The Bay Area's household buying power
rose $2933 during this period, and San Jose's climbed $2963.
The latter rigures seemed to indicate the gradual rise in
higher income employment in the San Jose SMSA as compared to
the entire bay region. This trend was even more evident
since the net household buying power in the San Jose SMSA in
1950 was $1,142 less than the comparable figure for the rest
of the Bay Area, but the difference had lessened to $83 by
1960. 37
It \'18S only na tura1 for the services and trade
industries to respond to meet new and enlarged demand.
Retail sales of the region rose qUickly as the buying power
of the area's families was enlarged (see Table 13). The Bay
Area's retail sales grew 83 percent, from 1950 to 1960, to a
level of $1~.9 billion. This sizable growth, however, was
36Californla, Department of Finance, California
Statistical Abstract, 1964 (Sacramento, 1964), pp. l7lf.:78;
and California, Department of Finance, California Statisti-
cal Abstract, 1968 (Sacramento, 1968), p. 55 (Hereinafter
referred to as Abstract, 1968).
37Sales Management, May 10, 1951, pp. 136 and 179;
Sales Management May 10, 1961, p. 90; and San Jose Mercury-
News, Market Mem~: Current Trends and Prospects in Metro San
Jose and the Nation (San Jose, California, JUly, 1968), unpa-
ginated (Hereinafter referred to as Market Memo, regardless
of date).
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TABLE 13
BAY AREA RETAIL SALES GROWTH, 1950 r 1960
(In thousands)
Year
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
San Jose Sr-1SA
$302,670
332,680
374,873
426,139
427,183
554,803
634,808
696,267
720,673
858,645
920,628
Bay Area
$2,669,110
2,918,051
3,160,257
3,383,212
3,416,498
3,756,882
4,039,351
4,186,575
4,130,683
4,598,982
4,898,852
Source: Santa Clara County Chambers of Commerce, Research
Committee, Data Sheet, Santa Clara County, 1967-
1968 (San Jose, California, 196~), unpaginated;
saTes Management, May 10, 1951, pp. 136 and 179;
and Sales Management, May 10, 1961, p. 382.
far exceeded by the 220 percent growth of sales in the San
Jose SMSA. The employment figures for retail and wholesale
business firms naturally followed the dollar growth pattern
of the decade, rising 22 percent in the Bay Area and 85
percent in the San Jose SMSA. Service industries, too,
experienced comparable growth in the area with employment
increasing 60 percent in the bay region and 174 percent in
the San Jose SMSA.38 Perhaps the best indication of the
overall business growth in the area was eVidenced in the
38Computed from infra, AppendiX II, Tables Band C,
AppendiX II, pp. 196 and 197.
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San Francisco business index computed by the San Francisco
Chamber of Commerce. Using the monthly averab~s from 1947
to 1949 for a base of 100.0, the index rose from 108.5 in
1950 to 157.3 in 1958. Not once during these years did the
index fail to rise. 39
The rapid growth of the Bay Area during the decade
of the fifties gave rise to questions asking why this area
was so fortunate in attracting the industry which was such
an important key to the expanSion. Many studies have tried
to answer why industries choose to locate in the areas they
do. One local study plausibly suggests that Santa Clara
County's industrialization was really a part of a regional
phenomenon. Industries first chose the general area in
Which to move, and then narrowed their site choices down to
a specific locality. Generally, several factors were con-
sidered by almost all firms in selecting the general area.
Access to markets, land abundance, good transportation
facilities, good climate, availability of labor, abundance
of raw materials, educational and research facilities, low
taxes, amenities for living, availability of utilities, and
the presence of allied or favorable businesses were all
39San Francisco Chamber of' Commerce, Research
Department, San Francisco and the Bay Area: An Economic
Survey and Yearly Review (San Francisco, 1959), p. 29 (This
Is an annual pUblication and will be hereinafter referred to
as San Francisco and the Bay Area, regardless of issue).
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rather important considerations. 40 The locality of the
actual site also involved consideration of these factors,
but many other items became important to the final selec-
tion. IBM, one of the largest companies coming into the
region, actually gave the area's rose bushes much credit
for prompting the firm's final site choice. 41
Perhaps most important to final site selection was
the attitude of the community, and the areas around the San
Francisco Bay certainly exemplified excellent attitudes
toward industrial growth. The State Planning Office noted in
a major study that most California regions used, during the
post World War Two years, normal economic development tech-
niques. To attract industries, the report stated, communi-
ties offered several benefits. Arrangements were made to
provide financial terms for plant sites and facilities,
special loans to newly formed firms were offered, pUblic
services were provided free or at initially low rates, tech-
nical and management services '11ere made available, tax rates
were often favorably adjusted, financial aid for relocation
was made available, and development organizations were
formed to coordina~e industrial growth. 42 The south bay
40Travis, Study of Industrial Site Development, pp.
13, 18, and 21-
41News November 17, 1960.
--'
42Phase II Report, PP. 76-77.
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region was fortunate in this respect to have the leadership
of the Greater San Jose Chamber of Commerce. The organiza-
tion's manager of many years was highly praised by the local
press for his work in bUilding the present Santa Clara
County economy: "More than any single man, perhaps, Russ
Pettit was responsible for the transformation of San Jose
from an agricultural community to a leading electronics and
aerospace metropolis. ,,43 In the 1950's, several community
leaders--including Pettit, Elystus L. Hayes of the San Jose
Mercury,· and Frank C. Mitchell of the Bank of America--began
a major push to diversify the prune-oriented economy of the
county. A national campaign was launched to attract indus-
try. According to Pettit, the drive was based upon persis-
tence, spirit, advanced planning, glossy brochures, aerial
photographs, surveys, national advertising, classified
notices, and much luck. By 1960, Pettit and San Jose's City
Manager, A. P. Hamann, had succeeded in having San Jose
designated as an "All American City," which was undoubtedly
an attractive drawing card to new industries. Companies had
responded to the drive in gratifying numbers, for there were
807 industrial plants in Santa Clara County by November,
1960. 44
43Mercury, July 3, 1969.
44News November 16, 17, 18, and 19, 1960.
-'
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By 1960 the Bay Area could boast of tremendous
advances. Its economic growth had been generally consistent
with the national growth pattern except in the manufacturing
sector, where the region reversed the national trend of
declining manufacturing employment to relative total employ-
ment. The key to this local growth in manufacturing was
possibly found in the expansion of the south bay region
growth and the steady industrial activity in the Contra
Costa County area. In any case, manufacturing became more
important, although not as blue-collar oriented as through-
out the rest of the nation. As the decade of the fifties
ended, the Bay Area's economy had completed a radical
change. The core of the area had increased its importance
as a major port facility, center for north-south coastal
trade, financial center, and regional office and distribu-
tion center. 45 The agricultural sector of the region,
particularly in the south bay area, had decreased consider-
ably; and the infant aerospace and electronics industry had
burst into maturity, more than filling any voids left by the
decline of the foods industry.
The structure of the regional economy at the close
of the decade was, perhaps, best illustrated by a state
sponsored analysis of the markets of the San Francisco-
45poland, Economic Trends, pp. 2-5.
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Oakland Metropolitan Area at the end of 1959. 46 While the
San Jose SMSA was not included in this particular analysis,
it should be recognized that the area was closely tied to
the San Francisco-Oakland SMSA. Therefore, the analysis
gave a relatively sound approximation of the general nature
of the overall regional economy.
Breaking the output of the various local industries
into demand sectors, the state research team was able to
determine the approximate distribution of total employment
to markets. For example, 96,900 manufacturing employees
(47.5% of the total manufacturing employment), initially
produced goods for the private exports demand sector (those
locally produced goods which leave the region under consi-
deration, except those that leave via sale to the federaJ.
government). In addition to the private exports sector, the
study defined sectors for government exports {sales to the
46California, Economic Development Agency, Markets for
California Products: An Analysis of SouI'ces of Demand, by VI.
Lee Hansen, R. Thayne Robson, and Charles M. Tiebout (Sacra-
mento, 1961) (Hereinafter referred to as Markets for Califor-
nia Products). Studies investigating the destination of
proctucts produced in a region are few. This is the only
partially comprehensive such analysis for California. In
the San Francisco-Oakland area, the researchers contacted
all firms of over 100 employees as of the third quarter of
1959 plUS conducting a random sampling of smaller establish-
ments. Their questionnaires were returned by approximately
25 percent of the firms contacted. Readers interested in
the exact methods of the analysis should refer directly to
the s~udy, for the methodology is complex at best. The ques-
tionnaire used in the study was slightly modified by this
writer and used to obtain more current data (infra, Appendix
III, pp. 204-07).
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federal government), local consumption (purchases by local
consumers), housing investment (local family housing unit
construction), business investment (local business invest-
ments in plants and equipment), current government (day-to-
day government activities, including some federal govern-
ment), and government investment (investment activities of
local and locally oriented government units).47 As seen in
Table A, Appendix III, the markets analysis for the Bay Area
revealed much about the region's economic structure--what
goods were exported, to what sectors of the economy goods
went, the relationships between various industry groups
and demand sectors, what demand sectors were most important
to the Bay Area and to specific industries within the
region, and so forth.
Initial sales of local industry groups in the ar~a
were quite diversified in 1959. One-fourth of the total
employment of the region produced for the export market;
one-half was split between production for local industry
groups and consumers; and the remaining one-fourth produced
for the business investment, housing investment, current
government, {nd government investment sectors. A detailed
analysis of at least one broad industry group should be
sufficient to see the importance of the various markets to
the bay region. In the manufacturing industry group,
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47.5 percent 01' the group's employees made products which
were initially sold to the private exports sector. The
remaining employees divided their production efforts between
sales to government exports (9.9%), local consumption (7.2%),
business investment (2.6%), government (1. 4%), and all local
industry groups (31.4%). When the manufacturing employment
which was credited to all local industry groups (31.4% or
64,000) was distributed among the sectors to which their
production efforts finally went, the actual market distrlbu-
tion became clearer. The private export market made possible
57.6 percent of the total manufacturing employment, the
government export sector provided for 12 percent, local
consumers made possible 23 percent, and the additional
sectors accounted for the remaining 7.4 percent of manufac-
turing employment. Of course, these figures were considered
only approximations. Using a much less complex method of
determining the percentage of manufacturing employment
producing for outside or export markets, the author esti-
mated that 51.7 percent of the employees produced for the
export sector. 48 This was somewhat less than the 57.4
48Calculated from, Bay Area, 1960-2020, PP. 34-36;
and infra, Table B, Appendix II, p. 196. The method used by
the Deoartment of Commerce and the author to obtain per-
centages of outside market employment is known as the "mini-
mum requirements" method. This approach compares the
employment structure of a city or metropolitan area with
the structure of other cities or metropolitan areas in the
same size-class. The employment structure of the areas in
the given size-class is measured with each industry
expressed as a percent of total local employment, i.e.,
---------------------------
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percent employed for the initial private and government
export sectors noted above, and less still than the 69.6
percent employed for the final demand export sectors. The
discrepancy, however, might have been accounted for by the
fact that the percentages used by the author were intended
for use with data for 1950, not 1959. Perhaps the dis-
crepancy should have been best used to suggest the shift in
manufacturing export markets. A dissimilar discrepancy
existed for total employment in the area. While the
Department of Commerce study used by this ~riter suggested
40.1 percent of the area's total employment produced for
the export market, the California market analysis estimated
that 28.0 percent of the total employment initially went
to export marlcets and 34.5 percent of the employment went
to export markets in the final demand. The reverse dis-
crepanc~r was, perhaps, accounted for by the growth of
No. Persons Employed in a Given Industry in the Area
Total No. Persons Employed in the Area
The ratio attained is compared with a determined mlnirnum
deemed necessary to supply the local population with the
goods and services within each industry required by an area
or the given class-size. Generally, the minimum local area
employment demand for goods and services is the equivalent
of the lowest percentage that occurs among all the areas of
the class-size.
The difficulty with this method, noted in Charles
M. Tiebout, The Community Economic Base Study (New York:
Committee for Economic Development, 1962), p. 50, is where
cne establishes the minimum employment requirement. "The
higher the cutoff place, the less each community will have
as exports. Thus unless good judgment is used, this
"approach can be misleading.'
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services, trades, construction, finance, and other industry
groups outside the manufacturing sector; howe~~r, the
assumptions, methods, and purposes underlying any of these
apprOXimations tended to differ slightly. Therefore dif-
ferent aspects of the economy were measured.
However measured, the changes in the Bay Area during
the 1950's were great. Growth was the key in this region
as in the state. 49 A rapid expansion caused by many inter-
acting forces had led to a major shift in relative impor-
tance of· broad industry groups. The state's manufacturing
output grew faster than the nation's, and business prospects
looked better in many aspects. In all editions of the San
Francisco Chamber of Commerce's annual publication concern-
ing the region'S economy between 1950 and 1960, growth
potential and business outlook were praised. It was con-
tinually suggested that the boom would certainly extend
through 1970. 50
The future of the electronics and aerospace industry
looked particularly good in the area. James Black, presi-
dent of Pacific Gas and Electric Company, had suggested as
early as 1955 that the state had no major industrial prob-
lems confronting it. He also noted that no defense cutbacks
49A good summary of state growth is found in Sidney
Sonenblum, "Economic Projections for California in 1975," in
Hirsch and Baisden, California's Future, pp. 13-14.
50San Francisco and the Bay Area (1950-1960 issues),
P. 5.
71
were likely to occur, thus jeopardizing the aerospace indus-
tries. Dr. Arnold Beckman, president of Beckman Instrument
Company, stated at the same time that the electronics
industry would, perhaps, accelerate its expansion. Its
leveling off place would be years ahead. 51 By 1960, these
dreams seemed to have become reality, and similar prophecies
for later years were offered. The Bay Area Real Estate
Report noted that ". the electronics industry has been
I
...
• most beneficial to the Bay Area." Continued gro\'Jth,
the author said, could certainly be expected. 52 Finally,
a Santa Clara County Planning Department analysis of the
county and surrounding communities for 1960 noted that the
bay region would continue to be a cultural, financial,
tourist, heavy industrial, transport, and high value indus-
trial center. Only for Santa Clara County did the decade
appear to end on a diminished note. "Ample employment oppor-
tunities 1n diversified industries," stated the Planning
Department report, "will be needed if our future population
is to live in prosperity. ,,53 What, indeed, had occurred to
stifle the othe~~ise glowing future of the area? Perhaps
this warning was mere cautiousness. Or did it foretell real
dangers for the Bay Area economy?
51"Business Leaders Find Outlook Brlght for 1955,"
Fortnight, January 5, 1955, pp. 11-12.
52C. D. Lafferty, "Industrial Development rl'rends J "
f3ay Area Real Estate R~e.or~ (4th quarter, 1959), 86.
53Facts and Forecasts, pp. 24 and 34.
IV. THE SURGE OF AEROSPACE
The decade of the fifties had ended, but growth was
not to cease. The factors leading to California's growth
during the 1940's and 1950's--good climate, abundance of
resources, and general high levels of economic activity--
would continue during the coming decade. These factors,
according to James Gillies of the University of California
at Los Angeles, would be the main forces creating future
expansion. l However, another force underlying the state's
and the Bay Area's prosperity was becoming increasingly
eVident. The new levels of defense spending attained by
the federal government had provided great stimulus to
California growth. Its impact, according to a significant
state report, had brought major changes to the economy.
Urban growth had been abnormally high, the agricultural
industry had suffered heavy losses, and much higher wages
and salary levels had been prompted by the high-skilled
labor requirements of new industry. "It is apparent," the
report noted, "that much of California's most rapid growth
was stimulated by economic factors that ultimately were a
lCallfornia, Governor's Commission on Metropolitan
Area Problems Metropolitan California, edited by Ernest A.
Engelbert (sa~ramento, 1961), p. 9 (Hereinafter referred to
as Metropolitan California).
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part of a larger national defense procurement policy.•
[Furthermore] economic investments in defense-oriented
. .
industries Vlill continue to gUide the volume and direction
of new development in the State's metropolitan areas. "2
Indeed, the growth did continue, and it was more and more
evident that national defense policy was very important to
that growth.
The population explosion, which had been so large
during the 1950's, did not diminish during the 1960's. Dur-
ing the first half of the new decade the state's population
grew 3,338,000--about 20 percent. The Bay Area's increase,
a sizable portion of the state growth, vias 719,800--also
about 20 percent. 3 The local San Jose area newspaper
reported that apartments covered once prospero~s orchard
land, and the most frequent vehicle seen on the city streets
besides the passenger car was the moving van. The apartment
boom, it observed, was synonymous with the establishment of
Lockheed Missiles and Space Company, IBM, and Ford Motor
Company in the area. 4 Such growth naturally prompted
increases in employment, construction, and retail sales;
and since much of this growth was prompted by the more
highly paid aerospace industry, income and buying power rose.
2Phase II Report, p. 39.
3Supra , Table 12, p. 58.
4Mercurl., January 10 and 17, 1966.
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Bay Area employment easily reflected the continued
expansion of the region. Manufacturing enlarged its employ-
ment over 100,000 during the first half of the sixties, and
the nonmanufacturing sectors gained about 250,000 employees.
The San Jose SMSA still accounted for a large portion of
this growth. Since it accounted for some 30 percent of the
Bay Area's population growth, it is not surpriSing that its
growth in employment totaled almost 30 percent of the larger
region's increase. Nonmanufacturing employment increases
dominated the Bay Area growth during these years; however,
manufacturing industries failed to increase at the rate they
had during the previous decade. The 20 percent growth of the
1950's was more than halved during the first five years of
the 1960's. In the Santa Clara Valley manufacturing employ-
ment growth remained higher, at 23 percent; but, even here,
the great increases of the late 1950's were not to be
matched. A leveling off point was clearly reached. Manufac-
turing had reached a stage in the Santa Clara Valley where
it was, according to a 1964 report by the Bank of America,
"••• the largest single contributor to the county's
growth."5 In the Bay Area, it had certainly reached a posi-
tion of heavy economic impact. It seemed that the nonmanu-
facturlng sectors of the economy had f1.nally matched the
manufacturing sectors.
5Focus on Santa Clara County, 1964, p. 1.
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Even though the higher than 30 percent growth rate
of the 1950's was not continued in the nonmanufacturing
tndustries or the Bay Area, the sixties fostered a continued
Qi5h expansion rate (see Table 14). Only in the construc-
tion industry did a retraction of growth occur, and this may
have been caused by the tremendous inflationary trend and
~ecesslon of the mid-1960's. Despite the drop-off in
~mployment in the industry during 1965, builders had con-
. ~t~ucted 260,265 private dwellings between January, 1961 and
becember, 1965. A total of 71,959 more houses were con-
~t~ucted than had gone up during the period between January,
1956 and December, 1960. The San Jose SMSA still led the
tndustry~ even holding a 20 percent growth figure in 1965.
{tS bUilders were responsible for 31 percent of the private
~wellings cOnstructed during the period, slightly leading
the Alameda County portion of this constructionj and valley
builders received a large share of the $236,812,736 spent
by industries, which constructed and expanded 687 plants
~urlng these years. 6
The other nonmanufacturing industries in Santa Clara
Valley also led the overall growth of the Bay Area. The
~ervices industry, in front of other nonmanufacturing sec-
tors, increased 64.4 percent in the entire Bay Area and
l,6.9 percent in the Santa Clara Valley. Business services,
"'-------------
6Abstract, 1968, p. 142j and Data Sheet.
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TABLE 14
NONMANUFACTURING EMPLOYMENT INCREASE
IN THE BAY AREA, 1960 - 1965
Bay Area 1960
Nonmanufacturing Industries • . •
Contract Construction . . . • •
Transportation & Utilities ..
Wholesale & Retail Trade . . .
Finance, Insurance, Real Estate
Services Industries • • . • . .
Other . . . . . . . . . . . . .
277,592 288,900Manufacturing Industries
San Jose SfJISA
. . . .
61~7, 397
78,725
99,181
250,790
73,655
133,370
5,676
1960
800,700
78,400
120,900
289,800
90,300
219,200
2,100
1965
24.8
21.8
15.5
22.6
64.4
4.1
%
90,000 23.2
Nonmanufacturing Industries ...
Contract Construction . . . ••
Transportation & Utilities ..
Wholesale & Retail Trade . . •
Finance, Insurance, Real Estate
Services Industries • . . • • •
.ManUfacturin~dustries
85,710
16,278
8,316
34)27'5
6,417
19,545
73,046
140,900
19,900
12,200
48,900
9,700
50,100
64.4
22.7
1+6.9
1+2.9
51. 5
156.9
* 6Figures for 19 5 are from the California Labor
Statistics Bulletin for July, 1965. Because of the interim
nature 01' this pUblication, the data are not completely
reliable and must serve only as an estimate.
Source: Infra, Table B, Appendix II, p. 196.
it might be noted, were highly significant in making such
expansion possible. It is important to realize that almost
all research and development (R & D) firms were classified
as service industries, and this may well account for a large
portion of the sector's growth. 7
7Bank of America National Trust and Savings Associa-
tion, Focus on San Francisco-Oakland Metropolitan Area: An
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Reflecting the general upward trend of the economy,
Bay Area retail sales increased about $1.5 b111ion during
the first half of the 1960's, reaching $6,588,554,000 in
1965. Santa Clara County's share of the growth was sub-
stantial, too, as retail sales increased $537 million,
reaching a 1965 total of $1,458,288,000--22 percent of the
Bay Area figUre. 8 No doubt prompting this growth was the
rise in total personal income and buying power. In 1961,
Bay Area residents took home $10.9 billion and, in 1965,
$14.6 billion. Those persons living in the San Jose SMSA
accounted for 17.2 percent of th0 income in 1961 and 19.6
percent of it in 1965. 9 Net buying power mirrored the
income increase, growing from $8,107 to $9,386 per household
and from $2,496 to $2,911 per capita between 1961 and 1965.
In Santa Clara County, the household and per capita net buy-
ing pO\>ler grew at the same rate, increasing $1,184 and $371+
respectively. While this area's per capita buying power
remained below the Bay Area's average, its household buying
power now exceeded the Bay Area average during these years. 10
Economic Study Prepared b Bank of America N.T. & S.A. (San
Franc~sco, 19 '( , p. Hereinafter referred to as Focus on
San Francisco-Oakland).
8nata Sheet; Sales Management, May 10, 1961, p. 382;
and Sales Management, June 10, 1966, p. C-15.
9Abstract, 1968, p. 55.
10Sales Management, June 10, 1962, p. 609; and Sales
Management, June 10, 1966, p. C-17.
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The overall economy of the Bay Area had reached a
truly prosperous level by the early sixties, and the very
rapid expansion of the aerospace industries--over 200 percent
according to one sourcell_-was undoubtedly a key factor in
the attainment of such a prosperous economic state. The
Cold War, Korean War, and Vietnam War had fostered large
United States security programs. Except for temporary,
brief thaws during 1957-58 and 1963-64, defense spending
continued at high levels. 12 Coupled with the establishment
of NASA in 1958 and President John F. Kennedy's top priority
order for the Apollo moon project in 1961, defense spending
had a most important impact on the California and Bay Area
aerospace industry. The faclJ.ities in CalifornIa 'nere
readily adapted to both defense and space programs. The
aerospace industry grew quickly when NASA contracts were
added to the large quantity of defense contracts already
being let to California firms. 13
llRobert K. Arnold, at. al., Jhe California Econ?my,
1941-1980 (Menlo Park, California: Stanford Research Insti-
tute, 1950), p. 118.
12Murray L. Weidenbaum, "Impact of the Vietnam War
on the American Economy" in .• U.S., Congress, Joint Economic
Committee, Economic Effect of Vietnam Spending, Hearings,
before the Joint Economic Committee, 90th Cong., 1st sess.,
1967, I, p. 194, contains a good discussion of the growth
and levels of U.S. defense spending during the 1950's and
1960's.
13ca1ifornia Governor, Economic Re.e.ort of the Gover-.!2.~rJ 1968 (sacrament~, February, 19b8), p. 30 (Herei~after
referred to as Report of the Governor, 1968); and Un~ted
79
The electronics and related industries, so closely
tied to the prime aerospace companies that th~y may well be
classified aerospace themselves, became more nearly dominant
in the Bay Area than anywhere else in the nation. 14 In a
study executed by Santa Clara County in 1967, the south bay
region economy was measured in two ways. "Both approaches--
the 'shift' analysis and the 'minimum requirements' approach
--taken together indicate that overall county growth as
measured by employment trends, has centered around the
defense-space sector .••• " The report stated that the
area was becoming more and more economically unbalanced. 15
The Bay Area became one of the most important national
regions in the production of highly technical aerospace-
electronics equipment for the Defense Department and NASA.
Durable goods, 51 percent of total manufacturing in the south
bay region in 1940, were produced by 85 percent of the area's
manufacturing firms by 1963. A Bank of America study in
California Bank, Research and Planning Department, 1969
Forecast (Los Angeles, 1968), p. 46.
14Frank H. Stedman, "The California Peninsula:
Laboratory of the New Industrial Age, It Ind~strial Development
and Manufacturers Record, October, 1963, p. 35.
15Economy of Santa Clara County,. p. 13. The "shift
analysis" studIes the growth of an area from three points of
view. First, the area's growth rate is compared to that of
the national economy. Secondly, growth is analyzed in terms
of the number of fast and slow growing industries in the
area. Fin~lly, growth is analyzed in terms of the growth
rate of individual industries in the area compared to the
national growth rate of the same industries. An explanation
of the "minimum requirements" approach is found in ~praJ
P. 68, n. 48.
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1964 reported: "Within durable manufacturing, it was the
activities associated with defense-space equinment, largely
electrical machinery (electronics) and ordnance (missiles),
which set the pace.»16 In 1950, only 13 percent of total
south Bay Area manufacturing employment was in this category;
by 1969, the share was approximately 60 percent. Nearly
70 percent of all new manufacturing jobs since 1950 were
in these industries. 17 The growth prompted by the influx.
of aerospace industries was quite similar to that experi-
enced in. Southern California during the 1950 1 s. "Unlike
the southern region, however, there ~a~ no declining
aircraft industry in the bay region to inhibit the growth
in the 1960 I s.»18
16Focus on Santa Clara County, 1964, p. 7j see also,
Focus on San Francisco-Oakland, pp. 49-50. So closely con-
nected have been the defense and space efforts, one politi-
cal scientist has suggested that the space race may be or
easily become the cold war in orbit. See Amitai Etzioni,
The Moondoggle: Domestic and International Im~lications of
the Space Race (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Co.,
1964), pp. 114-148, passim. While this may be an overstate-
ment, a large, untold amount of the space effort is military
controlled and oriented. Consequentially, the space industry
is.considered to be a part of defense-related industries by
the author.
17Bank of America National Trust and Savings Associa-
tion, Focus on Santa ClaranCount§, A~ Eco~omic Stud} Prep~red
b Bank of America N.T. & ~.A. ( an Franc~sco, 1969 , p. 4
Hereinafter referred to as Focus on Santa Clara County, 1969).
Focus on Santa Clara County, 1964, p. 7, states that 80 per-
cent of the manufacturing jobs added to the county between
1955 and 1963 were in electronics and missiles.
18Arno ld, California Economy, p. 118.
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It seemed that the Bay Area, particularly the Santa
Clara Valley, was becoming overly dependent v~on the defense-
related industry. Yet, some authorities suggested that,
during this period, the dependency on defense-oriented
industries had been over-publicized. A stUdy by Crocker
Citizen's National Bank stated: "While heaVily involved
in defense-related work, California had a very broad and
remarkably varied economic base."19 Although its pattern
was different from the nation as a whole, suggested another
source, ~he Bay Area's economy was well-balanced and not
dependent upon one dominant industry.20 Still the Bank of
America suggested that "••• because the Bay Area does not
rely heavily on any single industry, its economy has a
stability enjoyed by few areas of comparable size anywhere
in the nation." No single nor simple cause for the reglon's
economic expansion, it continued, could be cited. 21 Nonethe-
less, defense-related industry was important--very important
--to the state and bay region, and many sources recognized
this trend. The industry's growth in the early sixties,
according to Federal Reserve authorities in San Francisco,
P. 44.
nomic
19Crocker Citizen's National Bank, California Eco-
Diversitx (San Francisco, D96~), unpaginated.
20nay Area Council, Guide to Industrial Locations,
2lpocus on San Francisco-Oakland, pp. 1 and 3. This
source also expresses the view that the Bay Area is one of
the most important areas in the nation for the production of
aerospace-electronics equipment. Supra, n. 17, p. 80.
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added significantly to the economic expansion of the entire
West; and locally, the San Jose newspaper noted that
increases in missile production would have a great effect
on the Pacific coast. 22 In the San Jose SMSA, the impact
could not be denied, for over $384 million were paid to
defense-related industry workers in 1962, compared to less
than $30 million in 1952. 23
The impact of the defense-oriented industries on the
Bay Area economy was rarely disputed. However, the irr.pact
was little understood, and rarely was its magnitude compre-
hended. Perhaps one of' the best general indicators of the
emergence of a dominant aerospace industry in the area
during the 1960's was seen in a consideration of the export
sector of the regional economy. "Uncle Sam," reported the
San Jose News on March 11, 1968, "is Santa Clara Valley's
biggest customer." The area, it continued, is influenced by
external forces over which the local economy has no control--
forces such as the national economy and the level of defense
expenditures. 24 Most of the manufacturing firms of the Bay
Area tended to produce for markets outside the area--export
markets. As noted in Chapter III, the 1959 export
22Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco: Monthly
Review, March, 1963, p. 45; and~, May 8, 1962.
23Focus on Santa Clara Countl, 1964, p. 7.
24See also, Economy of Santa Clara CountlJ pp. 16-17.
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manufacturing activity of the area fluctuated somewhere
between 40 and 65 percent. 25 Such activity was commonly
referred to as "basic"; for it brought in capital from the
outside which, by circulating within the local region,
provided the primary income of the area. The south bay
region, in particular, had felt the emergence of the
aerospace industry. During the 1960
'
s it accounted for as
much as 10 percent of the area's employment. In 1965, for
example, a 54,000 out of 90,000 manufacturing positions
were in aerospace firms; and since the bulk of the industry
leans towards the federal government for production orders,
it was a primarily basic industry.26 A recent report by
the Bank of America suggested that approximately 70 percent
of the aerospace industry served the federal government--
52 percent to the Department of Defense, 10 percent to NASA!
and eight percent to other agencies. The remaining 30 per-
cent, it suggested, went to civilian markets. Although the
report did not indicate to what final market this civilian
percentage went, a considerable proportion might have gone
into the federal government market. 27 If the export per-
c~ntage of the region's manufacturing market was 60 percent,
and 60 percent of the manufacturing e~ployment was in
25SuEra , pp. 65-67.
26Economy of Santa Clara County, pp. 10-11 and 16;
and New~, March 9 and 11, 1908.
27Focus on Santa Clara County, 1969, p. 4.
I)PiS
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aerospace in 1965, then a rough estimate would suggest that
36 percent of the region's basic economic activity was a
result of defense-oriented industries. Since at least
70 percent of the aerospace market is with the federal
government--an export market--25 percent of the basic
activity of the south bay region might well be attributed
to the ~ederal government. Furthermore, one may suggest
that 22 percent of this activity was directly accounted for
by the Department of Defense and NASA. More will be related
about such estimates in succeeding chapters. It is enough
to note that the aerospace industl~ had certainly reached a
level of' major importance to the south Bay Area, indeed the
whole Bay Area, by the 1960's. So important was the new
industry, in fact, one may safely suggest the Bay Area was
to an undesirable extent dependent upon it.
The large companies of the area--Lockheed Missiles
and Space, IBM, Hewlett-Packard, and others--had by 1965
reached a point of relative maturity. Smaller companies,
though still springing up, were in a period of consolidation.
The community became aware of the aerospace industrial com-
plex and, perhaps, some of the implications of the industry
to the area's well-being. The growth of the aerospace
industry in the Santa Clara Valley was so fantastic that the
northern part of Santa Clara County was becoming less and
less an identifiable community. An increasing number of the
area's workers came from outside the north county, and each
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small town grew so quickly that they all seemed to blend
together. 28 The growth was recognized as being dependent
largely upon defense spending, and it was probably pleasing
to hear the San Francisco branch of Arthur D. Little, Inc.,
predict that funds spent on missiles would not drop off until
at least the seventies. 29 By 1966, the r-!ountain View and
Sunnyvale areas housed over 130 industries, which were
primarily in the electronics field; the United States Naval
Air Station and NASA's Ames Research Laboratories at Moffett
Field together provided about 6,900 jobs in the two co~~un1­
ties. 3D
Palo Alto seemed to be the center of the aerospace
industrial complex. Bright young men from Stanford Univer-
sity, particularly, appeared to have "••• created a city
within a city. Four firms alone--Lockheed, Philco, Varian,
and Hei-'.'1et t-Pacl{ard-- [accounted for] a $104 million payroll
annually. "31 Lockheed Missiles and Space Company, domina t-
ing this growth, was the builder of the Discoverer Satellite
and the Polaris missile series. One out of every fifteen
employees in Santa Clara County, it was suggested, worked
directly for Lockheed. So great was the aerospace impact,
28Mercury, May 19, 1964.
29r.1ercury, June 17, 1964.
30Mercury, January 17, 1966.
31r-1erc ur:z:, January 10, 1966.
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that some people feared the area might become another San
Diego, which had suffered greatly when defense contracts
to that area were cut sharply in the early sixties. Even
a gradual reduction in defense funds entering the valley
was cause for concern, for doubt existed that defense-
oriented firms could successfully make the transition to
production of consumer and industrial products. A report of
the Santa Clara County Planning Department stated that the
II
. . . dependence of the economy on the aerospace indus-
tries, • • • the reliance of the aerospace complex on a
single market, and the dominatior. by a few major firms
[made] the local economy extremely sensitive and vulnerable
to external events and decisions • "32 Even San Mateo
County's growing complex of manufacturers, wholesalers, and
service firms seemed endangered; for they had located there,
in part, as a natural overflow from the northern Santa Clara
aerospace complex. 33
Throughout the rest of the Bay Area, little concern
over defense-oriented industrial growth was shown. The San
Francisco-Oakland metropolitan area was characterized as the
West's financial capital, and defense-opending was largely
ignored as an endangering factor in the economy. It was
noted; however, that the East Bay region--primarily Alameda
323ackground: Santa Clara County, pp. 3-5; see also
Economy of Santa Clara County, p. 12.
33Focus on San Francisco-Oalcland, pp. 45-46.
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County--held a disproportionate share ot' government employ-
ment as a result of its several military esta'l)lishments.
Also the University of California was observed to have
attracted more than its share of federal research funds
\'Jhich, according to the Bank of America, ". • • in turn,
spurred the establishment of nuclear and electronics
research facilities in the area. ,,34 Even so, most of the
area's manufacturing employment was considered, in 1967,
to be other than defense-oriented. The food processing
industry. remained the 1eader. 35
The f'act that defense industries had become impor-
tant, though, was not totally disregarded at all times.
During 1964, the Bay Area felt the effects of cutbacks 1n
spending and recognized that serious repercussions could
result. A drop in activity in the aerospace industry was
obvious to local observers. A county research program in
the Santa Clara Valley prompted less than optimistic com-
ments about the area's economic future. Noting the impor-
tance of the aerospace industry, it was observed in January
34Ibid., p. 15 and 27-28. The impact of military
bases in the area was noted, but it was not considered cru-
cial. Bay Area Council, Guide to Industrial Locations, p. 3,
suggested that the University of California in Berkeley and
the Atomic Energy Commission Laboratory in Livermore were
the nuclei of these East Bay facilities.
35Californla, Department of Employment, Research and
Statistics Section, East Bay Manpower Survcl, Alameda COU1~,
1966-71 (San Francisco, 1967)/ p. B.
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that the region's economy might well be unbalanced. "Such a
circumstance holds the threat of widespread unemployment,"
stated the local newspaper, "••• if defense contracts are
curtailed." vlhile serious cutbacks were not foreseen, the
press added that the fate of much of the area's population
rested with the aerospace industry. Even a temporary
employment loss could still seriously disrupt the area. 36
The pessimism Shown in Janual'y, however, was tempered by
the end of the year, and the aerospace industry was sug-
gested to be merely leveling off. In fact, new contracts
were expected in the future to provide more growth.37
By the end of the sixties, the future of the aero-
space industry was again bright. Plant expansions were once
again announced and employment growth cited. Private
studies again began to forecast conti~ued growth in the
region of defense-oriented industries, for military spending
was expected to continue. 38 Fear over the dependency level
or the state was now becoming more Widespread, however, and
concern was shown over diversification efforts of aerospace
36Mercury, January 15, 1964.
37Mercur~, October 26, 1964, citing a study by the
Bank of America. See also Mercury, October 27, 1964.
38aoldberg and \.,ra1 ter, "Forecasting Employment," p.
15. See also Christian Science Monitor, January 8, 1969;
and Mercury, September 19 and November 8, 1967.
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firms. 39 Ye~ the vital character of the industry to the
economy of California and the Bay Area seemec to remain
relatively unnoticed.
39Engineering Employment, p. 28; and United Cali-
fornia Bank, 1969 Forecast, pp. 43 and 45.
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v. MEASURING THE IMPACT OF DEFENSE
SPENDING ON AREA GROWTH
7
On July 20, 1969, the United States accomplished a
seemingly impossible feat. The combination of money, tech-
nology, and faith had combined together to land a man on the
moon. The accomplishment was remarkable. Its possible
ramifications are yet untold. Interestingly, the crew of
Apollo 11 was not the one originally scheduled for the
flight. Removed from the flight only weeks before the
launch was the all military crew which later made the Apollo
12 flight in November, 1969. Replacing the original crew
was a back-up crew led by a civilian. A major attempt had
been made to illustrate that America's space program was not
tied in \>llth her military efforts. The first man on the
moon was a civilian. Yet the relationship of the two pro-
grams was evident. The expenditures of NASA were certainly
related to defense spending, and 1n California both these
expenditures were large.
The Apollo 11 program cost America approximately $24
billion dollars over a period of eight years, and each state
1n the Union was awarded at least $25,000 of this space
expenditure. Western states received about 44 percent of
the total amount, and California'S share was approximately
90
I
I
91
41 percent of $9.9 billion. An average annual NASA income
of some $1.2 billion for California between 1961 and 1969
made a sizable impact upon the state's way of life. l
It seems evident that defense and space spending
have left a deep imprint on the growth and quality of life
in California. True, since the early 1900's California
had experlenced broad-based industrial growth, as suggested
by an economist for the Bank of Ame~ica; but most marketing
specialists seemed overly concerned with the breadth of
the state economy and overlooked its narrow mainspring--
aircraft and related industries ~hich were qUite dependent
on federal spending. Perhaps it was not mere coincidence
that the state's outburst of growth in the 1940's began at
the same time federal spending was enlarged in the region.
Nor was it chance that postwar reductions in spending and
growth coincided or that since 1950 California had enjoyed
both favorable growth and enlarged federal spending. 2 Evi-
dence certainly indicated that profits were at least as
high in defense as in commercially oriented industries. In
fact, statistics presented by economist Murray L. Weidenbaum
of Washington University Showed the defense industry profits
lChristian Science Monitor, May 28, 1969, p. 7.
2Sterling L. Brubaker, "The Impact of Federal Govern-
ment Activities on California's Growth, 1930-1956" (unpub-
lished Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Berke-
ley, 1959), pp. 8 and 77.
l,n: r .77'17
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considerably higher than those of commercially oriented
industry. The net profits of stockholders' investments
between 1952 and 1955 were 18.6 percent in defense and 13.0
percent in non-defense industries. Of course, this was a
period of overall economic expansion in the nation. Between
1962 and 1965, years when the defense industry suffered some
major contract cancellations and stretCh-outs, the margin
was even greater, being 17.5 percent in defense and 10.6
percent in nondefense industries. 3 If these are reliable
figures, one can easily judge that the growth rate of
California's defense-oriented industries since the Second
World War had added significantly to the state's overall
growth. The high profits no doubt resulted in many residual
economic benefits to the region. James L. Clayton, profes-
sor of history at the University of Utah, has concluded th3t
" . . • it is entirely possible that defense spending will
loom as the single most important economic and demographic
factor in the history of the Far West during the past two
decades.,,4
Measuring the impact of defense-related spending at
3u.s., Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Economics
of Military Procurement, Hearings, before the Subcom~ittee
on-Economy in Government of the Joint Economic Committee,
90th Cong., 2d sess., 1969, Pt. 1, pp. 57-58.
4James L. Clayton, "The Irnpac t of the Cold \>Jar on
the Economies of California and Utah, 1946-1965," Pacific
Historical Review, XXXVI (~ovember, 1967), 473.
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the state level was possible, for data was available. 5 The
direct military impact on the state was rather obvious but
probably overrated. A review of the numbers of military
personnel and civilian employees of the military sectors
of the federal government in California revealed the impact.
During the Second World War as many as 936,000 military
personnel were in the state; then after a decline in the
late 1940's to 160,000, the number grew during the Korean
conflict and leveled off at slightly over 330,000 through
the 1950's (Table 15). In 1960 the number of personnel had
dropped off to around 304,000. Three years later, in 1963,
the number had increased again to about 333,000. Civilian
employees of the military sectors of federal employment in
Cal ifornia had added an a verage of another 150, 000 employees
to the total military employment of the state since World
War Tvlo. Evidence of the impact of these numbers in simple
economic terms was seen in the estimated payrolls of these
military and civilian personnel (Table 16). In 1962, for
example, the some 317,000 military personnel in California
recelved approximately $1.3 billion in pay and allowances.
When one added civilian employment of the military sectors
in California, the figures increased sUbstantially--in 1962,
5References to impact on the state will be made
throughout this chapter. Ibid., pp. 449-73, pas~lm, presents
the most complete overall analysis of the historlcal impact
of defense spending on California's economy seen by this
writer. Yet, Clayton's work is by no means definitive.
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TABLE 15
CALIFORNIA MILITARY STRENGTH AND FEDERAL
CIVILIAN EMPLOYMENT
(In thousands)
Civilian
Year Military Military NACA!NASA Tota1* Total
191W 51 20 -- 20.0 71.0
1941 188 39 -- 39.0 227.0
1942 438 120 -- 120.0 558.0
1943 936 200 -- 200.0 1136.0
1944 862 230 -- 230.0 1092.0
1945 821 254 -- 254.0 1075.0
1946 261 131 .8 131.8 392.8
1947 160 111 1.0 112.0 272.0
1948 169 125 1.0 126.0 295.0
1949 176 104 1.2 105.2 281.2
1950 171 136 1.3 137.3 308.3
1951 376 177 1.4 178.4 554.4
1952 444 184 1.4 185.4 629.4
1953 420 170 1.4 171.4 591.4
1954 31~0 152 1.5 153.5 493.5
1955 336 153 1.6 154.6 490.6
1956 334 152 1.7 153.7 487.7
1957 329 -- -- 151.5 480.5
1958 331 -- -- 155.2 486.2
1959 321 -- -- 157.5 478.5
1960 309 -- -- 158.3 467.3
1961 304 -- -- 163.0 467.0
1962 317 -- -- 166.0 483.0
1963 333 -- -- 164.8 49
r
( • 8
1964 320 -- -- 165.0 485.0
1965 309 -- -- 167.4 J~76. 4
*1957-1965 estimated by author from current popula-
tion reports.
Sources: Compiled from Robert K. Arn01d~ et al., TheCalifornia Economy, 19J~7-198Q (Henlo Park,
California: Stanford Research Institute, 196o)~
Table XII-3~ p. 365; Sterling L. Brubaker, "The
Impact of Federal Government Activities on
California's Economic GrO\~thJ 1930-1956"
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(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation~ University of
California, Berkeley, 1959), PP. 336-37; Bank
of America, Economics Department, Significance
of Military Installations for California's
Economic Growth, 1930-1952, b¥ Sterling L.
Brubaker (San Prancisco, 1955), Table 5, p. 10;
U.S., Department of Commerce, Bureau of the
Census, Current Population Reports: Ponu1ation
Estimates, Serles P-25, Nos. 229 and 324
fWashington, D.C.: Government Printing Office,
January 20 and May 22, 1966), pp. 4-7 and 12-14.
by $975 million. Thus the combined civilian and military
payrolls reached $2.3 million--perhaps 4.7 percent of the
total personal income of the state. 6 This percentage was
not large and probably not very significant in terms of the
overall state economy. The military would probably not be
a large factor in future state gro"'Jth, for no recurrence of
the growth seen during ~orld War Two was in the foreseeable
future. Conversely, no sudden decline in the military would
6U•S ., Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Background
~rial 8n Economic Aspects of Militar~?procureme~~nQ
Supp1l, 80th Cong., 1st sess., March, 1903, pp. 4-5, presents
figures of considerable variance for 1962 to those shown in
Table 16, this paper. Military pay and allowances in the
state are shown to be $842,670,000 and ciVilian employee pay-
rolls to be $866,915,000--a total of $1,709,585,000. The
discrepancy of some $574 million between these sources is
Significant; however, the Background Material data is only
presented for one year. According to Bank of America,
Economics Department, Significance of Military Installations
for California's Economic Growth, 1930-1952, by Sterling L.
Brubal-:er (San l'rancisco, 1955), p. 19, the addition of
indirect effects of greater civilian employment and business
opportunities as a result of the presence of military in-
stallations and personnel might substantially raise the
percentage of personal income resulting from diI'ect military
involvement in the state.
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TABLE 16
ESTIMATED ANNUAL DEPARTME~T OF DEFENSE MILITARY
AND CIVILIAN PAYROLLS IN CALIFORNIA AS A
PERCENTAGE OF PERSONAL INCO~lli~ 1946-1965
(In millions of dollars)
Department of Defense .J::) Column A
A Personal as a %of
Year Military Civilian Total Income Column B
191{6 830 358 1,188 16,048 7.4
1947 464 362 826 16,637 4.9
1948 453 364 817 17,621 4.6
1949 463 401 864 17,866 4.8
1950 596 414 1,010 19,760 5.1
1951 1,016 654 1,670 22,740 7.3
1952 1,325 740 2,065 25,196 8.2
1953 1,274 724 1,998 26,984 7.4
1954 1,113 650 1,743 27,661 6.3
1955 1,109 721 1,830 30,356 6.0
1956 1,130 751 1,881 33,154 5.7
1957 1,112 764 1,876 35,468 5.3
1958 1,152 804 1,956 37,339 5.2
1959 1,193 837 2,030 110,91!4 1~. 9
1960 1,220 862 2,082 42,910 4.8
1961 1,241 922 2,163 45,608 4.7
1962 1,309 975 2,284 }~8, 980 4.7
1963 1,351 1,012 2 1 363 52,431 4.5
1964 1,427 1,071 2,498 56,264 4.4
1965 1,482 1,047 2,529 59,476 4.3
Total 21,260 14,433 35,693 673,454 5.3
Source: Calculated from James L. Clayton, "rrhe Impact
of the Cold War on the Economies of California
and Utah, 1946-1965," Pacific Historical ReView,
XXXVI (November, 1967), Tables I and II, pp.
455-56.
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likely occur in the near future.7 The San Francisco Bay
Area share of this impact ~IaS not extremely large, and in
any case it would not give much of an indication of the
area's defense industry dependency. Probably the direct
impact of the military was relatively minor compared to the
impact of defense-related spending to the private sector of
the state and Bay Area economies.
According to a State Assembly study, almost two-
fifths of the nation's defense-space work was done in five
major locations in California: the Los Angeles-Long Beach,
Sacramento, San Bernardino-Riverside-Ontario, San Diego, and
San Jose metropolitan areas. The San Francisco-Oakland
metropolitan area was considered a sixth area of concentra-
tion. 8 Each one of these areas, of course, had some influ-
ence on the other areas; therefore it became much more
difficult to isolate and measure the impact on local areas.
For example, a change in defense spending in the Los Angeles-
Long Beach area would have obvious effects on the economy of
that area, but it would also influence the economic life
elsewhere in the state. "Through trading relations With
7Bank of America, Significance of Military Insta11a-
ti0rl1!, p. 24, suggests that this was also true in 1955.
8California, Assembly, Interim Committee on Ways and
Means, J'he }32ac t of Fe~eral ~pending in Cali ~ornia _. R8port
of the SUbcommittee on ~conomlc Development of the Interim
Committee on Ways and Means, 1965, p. 12 (Hereinafter
referred to as Impact of Federal Spending in California).
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other regions of the State," according to Charles roT.
Tiebout, "they too will feel the impact of the change in
defense spending. Thus, such a change will affect employ_
ment in San Francisco-Oakland, in the rest of the State,
and, in turn will have some further repercussions upon
employment in Los Angeles itself.,,9
Exactly what the impact was on any certain metro_
politan location was most difficult to determine. There
were indications of impact, but specific statistical eVi-
dence was not readily available. It was generally agreed
that both southern and northern California had their share
of defense industries; and, since the former had the most
Visible defense complex, the San Francisco bay region was
generally ignored. Yet; according to the Federal Reserve
Bank in San Francisco, northern California was stronger
in defense manufacturing during the late fifties than was
the southern half of the state. lO Nonetheless, the Bay
Area's defense establishment was for some reason not as
Visible as that of the southland. Despite news articles
citing that the Lockheed Corporation did some 35 percent
of its business in the bay regionll and that approximately
9Markets for California Products, p. 8.
lO"Five Periods of Growth, tt Federal Reserve Bank of
San Francisco: Monthly Review, December, 1965, p. 220.
llMercury, December 3, 1966.
::::------~-------------------------------
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$S18 million annually in defense contracts entered the
area,12 studies of the local economy's future rarely made
assumptions about defense spending. A recent report by the
Stanford Research Institute revealed that only rive of
twenty-seven Bay Area economic projection studies made any
such assumptions. Of these five, three assumed continued
high levels of defense spending in the region, one assumed
a reduction in constant dollars, and the last assumed both
high and low spending in two different projections. 13 Yet
the Bay Area, more specifically the San Jose SMSA, produced
more than half the nation's integrated circuits--an item
vital to computers, missiles, and space satellites--and was
ranked third In aerospace employment in the state behind
southern Califcrnia comp1exes. 14 Furthermore, the Bay Area
was the headquarters for the San Francisco Defense Contract
Administration Services Region. Some 865 military and
civilian personnel with offices in Burlingame ran the agency
which administered contracts for northern California, Utah,
Montana, Idaho, Washington, Oregon, Alaska, Hawaii, and most
of Nevada. IS Additionally, 17 of the state's 78 special
12News, November 7, 1968.
13Maurice I. Gershenson, Evaluation of Bay Area
EConomic Studies: High] ights and Summar~y (Nenlo Park, Cali-
fornia: Stanford Research Institute, 1968), p. 14.
l4Economy of Santa Clara County, pp. 17 and 20; and
~, March 12, 1968.
lSMercury, December 1, 1965.
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federal agents for small business and labor surplus areas
who assisted in obtaining contracts were located in the Bay
Area. 16 C t 1 I h der any, someone a seen that the bay region
had a large defense-space complex.
There were so~e studies which had probed the degree
of the defense-dependency of specific areas. George A.
Steiner, for example, completed an excellent study in 1961
concerning the southern California economy's relation to the
defense industry, and Charles M. Tlebout conducted a survey
of the Los Angeles area's defense dependency in 1964. 17 Yet
no studies were comprehensive, and these were two of the
best. The real problem was that information was not readily
available, and some was not available at all. According to
one federal government committee the Department of Defense
was gathering new information but much remained to be done. lS
One economist had gone into lengthy discussion of this
16U•S., Department of Defense, Small Business and
Labor Surplus Area Specialists Desi~nated to Help the
Businessman {Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office,
196~n, passim.
17southern California CED Associates, National
Defense and Southern Ca.lifornia, 1961-1970, by George A.
Steiner (Los Angeles: Southern California CED Associ.ates,
December, 1961); and Richard S. Peterson and Charles r·l.
Tiebout, "Measuring the Impact of Regional Defense-Space
Expenditures, II The Review of Economics and Statistics, XLVI
(November, 1964), 421-26. Perhaps other studies are also
out, but they were not found by the author.
l8U.S., President's Committee on the Economic Impact
of Defense and Disarmament, R~rt (WaSl'l.ington, D.?: Goyc:n-
ment Printing Office, July, 19b5); pp. 5r-67, paSS1.Til (Here~n­
after referred to as President's Committee, Reporf):
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problem and noted that information concerning defense-
oriented metropolitan areas was being collected by the
Department of Defense and the Census Bureau, but this data
was usually not for public use. According to E. J.
Mosbaek, it was "••• usually too sensitive for re1ease."l9
Murray L. Weidenbaum, a well known national economist, also
agreed tbat there was an unfortunate lack of data; however,
he pointed out that the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
and other government departments were beginning to release
information. 20 Nonetheless, no reasonable criteria for
defining the defense-dependency of an area had been found,
and the data to establish such a criteria was either not
yet available or collected. Therefore, one could only
estimate dependency and assume that these estimates would
be substantiated in the future.
There are many approaches one might follow in
measurir~ the impact of defense spending in a region. The
impact of a certain type of procurement, such as that for
Research and Development, may be investigated. The volume
of prime or initial contracts to an area may be analyzed.
The quantity of subcontracts (contracts from one company
19E J l'vIosbaek, "Information on the Impact of
.. • rr
Reductions in Defense Expenditures on the Economy, The
Quarter~v Review of Economics and Business, V (Fall, 1965),
--- '>51 and 60.
20"Measurements of the Economic Impact of Defense
and Space Programs," Jhe American Jou~nal of Economics and
§ocioloe:..l., XXV (October, 196b), 1~15-2b, 'pas3i~.
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to another to work on a prime contract held by the first
company) entering a region's industrial firm~ might be
calculated and analyzed. The impact of procurement on
industrial groups or specific industries might be studied,
or the impact of procurement on the incomes of specific
companies may be analyzed. Using data gathered from con-
tract awards, further analysis may be made concerning the
exogenous income and the employment of a region. From such
analysis perhaps reasonably sound estimates may be made
concernipg defense impact and dependency.
Since the outbreak of the Korean War the defense
bUdget of the United States had averaged about $42.6 billion
per year, actual calendar year expenditures averaged
slightly more per year at $42.9 billion, and national
security expenditures, including both prirr.ary defense and
space expenditures, averaged approximately $53.0 billion
per year. 2l Approximately 8.6 percent of the annual defense
2lCa1cu1ated from infra, Table D, Appendix I, p. 192.
Averages do not include data for 1950, as the Korean War
expenditures did not become important until well into that
year. The average for national security expenditures was
calculated from columns II and III of the referenced table.
The variance of data between columns II, III, and IV is
probably attributable to rounding off of figures by the
original compilers. The variance between column I data and
that of the other columns is unclear. Apparently the Bureau
of the Census had a different criteria for national security
expenditures; however, exactly what made up this criteria
was not spelled out 1n the sources consulted by the author.
W1th the e:~ceptlon of da ta for 1963, 1964, and 1965 whiCh is
not drawn from the Bureau of the Census the variance is large
only in 1951 and 1954. Otherwise, the inconsistencies are
rela~lvely small and not considered of consequence.
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expenditure (Department of Defense) had gone into the
research, development, test, and evaluation p~ogram (RDT &
E or R&D). This equaled an average of about $3.6 billion
of annual defense expenditures. Of course, much of the
annual defense spending went toward payrolls and allowances,
maintenance and operations, military assistance, and other
miscellaneous programs. The remainder of the nation's
defense expenditures went into military procurement and
R & D--approximately $16.8 billion (average) per year since
1951,22 ~r 39.1 percent of the $42.9 average annual Depart-
ment of Defense (DOD) expenditures. It was this procurement
figure which most directly affected American manUfacturing
industry.23 Of the procurement average of $16.8 billion,
21. 4 percent went to R&D. Hence, expenditures for re-
search, development, testing, and evaluation of new weapons,
equipment, and other military activities constituted a
sizeable portion of the funds directly affecting the coun-
try's manufacturing industries.
R&D expenditures have had an extensive impact on
California in relation to other areas of the nation. From
1961 to 1965, a total of slightly over $11.2 billion in
22Ca1cu1ated from infra, Table E, AppendiX I, p. 193·
23Natura11y, expenditures for food, clothing, and
perhaps replacement parts would be included in the a~ount
of the defense budget committed to operations and malnten-
ance, and this, too, affects many of the nation's industrial
groups.
lOJ~
R &: D contracts \OlaS gi \'en to firms in California. The
average for this five year period of $2.2 billion was not
met in 1965 when contracts to the state totaled about $1.5
billion; however, by 1967 the figure had increased to just
under $2.0 billion. While national R&D expenditures
rerr,ained relatively steady at about $6.4 billion per year,
California fir.:ns experienced some fluctuation in the annual
dollar value of contracts received. Nonetheless, California
managed since 1961 to obtain an average of about 32.8 per-
cent of the total R&D contracts awarded by DOD. These
awards would be equal in dollar value to about 3.7 percent
of the personal income of California. Table 17, below,
indicated the R&D contracts awarded California since 1961.
In 1963, according to a study aponsored by the
Stanford Research Institute, there were five areas in the
United States that could be considered major defense R&D
complexes. These complexes shared a total of 58.1 percent
of the prime R&D contract awards during that year. Of the
five complexes, California's two major urban areas led the
other areas which were located on the eastern seaboard. The
"Southern California Complex" received 26.8 percent of the
tota13wards, the "San Francisco-Bay Area" received 12.4
percent, the "New York City-Northern NeH Jersey" complex
received 8.4 oercent, and the "Boston--centered" and
"Washington, D.C.--centered" complexes each received less
than 6.0 percent. First and second tier subcontracts
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TABLE 17
VALUE OF R&D CONTRACTS TO CALIFORNIA
AND THE NATION, 1961-1967
(In millions of dollars)
%to Awards
National
Personal as a %of'Cali- Cali- Income PersonalYear Total fornia fornia (State) Income
1961 $6,131 $2,492 40.6 $45,608 5.51962 6,319 2,438 38.5 48,980 5.01963 6,376 2,567 40.2 52,431 4.91964 7,021 2,258 32.1 56,264 4.0
1965 6,236 1,502 24.0 59,476 2.51966 6,259 1,683 26.8 65,156 2.6
1967 6,700 1,989 29.7 69,932 2.8
Sources: U.S., Congress, Joint Economic Committee,
Economic Effect of Vietnam SFending, Hearln~s,
before the Joint Economic Committee, 90th~
Cong., 1st sess., 1967, II, pp. 480, 1004,
1007, 1010, and 1016; and James L. Clayton,
"The Impact of the Cold War on the Economies
of California and Utah, 1946-1965," Pacific
Hts torical Revie,'l, XXXVI (November .• 196·(),
Table II, p. 456. California, Department of
Finance, California Statistical Abstract, 1969
(Sacramento, 1969), Table D-j, p. 52.
studied (in this instance on NASA prime contracts) indicated
the same general geographic pattern as was found at the
prime contract level. 24 For example, a survey of t\'leJ. ve
aerospace companies receiving prime contracts from NASA gave
34.3 percent of their material procurement subcontracts to
2l~Albert Shapero, Richard P. Howell, and James R.
Tombaugh, An Explorator~l Study of the St:ructure anel Dynamics
of the R &: D Industry Ulenlo Park, California: Stanford
Research Institute, 1964), p. 25.
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the two California complexes. 25 Further exploring this
subject, Albert Shapero and others found that two unnamed
San Francisco firms did 58 and 71 percent of their procure-
ment in the Pacific Coast region. 69.5 percent of their
procurement was subcontracted within California. One of
the two firms procured materials totaling 41 percent of its
dollar sales in the San Francisco Bay Area, 15 percent in
the Southern California complex, 8 percent in Boston,
16 percent in the New York-New Jersey area, and less than
.05 percent in the Washington, D.C. area. Shapero's evi-
dence led him to believe that if R&D companies were in
the R&D complex area, a large percentage of procurement
would be from that area. 26 Another study sponsored by the
Stanford Research Institute produced statistics which seemed
to confirm Shapero's conclusion. According to this study,
Bay Area firms conducted 41.3 percent of their material pro-
curement within the Bay Area. 27 While information as to
the exact dollar value of R&D contracts given the Bay Area
25Ibid., pp. 78 and 82.
26Albert Shapero, Richard P. Howell, and James R.
Tombaugh, The Structure and Dynamics of the Defense R&D
Industry: The Los Angeles and Boston Complexes (Menlo Park,
California: Stanford Research Institute, 1965), pp. 69-71
and 75-76.
27Richard P. Howell, William N. Breswick, and
Ernest D. Wenrick, Economic Impact of Defense R & ~
Expenditures: In Terms of Value Added and Employment
"(r1enlo Park, California:sta:1ford Research rnsti tute, 1966) J
p. 11.
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is still undisclosed~ one can estimate that the region
received roughly $459 million in 1963 (12.4% of 58.1% of
the national total R&D contracts).
The real impact of this $459 million~ however~ was
not easily computed. Not all of it was paid in wages and
salaries~ nor was it all put in procurement of materials
either within or outside the Bay Area. Shapero concluded
that of three companies~ which were analyzed over a six
year period (1957-1962)~ 45.2 percent of their sales dollar
went to material procurement. Of the twelve aerospace
companies mentioned above~ the average percentage of sales
dollar spent for materials was 45.8 in 1955 and 44.5 in
1961..Approximately 37.6 percent of the average 1961 sales
dollar of these companies went into wages and salaries.
Shapero suggested that when these figures were applied to
first and second tier sUbcontract levels, a minimum of 61.7
percent of the defense R&D prime contract dollar could be
estimated as being spent for wages and salaries. 28 Using
these conclusions, one could estimate the dollar impact of
the R&D prime contracts entering the Bay Area. If 37.6
percent of the $459 million in prime awards in 1963 went
28Shapero~ Howell~ and Tombaugh, Exploratory Stud~,
Pp. 30 and 76. The total labor portion of the R&D prime
contract dollar was derived from the following equation:
Labor portion of dollar (.617) = (.376) - (.376)(.445) -
(.376) (.445)( .445). Note that the 1961 figure for expendi-
tures for material has been used.
r ssrrrmrr·mrnrnrr fer",e'
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into payment of wages and salaries in the Bay Area, then
approximately $172 million became a part of the personal
income of Bay Area residents. Furthermore, if it was
assumed that about 40 percent or $81 million of the 44.5
percent of prime contracts to the Bay Area which were sub-
contracted went to firms within the Bay Area, one must add
about $30 million more in wages and salaries paid at the
first tier subcontract level within the Bay Area and
approximately $14 million more in wages and salaries paid
at the second tier. Thus, roughly $216 million of the
$459 million originally awarded to Bay Area firms became a
part of the region's personal income in 1963. About 1.6
percent of the total personal income of the region ($12.7
billion) came from defense R&D prime contracts. This
equals approximately $58 per capita--l.7 percent of the
per capita personal income of $3,449 and 2.2 percent of
the $2,656 per capita net buying power. This, of course,
does not take into consideration the multiplier effect of
the $216 million. This aspect of impact, which indicated
that R&D income made up about 4.9 percent of Bay Area
personal income and over one-half of total Bay Area defense
income, will be considered below (infra, pp. 150-56).
The R&D industry has had many effects on the com-
munities 1n which it was concentrated, some economic in
nature and others social and political. Naturally, the
industry created a demand for housing, services, and
.
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community facilities. The effect of in-migration of popula-
tion and, sUbsequently, its effect on local c~~sumer
spending was felt. Of course, these were effects on the
community that would result from any industry, but it was
important to consider this impact. The industry certainly
made a significant impact on wages and salaries, taxes, and
use of utilities--a sizable impact according to a study of
the R&D industry in Santa Clara County. However, the
percent of the industry's income which found its way to
retail s~ores and everyday service establishments may not
have been as large. 29 There was Borne controversy as to the
importance of local markets in supplying the R&D industry
with goods and services, yet one of the Stanford Research
Institute studies suggested this was significant. Purchases
of goods and services were extensive, including blueprint
services, car rentals, catering services, office furniture,
and hotel and restaurant services. 30 It has already been
noted that there was a tendency for R&D firms within a
community to supply each other with goods and services. A
further effect of the industry was in its influence upon the
community's educational system. A direct impact was made
29Info Commentary, p. 15.
30Shapero, Howell, and Tombaugh, Explorat~ry Stud~,
p. 101. Info Commentary, p. 15, presents a contrary view,
stating that local markets are inconsequential in supplying
the industry with goods and services.
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on the size of graduate school facilities, as the industry
provided both part-time faculty and students ~s well as
laboratory facilities and computer services. There was also
a tendency to improve local primary and secondary schools
and curricula through the participation of the predominantly
white-collar R&D employees in local school affairs. 3l
The effects of the industry, then, were widespread. Obvi-
ously, they did not seem to be detrimental to the community,
but few of the effects were a result of the type of work
done in the defense R&D industry. In fact, it is most
important to note that there may have been little direct
benefit from defense R&D on the civilian economy or
quality of life. On the other hand, if the dollars for
basic science research provided by the military had not been
available, they might not have come from any other source.
Yet this contention is hypothetical.
Another step in analyzing the impact of defense
spending in an area was to calculate the value of prime
contracts let to the area by the Department of Defense and
other agencies. Data, however, is still not as complete as
one would desire. Generally, only procurement contracts of
$10,000 or more were included in prime contract data. The
contr~ct values were recorded in the year the award was
3l Shapero, Howell, and Tombaugh, Exploratory StUdy,
PP. 103-104.
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made, yet spending was frequently spread over several
years. 32 Murray Weidenbaum discussed this i~ recent testi-
mony before Congress, showing the relationship of active
Air Force expenditures to the "new obligational authority"
received annually for this department. Table 18 illustrates
the percentage of the Air Force "new obligational authori t~y"
expended over a five year period for the years 1951, 1952,
and 1953. The difficulties in estilllating impact suggested
by this time lag in actual expenditures are obvious. There
were als~ problems in attaching specific awards to the plant
in which the work was actually to be performed. Since most
companies receiving awards were large and sometimes had
plants in several. locations, this vias not a minor problem.
Finally" sub-contracting was not considered at all when
dealing with prime contract data. This was a major problem
as one could not judge effectively the amount of the award
remaining within the recipient company.33
California had been the leading recipient of prime
32Mosbaek, "Reductions in Defense Expenditures,"
p. 64" citing observations by economist Robert A. Solo.
33George Jensen, "Information on the Impact of
Defense Expenditures: A Comment," Quarterly Review of
Economics and Business" VI (Fall" 1966)" 79-80. Clayton,
"Impact of the Cold \-iar" II p. 453, suggests" however, that
use of prime contract data "••• is a generally accurate
and widely acceptable approach--particularly over a series
of years." In analyzing iiTipact at the state or larger
regional level this may be somewhat true, but Clayton's
jUdgment can be accepted for an analysis of a smaller geo-
graphic area only with caution.
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TABLE 18
RELATIONSHIP OF ACTUAL EXPENDITURES TO NEVI OBLIGATIONAL
AUTHORITY, USAF, FISCAL YEARS 1951-1953
Percent Expended
NOA 1st Year 2nd Year 3rd Year 4th Year 5th Year
1951 25 40 28 6 1
1952 23 36 28 9 2
1953 29 35 30 8 3
Average 26 37 25 8 2
Source: U.S., Congress, Joint Economic Committee,
Economic Effect of Vietnam Spending, Hearing~,
before the Joint Economic Committee, 90th Cong.,
1st ness., 1967, II, p. 613.
awards during most of the years since the Korean War.
Between 1951 and 1965 the state received an annual average
of $4,478,367,000 in prime contracts from the DOD, approxi-
mately 20.6 percent of the total annual awards let in the
nation. When the contracts awards let by NASA were con-
sidered during the years since 1960 when data became avail-
able, the average jumped to $5,523,789,000 from 1961 to
1965. During this period about 45.9 percent of NASA's total
prime contracts went to California eaclJ year. Table 19
gives the annual totals for California during these years.
An interesting study by the United States Commerce Depart-
ment, dealing with total federal procurement in California,
indicated that $10,374 million in prime contracts were
awarded the state in 1963. By breaking this total into
------------
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TABLE 19
CALIFORNIA SHARE OF U.S. DEFENSE-SPACE CONTRACTS, 1951-1967
(Thousands of dollars)
Dollar Awards Percent of U.S. *
iscal
Year DOD NASA Total DOD NASA Total
1951 $3,897,915 --- $3,897,915 13.2 --- 13.2
1952 4,907,845 --- 4,907,81+5 12.8 --- 12.8
1953 4,161,835 --- 4,161,835 15.4 --- 15.4
1954 2,761,574 --- 2,761,574 26.0 --- 26.0-
1955 2,813,676 --- 2,813,676 20.1 --- 20.1
1956 3,311,203
---
3,311,203 20.1
---
20.1
1957 3,381,927 --- 3,381,927 18.8 --- 18.8
1958 4,457,666 --- 4,457,666 21.4 --- 21.4
1959 5,282,659 --- 5,282,659 24.0 --- 24.0
1960 4,839,252 --- 4,839,252 23.7 --- 23.7
1961 5,276,760 $ 148,713 5,1+25,473 23.9 39.1 24.1
1962 5,993,21+4 441,179 6, It 34,423 23.9 47.0 24.8
1963 5,835,670 1,098,486 6,934,156 23.1 50.4 25.3
1964 5,100,650 1,663,071 6,763,72) 21.0 47.6 211.2
1965 5,153,639 1,875,663 7,029,302 22.1 45.7 25.7
1966 5,813,078 1,808,100 rr,621,178 18.3 43.8 21.3
1967 6,688,812 1,562,968 8,251,819 17.9 39.6 20.0
F
*Percent of awards allocated by states.
Sources: California, Governor, Economic Report of
the Governor, 1968 (Sacramento, 19bb),
Table 10, p. 30. See also California,
Department of Finance, California Statis-
tical Abstract, 1968 (Sacramento, 1968),
Tables I-I and 1-4, pp. 135-36; California,
Department of Finance, State Office of
Planning, California State Development
Plan Program: Progress Report and 0ummarz
Interpretations of Phase I Studies (Sacra-
mento, February, 19b,), p. 22; and U. S. ,
Congress, Joint Economic Committee,
Economic Effect of Vietnam Spendirog, Hear-
ings, before the Joint Economic Committee,
90th Cong., 1st sess., 1967, II, pp. 894
and 907-908.
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industrial sectors, the study estimated that $2,997 million
went into ordnance, $621 million into electronics, $2,094
million into aircraft and parts, $1,461 million into trade
industries, $734 million into business and R&D services,
and $704 million into personal services. However, when
totaled, the sum did not match the study's earlier figure
for national procurement in the state. 34 Explanations
were unfortunately vague in the study, yet the study was
illustrative of the type of calculations made with prime
contract data. One did not need to rely only on state or
regional totals.
Since 1960, a research program has been sponsored
variously by the Regional Science Research Institute at
the University of Pennsylvania and World Friends Resear~h
Center to develop some understanding of the industrial and
local to regional impact of prime contract awards. 35 The
34U.S., Department of Commerce, Economic Development
Administration, Report of the Independent Study Board on the
Re ional Effects-C>r Government Procurement and Related Poli-
cies Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, December,
1957), pp. 15 and 23 (Hereinafter referred to as Regional
Effects of Government Procurement).
35dalter Isard and James Ganschovl} Awards of Prime
Military Contracts by Coun~, State, and Metropoli.tan Area
of the United States, Fiscal Year 1960 (Philadelphia:
Regional Science Research Institute, University of Pennsyl-
vania, 1960); Walter Isard and Gerald J. Karaska, Unclassi-
fied Defense Contracts: Awards by Count~, State, and
Metropolitan Area of the United States, Fiscal Year 1962
tphiladelphia: World Friends Re~earch Center, Inc., JL902);
and Walter Isard and Gerald J. Karaska, Unclassified Defense
and Space Contracts: Awards by County, State, and Metropolitan
-a
I
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data collected by those involved was most helpful in
determining impact, but it was not consistent with other
data nor complete in all respects. Prime contract awards
of $10,000 or more were, as in other studies, used in part
of the calculations for this research program, while data
for a large part of the study utilized unclassified con-
tracts only which did not include all prime contracts.
Furthermore, only net contract awards were considered; i.e.,
minus contract cancellations. DOD and NASA contracts were
separated, the latter being dealt with only for the year
1964. Finally, in addition to ranking states, metropolitan
areas, and counties, awards were broken do....m by four digit
standard industrial code (SIC) classifications. For
example, under the SIC system, the code number 3721 would
indicate "guided missiles" industry and SIC 7399 \'lould
signify "commercial research" industry.36
Using the data collected for the fiscal years 1960,
1962, and 1964, one could begin to judge the impact of
derense spending upon the Bay Area. For example, in FY 1960,
approximately $1,114,370,000 in prime contract awards from
Area of the United States, Fiscal Year 1964 (Philadelphia:
\oJorld Friends Research Center, Inc., 1965) (Hereinafter each
report will be referred to as Isard, [With appropriate
year] ).
36Fuller explanation of research considerations are
found in Isard, 1960, pp. 1-2; and in Isard, 1962 and 1964,
pp. 1-5, passim.-- -- --
1
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DOD entered the Bay Area--22.8 percent of the total awards
to the state. The two SMSA's making up the b~y region--
San Francisco-Oakland and San Jose--were ranked fifteenth
and fourth respectively in value of contracts received
among the nation's SMSA's. Together they acquired 5.3
percent of total DOD awards for FY 1960. While the counties
in the area were almost all in the top 150 counties in the
nation receiving awards, none could top Santa Clara County
(the San Jose SMSA) which received almost $800 million in
awards--3.69 percent of the national counties. The Bay
Area thus received about $1,330 per capita in contracts in
FY 1960, with Santa Clara County accounting for $1,208 per
capita. Thus, the per capita awards amounted to abo~t
44 percent of a per capita perso~al income of about $2,970
in the Bay Area, and approximately 44 percent of a per
capita personal income of about $2,690 in Santa Clara
County. 37 As seen in Table 20, data for 1962 and 1964
differed radically from that for 1960, for the latter years
included only figures for unclassified contracts. Nonethe-
less, the figures were sizeable and gave some indication of
impact. Finally, Table A, Appendix IV, gives Bay Area
awards by two digit SIC for the same years. The implications
37Calculated from supra, Table 12, p. 58; infra,
Table 20, p. 117; and Abstr3ct, 1968, p. 55. The percentages
of net buying power were someWhat higher: 53 percent of
the Bay Area's $2,514 per capita net buying power and 53
percent of Santa Clara County's $2,300 per capita net buying
power.
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TABLE 20
DEPAHTMENT OF DEFENSE PRIME AND UNCLASSIFIED CONTRACT AWARDS TO CALIFORNIA AND THE BAY AREA~
FISCAL YEARS 1960~ 1962~ AND 1964
Year~ Rank in Cate~Qry, a~d Perce~t of National Awards
Category 19bO (Pr:!.mes) Hank % 1~b2 (Unclass.) Rank % 19b4 (Unclass.) Rank %
California .
·
$4~874,583,OOO --- --- $1~523,291~000 2 23.94 $2,536,281,000 1 20.86
San Francisco-
Oakland SMSA 338,319,000 15 1.61 172,837,000 9 1. 72 226,129,000 11 1.86
* 775,951,000 4 3.69 18 395,328,000San Jose SMSA 123,509,000 1. 23 5 3.22
Counties:
Alameda •
· ·
84,370,000 49 --- 18,539,000 92 .18 83,779,000 33 .68
Cont:'a Costa --- --- --- --- --- --- 11,783,000 118 .09
r>1arln • . •
·
15,841,000 139 --- --- --- --- --- ---
San I1'rancisco 84,317,000 50 --- 116,98 J-l-, 000 22 1.16 98,811,000 28 .81
San Mateo •
·
50,864,000 73 --- 30,879,000 70 .30 28,813,000 72 .23
Solano •
·
• 15,524,000 142 --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
-
*Equivalent to Santa Clara County.
Sources: Walter Isard and James Ganschow, Awards of Prime Militar Contracts by Count~, State, and
Metropolitan Area of the United States, Fiscal Year 19 0 Philadelphia: Regional ~cience
Research Institute, University of Pennsylvania, 196o)~ Tables 1-3, pp. 5, 9, and 14-15;
Walter Isard and Gerald J. Karaska~ Unclas3ifled Defense Contracts: Awards by County,
State and Metropolitan Area of the United ~tates, Piscal Year 1962 (Philadelphia: World
Friends Research Center, Inc., 19 2 , Tables 1, and 1~-5, pp. 4, 10, and 14-15; and Walter
rsard and Gerald J. Karaska, Unclassified Defense and Space Contracts: Awards by County,
State, and Metropolitan Area of the United States, Fiscal Year 1964 (Philadelphia:
World Friends Research Center, Inc., 19D5)~ ~~blcs 1, 3, and 5-6, pp. 4, 7, 12 and
14-16. '
I-'
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of these statistics will be dealt with below.
Prime contract data was the basic date available in
estir~ting defense impact, yet it was by no means comprehen-
sive. One of the most difficult areas in judging impact
was in the subcontract field. The Subcommittee on Economic
Development of the California Assembly Interim Committee
on Ways and Means pointed out, in 1965, that subcontracts
from California going to out-of-state firms were largely
offset by the volume of subcontracts won by firms in the
state from out-of-state prime contractors. California's
governor, Ronald Reagan, later sugge3ted that SUbcontracting
simply did not affect the overall volume of prime awards
awarded in the state. 38 If such was the case, then sub-
ccntract studies directed at the state level would be of
limited value. 39 Yet the subcontracting within a state may
well have been significant for the final impact of prime
contracts on certain areas in the state.
Conclusions about the final impact of prime awards
after SUbcontracting were at best educated guesses. E.D.
Carter, the Corporate Director of Martin Company--a leading
aerospace firm--has generalized that about 50 percent of
prime contracts were subcontracted. For example, in FY 1960,
38Impact of Federal Spending in California, p. 10j
and Report of the Governor, 1968, p. 20.
39No comprehensive studies dealing with subcontracting
were available to the author. Because of the difficulty in
obtaining such data from individual companies, few studies
seem to exist.
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Martin Company concluded 182,000 purchase transactions,
dealing with around 9,700 suppliers; this involved 43 per-
cent of the firm's total sales for that period. 40 In a
study of twelve NASA prime contractors presented before
hearings of the Senate Select Committee on Small Business
in 1964~ the data revealed would seem to substantiate
Carter's information. Between July 1 and December 31, 1963,
41.5 percent of the prime contracts received by the companies
studied were subcontracted. During a longer period, Janu-
ary 1, 1962 to December 31, 1963, the percentage subcontracted
totaled 43.6 of the prime contracts. 41 In a study of the
defense market between 1955 and 1964, William L. Baldwin
observed that DOD did not make available comprehensive
information concerning sUbcontracting firms of prime con-
tractors, so accuracy was difficult in judging the sub-
contract impact. Baldwin's research did reveal, however,
that approximately 49.8 percent of the military prime con-
tract payments received by all firms were paid out as sub-
contracts. Interestingly, small business firms received
some'lJhat less than half of the subcontracts let--an average
lWMartin Cor.lpany J The Missile Industry in Defense
and the Exploration of Space (Baltimore: The Martin Company,
1961), pp. 87-88.
41U. S ., Congress, Senate, Select Committee on Small
Business, Small Bus lness Conversion Pr-oblems--1964, Hearings,
before the Select Committee on Small Business, Senate, d8th
Cong., 2d sess., 1964, p. 167 (Hereinafter referred to as
~mall Business Conversion ...Hearings).
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of 18.7 percent of the prime contract payments (Table 21).
While small rirms probably tended to concentrate much of
their efforts in supplying larger companies, Baldwinrs data
indi.cated that larger firms procured more of the subcontracts
than did the small companies.
If close to half of the prime contracts were indeed
subcontracted, this would certainly suggest that use of
prime contract data to determine impact remained rather
risky. However, if the bulk of the subcontracts let by
prime contractors in an area stayed within that region and
tf these were supplemented with a small number of subcon-
tracts let from outside the area, perhaps the subcontract
impact could be ignored to some extent. James L. Clayton,
in his study of the California defense economys suggested
that most subcontracts tended to stay within the area of the
prime grant. He added that prime R&D contracts ".••
undoubtedly stayed in California." His conclusion was that
most prime contract investment remained in Californla and
that, furthermore, subcontracts entering the state from
prime contractors outside California made it conceivable
that the state received more in defense spending than prime
awards would indicate. 42 In a report on the sUbcontracting
patterns of major defense contractors submitted to the
Secretary of Defense and presented before congressional
42clayton, "Impact of the Cold War," pp. 453-54.
TABLE 21
SUBCONTRACTING AS A PERCENTAGE OF PRIME CONTRACT PAYMENTS,
1957-1963, BY PRIME CONTRACTORS
l
~Mil1tarycontract
IPayments by Reporting Fiscal Year
Prime Contractors,
I 1957-It 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 AveragePaid to:
All Business Concerns I 54.8 51.6 48.9 50.6 47.5 47.3 48.2 49.8
Small Business Concerns I 20.9 18.5 17.8 18.8 17.7 18.0 18.3 18.7
*Voluntary prior to 1960.
Source: William L. Baldwin, The Structure of the Defense
(Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 64 .....f\)
.....
--
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hearings in 1967, C-E-I-R, Inc. presented data indicating
that almost 53 percent of the subcontracts let by its prime
contractors was retained. However, the report noted that
the general trend of subcontracts was to flow toward the
northeast and north central part of the country. California
obtained fewer outside subcontracts than those from prime
contractors \llthin the state. 43 Probably Claytonrs con-
elusions were somewhat speculative, for the C-E-I-R report
indicated a probable overall loss of prime contracts to
the state as a result of the subcontract flow. Even Clayton
admitted that not all of the original NASA awards to the
state were retained or came back into California via sub-
contracts, although over go percent remained. 44 Despite
the studies done on the sUbcontract flow, however, the data
available was very vague and conclusions remnined ina de-
quate. If further conclusions about defense impact were
to be made, one had to assume that the subcontract flow
made little overall change to original prime contract
awards.
The use of prime contract data and the consideration
of the subcontract flow were basic for most analyses of
43U.S., Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Economic
Effect of Vietnam SpendiEg, Hearin~, before the Joint -
Economic Committee, gOth Cong., 1st sess., 1967, II, p. 791
(Hereinafter referred to as Vietnam Spending).
44Clayton, "Impact of the Cold War, I, p. 454.
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defense impact upon a region, yet other approaches could be
used. A somewhat useful method was to study the impact of
defense-oriented procurement on a specific industry. The
electronics industry was a good example of an industry sig-
nificantly influenced by defense and space spending levels.
The Electronics Industries Association demonstrated the
importance of defense-oriented procurement to the industry in
data presented in Governor Ronald Reagan's 1966 report on
the Cali£ornia economy. As seen in Table 22, the electronic
content of the listed DOD procurement categories averaged
about 34.5 percent and that of NASA sectors was approxi-
mately 47.0 percent in 1967. Overall, the 1967 DOD procure-
ment in electronic content totaled 15.1 percent. An indica-
tion of the monetary impact of this procurement can be
easily gi ven. For example, in 196'/, DOD procurement for
aircraft totaled $8.0 billion. Hence, the 25.8 percent of
this figure expended for electronic components amounted to
about $2.1 billion. Total DOD expenditure, minus that for
military assistance programs, was $66.9 billion for 1967;
and, if 15.1 percent of the amount accrued to the electronics
industry, directly or indirectly, the industry would have
gained about $10.1 billion in sales. 45 One study noted that
the government products sector of the electronics industry
45Calculated from Table 21 and DOD expenditures
found in Vietnam Spending, II, p. 480.
:::=---------------------
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TABLE 22
ELECTRONIC CONTENT: AVERAGE PERCENT BY
PROCUREMENT CATEGORY, 1967
Department of Defense:
Aircraft . .. ... . . .
Missiles . . . . . . . . . .
Ships . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Electronics and communications .
Ordnance and vehicles . . . .
Operation and maintenance . . .
Astronautics . . . . . . . .. ....
Research and development . . . . . . . . .
Average . . . . . . . . . . . . .
NASA:
Research, development and operations . . .
Manned space flight . . . . . .
Space science and applications .
Advanced research and technology . . . . .
Tracking and data acquisition
Average . . . . . . . . . . . .
25.8
45.0
20.7
91.9
7.0
11.2
42.5
32.2
15.1
40.7
32.1
47.3
37.5
77.5
47.0
Source: California, Governor, Economic Be art
of the Governor, 1968 Sacramento ,--
1968), p. 31.
factory sales amounted to $8.8 billion in 1965--51.2 percent
of the industry's total sales of $17.2 billion. The direct
government sales of the industry equaled one-half of total
sales. The addition of indirect sales to the government
through sales of industrial products to other industries
would have somewhat increased the percent of total sales to
the government. 46
Studies of the electronics industry in the Bay Area
46Carl Lindner, "Diversification Progress," p. 97.
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indicated that the industry was primarily defense-oriented.
A 1958 survey reported by Robert K. Arnold prt~ented data
for 46 Bay Area electronics firms. $67.2 million in sales
were the result of military prime and subcontracts, and
$49.1 million were industrial sales primarily for military
use. These sales amounted to 60.7 percent of the Bay Area
electronics industry's total sales of $191.8 million. 47 If
60.7 percent of these sales supported the same percentage of
the 22,968 employees in the electrical machinery industries
of the BaY Area, approximately 13,941 employees earning about
$103.2 million would have been supported by military-space
spending in 1958--one-half a percent of the Bay Area
personal income. Lindner's study of electronics industry
diversification was likewise relevant to the impact of
defense spending in the bay region. Lindner revealed th?-t
in 1964 almost $30 million was contributed by defense
spending to Palo Alto's economy in local purchases and taxes.
More generally, his study of 56 electronics firms in the
Bay Area revealed that 75 percent of total sales in 1961 and
67 percent in 1965 went to military and space endeavors. He
suggested that the 15 percent decline in military sales
(see Table 23) between these years was particularly Signifi-
cant in view of the total military market increase attribut-
able to the Vietnam conflict. However, it should be noted
47Arnold, California Economy, pp. 449-50.
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TABLE 23
PERCENT SALES OF BAY AREA ELECTRONICS FIRMS
TO MAJOR MARKETS, 1961 AND 1965
-
Year ~1i1itary Space Other Govt. Industry Consumer
Group I:
1961 38.0 4.0 14.0 37.0 7.0
1965 34.0 13.0 7.0 41.0 5.0
Group II:
1961 68.0 9.0 3.5 19.0 .5
1965 52.0 18.0 4.0 25.0 1.0
Group III:
1961 70.0 5.0 2.0 20.0 3.0
1965 56.0 10.0 4.0 25.0 5.0
All Groups:
1961 70.0 5.0 3.0 20.0 2.0
1965 55.0 12.0 4.0 25.0 4.0
Firm Sizes:
Group I
Group II . . . .
Group III .
1 - 99 employees
100 - 999 employees
1,000 employees !21 firms)24 firms)11 firms)
Source: Carl Lindner, "Diversification Progress and the
San Francisco Bay Area Electronics Industryll
(unpublished MA thesis, San Jose State College,
1967), p. 36.
that the increase was in conventional w~apons with a small
portion of electronic parts. Hence, the decrease in the
military part of the Bay Area electronics industry sales was
less significant than Lindner indicated. 48 It should be
48Lindner, "Diversification Progress," pp. 8-9, 36,
and 69. "Northeast of Saigon," Federal Reserve Bank of
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noted, too, that the space market showed marked growth for
the region's electronic industry (Table 23). Nonetheless,
the percentage of sales Lindner found attributable to
military-space spending was sizable. If these percentages
were possibly applicable to the number of employees in the
Bay Area's electrical machinery industries supported by
military-space spending, the employees in 1961 would have
numbered about 25,142 earning some $142.5 million. In 1965
they would have numbered approximately 27,001 and earned
about $201.0 million. This equaled about one percent of the
Bay Area's personal income in both years. One further
observation of Lindner's study revealed that the larger
electronics firms concentrated more of their sales to the
government market than did firmn employing from 1-99 persons.
Undoubtedly, the smaller firms had more sales to the govern-
ment than were readily seen, but many were subcontracts from
larger prime contractors. Based on these studies by Arnold
and Lindner, one may conclude there was a sizable influence
by defense spending upon the Bay Area electronics industry.
Another approach used in evaluating impact upon
industrial groups was to determine the percentage of company
sales to the government. A market survey by the author
provided usable data pertaining to sales distribution
San Francisco, Monthly Review, June, 1966, pp. 118-19, dis-
cusses the shift to conventional weapons production •
..~-----.
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between 1955 and 1965 for forty-six Bay Area companies
employing approximately 51,831 persons--17.93 ~ercent of
total 1965 Bay Area manufacturing employment. 49 While the
results may not have been applicable to total bay region
manufacturing sales distribution, they were indicative of
general trends, especially in certain industries surveyed.
Companies replying included one in the ordnance and acces-
sories field (SIC 19), one in rubber and plastics (SIC 30),
one in fabricated metal products (SIC 34), three in non-
electrlca1 machinery (SIC 35), 28 in electrical machinery
(SIC 36), one in transportation e~uipment (SIC 37), seven
in scientific and mechanical instruments and R&D (SIC
3811 and 3821), and two in industries not elsewhere classi-
fied (SIC 3999). The companies employed the equivalent of
36.6 percent of the 136,900 workers who were paid wages and
salaries in 1965 by firms in these SIC classifications.
These workers further were paid an estimated $388 million
in wages and salaries. 50
General results of the survey (Table 24) indicated
49These 46 firms amounted to 18.5 percent of the 248
companies contacted. For the market survey questionnaire see,
infra, AppendiX III, pp. 204-07. While only 46 companies re-
turned usable historical sales data, 60 firms returned usable
1969 market data. Thus, a 24.19 percent overall return rate
was experienced. Eight questionnaires were returned undeli-
vered, 19 were returned unusable, and 161 were not returned.
Infra, Table B, Appendix III, p. 202, and Tables 24-26, pp.
129 and 132-133, contain the major results of this survey.
50Calculated from data in Table 24 and infra, Tables
Band D, Appendix II, pp. 196 and 198.
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that Bay Area firms employing over 1,000 persons held the
largest percentage of sales directly to military markets
of the federal government. The companies employing less
than 1~000 persons conversely sold more to industrial
markets. This seemed to give further indication that
smaller companies tended to capitalize upon subcontracts
:'l
"issued by larger firms; however, the firms employing 50 and
100 persons did hold the largest percentage figure for sales
to space markets of the federal government.
Total averages for all companies contacted indicated
that about 39.8 percent of sales went directly to the
military-space market between 1955 and 1965. The decline of
military sales from 34.0 to 31.3 percent between 1955 and
1965 was more than overcome by the increase in space sales
from 3.8 to 9.8 percent. Thus sales to the military-space
market had a net increase of over 3.3 percent. Sales to the
federal government for purposes other than military and
space averaged about nine percent between 1955 and 1965.
Industrial sales of the surveyed firms remained relatively
stable as did sales to consumers, the two combined making
up about 50.9 percent of total sales between 1955 and 1965.
Actually, these two markets experienced a decline in sales
between these years of slightly over 1.5 percent. 51 Overall
51Interestingly, these conclusions contradicted
Lindner's study of electronics industry diversification
Which showed a marked tendency for electronics firms to
dlverslfy aVJay from military-space sales.
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sales distribution showed a marked influence by military-
space marl<ets and perhaps an overwhelming influence if
subcontracting were determinable.
Data perhaps more lndicative of the trend of the SIC
groups jncluded in the survey was attained by computing an
estimated percentage of employees actually supported by
each market in each company and then in each SIC group.
Table 25 presents general information concerning this analy-
sis to include the number of firms and employees in existence
in 1955, 1960, and 1965 by SIC classification and what
percentage this was of total employment in the industry.
Table 26 reveals the percentages of employees and equivalent
number of employees supported by the major markets by SIC
groups and all surveyed companieD. Because not all firms
responded to the survey, less than 20 percent of the total
Bay Area employees in SICrs 19, 30, 34 and 37 were included
in participating companies. Consequently, Table 26 presents
two total percentages of employees and equivalent number
employees for all industries in each market. The first set
of totals represenm all SIC groups participating in the
survey, and the second set represents only those SIC groups
for which 15 percent or more total 1965 Bay Area employment
was accounted. In most instances the data varied little;
however, the latter totals will be discussed herein.
In 1955 the military market supported approximately
43.8 percent of the employees in the fabricated metals,
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aSIC c1assirications fbr surveyed rirm~ were
assigned by the Greater San Jose Chamber or Commerce and Day
;\l~C::-:, (~~:'~J_;:~:',"l: ,,:.~1"'.1.Jc .l~4.j_:,,-: C,~~=~.~fl)r·r(l~~, D(;~-<Jl-,t\i·.~,~·l:t C1.C' r::~rlpJ:..;yr;:",-~·Clt
c 1. f}: ~_~ ~ .'1.. 1.' 5. ~-: (J t, }.; ~~,: :'.\ 1 ::~j';'~~"; J\.::" t t~1 e () l." C :-'~:.1 J i:,:\:; t\ r'ca . I? C: c tl tl c; C: 3 I C
cIa.:; s J fi c ~ t .L':J tlS (ic~': t c 1~rrL~_11:,; cl f -,,:e cu il1f)2. t11c~) t n 'ie) 1 vc d v::.. f' ted,
t.:hc l:<'i.Y Ar::.:a .fiEi:ttrCs tr:.:::/ -~\'t'~1'~ be; ra11~3(;1()c!.f~ c111d (11"0 ()f11y
offe~l(~d. as ari inrllcation .~)_[' tr;(; r:;~)~(i.'>2I· lii" e()rnp~1.nl~~s ex..tst:in}.~
1n each SIC group. Solar~o COI.W t:y 1:3 nu t inc hlded in Day Area
da t·9 foJ.:" 1965.
bDlccr~Dancles the rcsulL of utilizing 1969 company
employment data" for sales years 1955, 1960, and 1965. Since
data fer these years for surveyed companies waG not aval1-
ab.10:, emp:ioyment ror 1969 was used throughout the study.
Sources: Inrra, Table B, Appendix II, p. 196; Table
B, Appendix III, p. 202; and California,
Department or Employment, Research andStatistie~ Division. CalIfornia Err,;Jl2.~~£.!l!
and Payrolls in 1955: Ii StUdy of \"orka~2-ran~gesl Covered by the Cnlii'ornla Unem-
p10yment .In:::;urance Ae t. G18 sS 1.!.:J}:'d ~~
InouGtr,'I 3:1(1 County. f-.:cpt. No. 1.-:( ~ t t. lSb
pUly, r0~b),-arui'Pts. 23b and 28b for 1960
and 1965.
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FOR 1955, 1960, AND 1965 J
ence.
aNa companies surveyed or this SIC group in exist-
cCalculated rrom: Infra, Table B, Ilppendlx 111 1
Military-Space Marke~s, All
Total 48.12 115817
T (b) 45.08 113237
All Markets, Ali SIC Groups:
Totalu'lOo.OO 132825 100.00 47834 100.00 51808
T (b . 100.00 ! 29365 1.-:1::.;0:::.;0:.,..:-.0:::"'0=--L-..;.lt..;.4~3-=1...;;,6_~..:;;1;..;:O;..;:O;.,.:.;..;:..OO. I 4Q310
p. 202.
bBased on 1965 employment or SIC group in Bay Areal
more t11an 15 percent of trle employment in the classl1'ication
was included in the companies surveyed.
machinery, electrical machinery, instruments, and miscel-
laneous SIC industries. This percentage rose to 51.3 in
1960 and then declined to 35.5 in 1965. A lessening impact
on these industries by military spending was evident;,
however, the addition of a growing impact of space spending
tended to cushion the decline. The 45.0 percent of
employees supported by the military-space market in 1955 had
increased to 56.6 percent in 1960 and still remained above
the mid-fifties percentage in 1965 when it slipped to 48.0
percent. Thus, between 1955 and 1965, the military-space
market supported a'pproxim3 te ly 49.9 percent of these sur-
veyed industries. Sales to non-military and non-space
government agencies acco~nted for another 6.6 percent of
income, so total direct reliance upon government markets for
these surveyed firms averaged about 56.5 percent of their
sales. The consumer market accounted for only about 8.5
percent of sales over the decade and had, 1n fact, declined
from 12.9 to 6.6 percent between 1955 and 1965. The remain-
ing 35.0 percent average of the decade's sales were to
industrial markets. The amount of this percentage which
• Ultimately went to government markets was undeterminable.
Yet, if 20.0 percent of the industrial sales were sub-
contracts destined for government markets, the overall
reliance of the surveyed firms upon government markets
averaged around 63.5 percent of their sales. The military-
space market alone received about 56.9 percent of their sales.
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The individual industries dealt with in the survey
were found to have a relatively heavy reliance upon the
military-space market for their sales. The miscellaneous
or unclassified industries (SIC 39) led all other groups in
reliance with an average of about 87.03 percent of their
sales going to this market; however, only about 1,000
employees working for three firms were included among the
survey respondents. The machinery industry (SIC 35) had an
average 63.98 percent reliance upon the military-space
market. In this classification some 20 percent of the
employees in the industry were accounted for by the respond-
ents, although many small companies were not included. The
best coverage of the survey was for the electrical machinery
industry (SIC 36). Approximately 90 percent of the employees
in the industry appeared to have been accounted for and some
28 firms responded. This industrial group had an average of
44.01 percent sales to the military-space market for the
three years covered.
Because of the variables existent in the calcula-
tions of the survey data, conversion of the percentages of
sales to various markets into monetary impact w~y be mis-
leading. Yet the percentages of sales to the various markets
are indicative of general trends. One can hardly dispute
that the military-space market was significant. Several
firms of varying size had very close to a 100 percent
reliance upon these markets--particularly in the machinery,
~
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electrical machinery instruments, miscellaneous, and,
obviously, the ordnance classifications.
The two digit SIC classifications obtained from
Walter Isard's data on unclassified prime contracts to firms
in metropolitan areas provided additional indication of the
significance of the military-space markets to industrial
groups in the Bay Area. 52 When size of contracts let to
Bay Area firms were estimated from Isard's compilations, the
impact on the surveyed SIC groups above was again evidenced
with the exception of the miscellaneous sector (SIC 39).
Again, however, SIC classification for various firms varies
from year to year and survey to survey, so data was not
directly comparable. In addition to the industrial groups
dealt with above, other industries were revealed to be heavy
recipients of military-space contracts. Many of these
groups received a surprisingly large percentage of the
contracts reported by Isard (Table 27). The service indus-
tries (SIC'S 70-89), for example, received about 47.6
percent of the some $1.1 billion military awards let to the
Bay Area in 1960, 8.2 percent in 1962, and 22.9 percent in
196!~. During the latter year this sector was awarded about
25.6 percent of the combined military··space contracts let to
the region's firms. This 25.6 percent of the wages and
salaries to the 173,337 service industry employees according
52Supra, p. 117.
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TABLE 27
PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL BAY AREA MILITARY CONTRACTS
RECEIVED BY SELECTED INDUSTRIES:
1960, 1962, AND 1964
SIC
19
20
28
29
30
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
15-17
41-49
50-59
70-89
INDUSTRY
Ordnance & Accessories ....
Food & Kindred Products •.
Chemicals & Products ....•
Petrol & Coal Products ...
Rubber Products ..........•
Stone, Clay, & Glass ...•.
Primary Metal Industries •
Fabricated Metal Products
Machinery .
Electrical Machinery
Transportation Equipment .
Instruments .
Contract Construction .
Trans, Commo, & utilities.
Wholesale & Retail Trade .
Service Industries .....•.
1960
3.5
2.8
.6
7.3
.1
*
*
.2
.8
6.9
21. 5
5.6
2.5
4.4
.8
47.7
.7
13.6
.8
20.2
*
*
"*
*
.8
15.6
25.6
.9
3.6
8.1
.8
8.2
1964
31.1
5.0
.5
7.4
.4
.2
.2
.3
.4
11.0
6.1
1.2
6.9
5.3
*
22.9
AVERAGE
11.8
7.1
.6
11.6
.2
*
*
.2
.7
11.2
17.7
2.8
4.3
6.3
.5
26.3
Source: Calculated from infra, Table A, Appendix IV,
p. 209.
to the State Department of Employment SIC classification
would total approximately $225 million dollars--sume 1.6
pergent of the region's personal income. In 1960 the
ordnance industry obtained only 3.5 percent of the region's
military contracts, and this fell to .07 percent in 1962.
However, the largest share of military contracts went to
this sector in 1964--31.1 percent. The approximately 24,300
ordnance industry employees could have, perhaps, attributed
about $74,205,22 of their wages and salaries in 1964 to
military contracts--.5 percent of the Bay Area's personal
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income. 53 Other industries gaining a significant percentage
of the total military contracts let to firms in the Bay Area
included food and kindred products (SIC 20) with an average
percentage for the three years of about 7.1, petroleum and
coal products (SIC 29) with an average of about 11.6 percent,
electrical machinery (SIC 36) with an average of about 11.2
percent, and transportation equipment (SIC 37) with an
average of about 17.7 percent. The instruments, contract
construction, and transportation-communications-utilities
industries also shared a noticeable percentage of the
contracts--a combined average of approximately 4.3 percent.
An additional approach for analyzing defense impact
was to determine the impact up~n individual companies.
Perhaps the most comprehensive method was to consult data
published by the various firms being studied and to conduct
personal interviews with the companies or request data by
mail surveys, though companies were reluctant to respond;
however, a thorough study of Bay Area defense-oriented
industries was beyond the limits of this paper. Yet,
investigation of individual companies could not be altogether
neglected. As noted in Governor Reagan's 1968 report on
the state economy, it was obvious that a major change in
the government's procurement program might have significantly
53calculations from data in infra, Tables Band C,
Appendix II, pp. 196 and 197; and Table B, Appendix III,
p. 202.
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affected the employment and production of an individual
company and might have had extensive repercus~~ons on the
local economy.54 An indication of the flow of contracts to
Bay Area companies was found, for example, in figures on
procurement in 1956. This data, released by the San
Francisco Air Force Procurement District, showed that $26
million in contracts for part of FY 1956 was divided between
sixteen local firms. Five of the firms accounted for $21l.4
million of this procurement by themselves.55 Certainly, a
sudden or, unexpected contract adjustment could have seriously
affected the welfare of any of these firms.
Some sources did release contract data for companies
by location, and this informa~ion was utilized herein. Un-
classified prime defense-space contract data for Bay Area
firms is presented in Table 28. (More extensive figures are
found in Table B, Appendix IV.) The top ten defense con-
tractors in the Bay Area in FY 1963 were awarded $745 million
dollars. Eight of these companies were found to be among
the top one-hundred nationwide defense contractors. ~~O of
these were universities probably engaged solely in R & D--
Stanford and the University of Californ~a at Berkeley.
Another, the Stanford Research Institute, was a nonprofit
R&D organization. Finally, the Lockheed Aircraft
54Reeort of the Governor, 1968, p. 42.
55Mercury, March 5, 1956.
TABLE 28
TOP TEN BAY AREA DEFENSE-SPACE PRIME CONTRACTORS: FY 1963 AND FY 1964
(Thousands of dollars)
1
FY 1964
Area IArea IU. S.
Contracts Rank Rankb
Area IArea IU.S.
~ontracts Rank Ranka
I: -FY 1963
ComRany
I-'
-l::"
o
fDivision of Link Indus-
tries.
gOther contracts of undis-
closed value.
URank among the top 500 American defense contractors.
bRank among the top 100 American defense contractors.
cProbab1y includes the Missiles and Space Division.
dDivision of United Aircraft Corporation, Inc.
Lockheed Aircraft Corporation ••. $537,414c 1 1 $406,166 1 1
United Technology Centerd . . • •. 52,254 2 29 4,466g 13 8
Phi1co Corporatione • • . • . . •• 43,026 3 28 13,61Cg 6 27
Westinghouse Electric Corporation. 31,023 4 12 11,061 8 23
General Telephone & Electric Corp.f 29,263 5 19 19,211 4 25
Stanford Research Institute . . .• 22,052 6 39 792 21 91
University of California . . . •• 12,222 7 48 3,216 16 --
Stanford University. . . . • . .• 8,775 8 65 2,400 17 --
Litton Industries, Inc. • . . . •. 3,226 9 144 1,105 20 28
Watkins-Johnson Company. • • . •. 2,991 10 125 99 28 --
Lockheed Missiles & Space Division -- -- -- 295,728 2 --
Standard Oil of California . . . . -- -- -- 34,057 3 39
Global Associates. . . . . . . . . -- -- -- 17,335 5
FMC Corporation. • • . . . . • .. 2,748 11 107 11,917 7 I 35
World Airways. . . . . . . . . . . -- -- -- 9,708 9
General Precision, Inc. . . . • . . 48 31 30 7,000 10 I 38
'ro tal . . . . . . . • . . . . . . .1 $745, 042 $;.::8;.:=3:..l..7...!..,.::,8.=.1.=.1-...:__-..:..__
eDivision of Sylvania
Electric Products.
Source: Infra, Table B, Appendix IV, p. 210.
~,'..'~
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Corporation (to include the Missiles and Space Division),
the leading employer in Santa Clara County, accounted for
72.1 percent of the awards to these leading Bay Area con-
tractors. In FY 1964, the top ten companies had changed
somewhat, and their volume had risen to $837 million.
Lockheed Aircraft Corporation still led the other con-
tractors in volume of awards. When the corporation's
separately listed Missiles and Space Division was included,
this company accounted for 83.7 percent of the contracts
received by the top ten. Only three of the remaining top
ten companies for the previous yecr appeared in this cate-
gory in 1964. Moreover, the aerospace companies which had
dominated the leaders in FY 1963 were replaced not solely
by more aerospace companies but by two air service compan1.es
(Global Associates and World Airways, Inc.), an oil company,
and a traditional ordnance producing company (FMC). Also
the three nonprofit R&D organizations among the earlier
top ten had been replaced by commercial companies. The
impact on the Bay Area of the contracts awarded to just
these top ten companies was evident when calculated as a
percentage of the region'S personal income. In FY 1963,
the $745 million received by these companies amounted to
5.8 percent of Bay Area personal income, and in FY 1964
$837 million accounted for 6.1 percent. The total contracts
awarded to Bay Area firms for which data was available
during FY 1963 amounted to $760.6 million, 5.9 percent of
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the region's personal income. This equaled about $206 per
capita for the region and constituted 7.7 percAnt of the
$2,656 per capita net buying power. In FY 1964, $844.6
million total awards was 6.1 percent of the area's personal
income. 56 This totaled $222 per capita and equaled about
7.9 percent of the $2,780 per capita net buying power. Thus,
the top ten companies seemed to have earned well above 90
percent of the contracts let to bay ~egion firms. The addi-
tion of identifiable subcontracts let to the Bay Area only
raised the FY 1964 percentage to 6.3. Probably these were
conservative figures, for the sources may well have not
reported all contracts received by Bay Area companies.
The data discussed so far presents an indication of
regional defense expenditure impact; however, no overall
conclusions have been reached. First, two Inore indicators
of impact should be considered. The Bureau of the Census
released a revealing report in 1966 concerning shipments of
defense-oriented industries from selected metropolitan areas,
regions, and states. 57 This study and the location quotion
method of analyzing basic manufacturing employment deserves
attention.
56Personal income figures for the Bay Area are found
in infra, Table E, Appendix II, p. 199.
57U.8., Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census,
Census of Manufacturers, 1963 (Washington, D.C.: Government
Printing Office, 19b6), I, SR2.
The compilation and release of information concerning
the value of shipments from defense-oriented industries was
a signi:ficant step on the part of' the Department of' Commerce
toward solving the problem of data availability dealing with
defense spending impact. Over a period of years this data
should prove most useful, yet even the initial release was
important. The census data indicated a larger Bay Area
defense spending i~pact than other analyses. Earlier studies
demonstrating that the San Jose SMSA was largely affected
by defense expenditures seemed substantiated. The industries
involved in the analysis by the Bureau of the Census
employed 61,100 persons in the Bay Area in 1963--21.0 percent
of the region's manUfacturing employment and 6.1 percent of
the total employment minus federal government employees (see
Table 29). The total value of shipments from the defense-
oriented Bay Area industries amounted to $1,389.6 million--
10.9 percent of the region's personal income. Shipments to
the federal government equaled $1,155.5 million--9.1 percent
of the personal income. This percentage indicated qUite an
increase in impact compared to the 4.9 percentage of personal
income of' the unclassified awards compiled by Isard for the
Bay Area for 1964. 58 While only 6.1 percent of the total
employment was 1n defense-oriented industries, these indus-
tries accounted f'or apprOXimately 9.1 percent of the region's
58Supra , p. 116.
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r TABLE 29
DEFENSE-ORIENTED SHIPMENTS FROi>1 CALIFORNIA AND THE BAY AREA, 1963a
Total Total Government Shipments (millions)
EmpllJY- Shipment By Level or Contract By Agency
ees Value ::;ub- IArea (000) (millions) Total Primes contracts DOD NASA AEC Other
San Fran-
cisco-
Oakland
Sf'.'1SA . . . 15.1 $ 275.3 $ 174.0 .$ 96.7 .$ 77.3 $ 148.3 $ 7.9c $ 3.0c $ 14.8
San Jose
SMSA . . . 46.0 1,114.3 981.5 891.9 89.6 882.0 45.0c .8c 53.7
Bay Areab . 61.1 1,389.6 1,155.5 988.6 166.9 1 030.3 52.9 3.8 68.5
Bay Area
as a %of
California 14.9 17.1 16.4 17.7 11.2 18.8 4.2 13.8 2?5
California 407.5 $8,116.0 $7,036.0 $5,557.8 $1,478.2 $5,456.0 $1,248.3 $27.4 $304.3
California
as a %of
the U.S. 21.6 22.1 28.8 28.4 30.3 26.7 51.4 85.9 23.7
arndustries included in analysis were SIC's 1925, 3511, 3531, 3541, 3542, 3571.- 366,
367, 372, 3731, 3811, 38211, 38216, 3831, and 3861.
bMinus data for Solano and Napa Counties.
CEstimated from value ranges provided by the Bureau of the Census.
Source: U.S., Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Census of Manufacturers, 1963(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1966), I, SR 2-11-13 and 17.
~
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personal income through sales to the federal government.
Furthermore, while 21.0 percent of the employwcnt in manu-
facturing firms was in the defense-oriented industries ,
about 55.0 percent of the total wages and salaries paid to
the Bay Area's manufacturing industry employees could have
been paid by the value of shipments to the federal govern-
ment by the defense-oriented industries. In fact the value
of these shipments amounted to about 83.2 percent of the
industries' total shipments. Therefore, if 83.2 percent
of the e~ployment in these industries was supported by the
shipments, approximately 27 percer.t of the total wages and
salaries paid to 21 percent of the employees of all Bay Area
manUfacturing industries could have been attributed to shlp-
ments to the federal government by defense-oriented indus-
tries. Census data also showed that the San Jose SMSA far
exceeded the San Francisco-Oakland SMSA in total shipments
of defense-oriented industries and shipped about 20 percent
less to the federal government firms based in the San Jose
region. Approximately 51 percent of the manufacturing·
employment and 22 percent of total employment in the San
Jose SMSA as compared to 21 percent and 6 percent respec-
tively in the Bay Area was accounted for by defensc-
oriented firms. Finally, it was indicated that the Bay
Area shared about 18.8 percent of shipments to the Depart-
ment of Defense from California and, surprisingly, only
about 4.2 percent of the state's shipments to NASA. The
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region's significance as a defense-industry complex was
obvious.
The last analysis considered was based on the assump-
tion by Charles Tiebout that, ". • • if a given commodity is
highly specialized relative to the nation in the production
of a particular commodity, the product is assumed to be an
export item, e.g., automobiles from Detroit. "59 The loca-
tion quotient analysis assumes that the percentage of total
national employment of an industry should equal the percen-
tage of total local employment of that industry. Any excess
of that percentage locally would be export or basic industry
employment.
= national employment in industry A
total national employment
x
total local
employment
X = number employed locally in industry A to provide
area needs.
An a-djustment was possible, according to Tiebout, for pro-
ductivity locally as compared to productivity nationally by
using local and national value added data for each industry
analyzed. However, this step was not used herein. Finally,
Tiebout noted that results using location quotients inevi-
tably tended to be lower than direct survey resultsj yet how
much location quotients were lower was not known, so no
adjustments could be made for this variable.
59Tiebout, Base Study, p. 59.
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Five industries, considered defense-oriented, were
analyzed over the period 1950-1965 using location quotients.
The aircraft and parts industry was found to have had no
basic employment in the Bay Area; i.e., this industry's
local employment as a percentage of the region's total
employment was less than the industry's national employment
as a percentage of the nation's total employment. The
instruments industry also showed negative location quotients
for every year with the exception of 1964 in the San Jose SMS]
when the analysis showed .03 percent basic employment. The
shipbuilding industry, the region's most significant defense
industry for many years, was shown to have had a declining
basic employment percentage--from .49 in 1958 to .11 in 1964
(the only years analyzed for this industry). The remaining
two industries analyzed were shown to have had very sizable
basic employment, rising rapidly during the 1950's to a peak
in 1962 and then dropping off slightly. The ordnance indus-
try (to which shipbuilding was added for the years 1958-
1964), had the highest growth rate in relation to the
industry nationally and reached the highest level of basic
employment in 1962--2.29 percent. The electrical machinery
industry grew less rapidly in relation to the industry
nationally, also reaching its highest level of basic employ-
ment in 1962--1.69 percent. Both industries, however, had
extremely hig}] location quotients in the San Jose SMSA. In
1962, the ordnance industry reached 13.60 percent, and the
J~~-----------------------
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electrical machinery industry climbed to 11.66 percent.
The overall results of the location quotient analysis
can be seen in Table 30. In 1950 basic employment for the
Bay Area in the ordnance, electrical machinery, and instru-
ments industries was actually nonexistent. The San Jose
SMSA, however, had a basic employment rate of 1.95 percent
or 1,189 workers. Gradually, between 1950 and 1956, the Bay
Area location quotient became less negative until it reached
a positive percentage indicating .59 percent basic employment
(5066 workers) in 1957. Meanwhile, the San Jose SMSA
steadily grew in basic employment ar.d reached 9.40 percent
(11,129 workers) in 1957. A steady increase in basic employ-
ment was experienced in both areas until 1964, when a setback
was experienced. Yet the decline was brief, and by 1965 the
basic employment had risen in numbers of employees although
the percentages or basic employment had continued to decline.
It is obvious that the smaller geographic and population
area of the San Jose SMSA had an extremely large location
quotient in comparison with the Bay Area in general. Yet
the San Jose region was an integral part of the entire Bay
Area and should not be considered as completely autonomous..
The results of the location quotient were helpful in giving
a wider perspective to the question of defense s~ending
impact on the Bay Area, providing an indication of relative
impact compared to the nation.
The overall impact of defense spending on the Bay
~---------------------------------""nr
TABLE 30
COMBINED LOCATION QUOTIENTS FOR ORDNANCE, ELECTRICAL MACHINERY, AND
INSTRUl'1ENTS IN THE SAN JOSE SMSA AND THE BAY AREA, 1950-1965*
= I%u.s. %Total ..- San JoseBay Area
'rotal Emnlovment Employment Employment
Year Employment Bay Areaj~ San Jose % Basic Actual % Basic Actual
1950 2.15 1.11 4.11 -1.04 1.95 1189
1951 2 . l~'7 1.61 5.'""(8 - .86 3.30 2332
1952 2.78 1.93 5.88 - .85 3.10 2335
1953 3.11 2.21 6.45 - .90 . 3.32 2586
1954 2.78 2.01 7.00 - .77 4.22 3432
1955 2.74 2.13 7.50 - .61 4.76 4329
1956 2.82 2.68 8.98 - .14 6.16 6406
1957 2.84 3.44 12.24 .59 5066 9.40 11129
1958 2.74 4.14 16.76 1.90 15798 14.01 17372
1959 3.00 4.99 20.01 1. 98 17291 17.00 23214
1960 3.10 5.67 22.18 2.57 23611 19.07 30283
1961 3.13 6.31 24.51 3.17 29735 21.37 36924
1962 3.28 7.00 26.15 3.72 36608 22.87 43149
1963 3.22 6.85 25.03 3.62 36687 21.81 44038
1964 3.11 6.28 23.07 3.17 32970 19.95 I 416421965 3.19 6.09 21.55 2.90 33787 18.35 43781
*Shipbuilding is included for the years 1958-1964.
I-'
~
\D
Calculated from: u.s., Department of Commerce, Office of Business Eco-
nomics, 1967 Business Statistics: A Supplement to
the Survey of Current Business (Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, 1967), pp. 65 and 68; and
infra, Tables Band C, Appendix II, pp. 196 and 197 .
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Area was increasingly significant after 1955~ as it was for
the entire state. Its impact was not fUlly determinable.
The California State Office of Planning stated that in 1965
about 35 percent of the state's manufacturing employment was
directly involved in produc tion for defense-space use. "If
,
the multiplier effects of manufacturing employment are taken
into account," the planning office continued, "then at least
a third of the state's employment, and probably more~ is
directly and indirectly dependent upon decisions made
within the federal government.,,60
The multiple effects of exogenous income in the Bay
Area were most important during the 1950's and 1960's, and
defense-related income comprised a significant portion of
exogenous income. For example, in a 1965 study of a hypo-
thetical defense reduction in California, the State Office
of Planning suggested that the reduction of one dollar in
products from defense industries would result in a $2.57
reduction of total wages and salaries in the state. 6l "A
dollar of income from outside thus supports more than a
60Californla, Department of Finance, State Office of
Planning, California State Development Plan Program: Progress
Report and Summary Interpretations of Phase I Studies (Sacra::-
menta" February" 19b5 J" p. 2ltHereinafter referred to as
Phase I Studies). Impact of Federal Spending in California,
p. 11, notes that some economists estimated that as many as
one-half of California's Jobs were attributable to defense
and space activities.
61Phase I Studies, p. 21.
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dollar of total income," said economist Roger E. Bolton in
1966, "because the original dollar earned is ;-.~spent several
tlmes.,,62 A t d bs u Y y the Department of Commerce suggested
that approximately $.50 of each dollar of national income
went to taxes, savings, and imports from foreign countries
in 1963, while the remaining $.50 was spent on consumption
within the nation. The multiple effects of the consumption
spending was defined as:
1
1 - Proportion of income spent on locally
produced consumption of goods and
services
Thus, the multiplier for the nation was 2.0; i.e., 1/1 -.50.
"Other things being equal," continued the report, "the
income multiplier for any local area will be smaller than
the national multiplier, since many of the goods and ser-
viceo consumed in the local area are imported from other
areas of the country." Therefore, if half of the consump-
tion goods of an area were provided locally, $.25 would have
been spent on local consumption in each spending round, and
the multiplier would have been 1.33; i.e., 1/1 - .25. Large,
diversified metropolitan areas would have, it was assumed,
a multiplier of about 1.8. In each consumption or spending
round, then, $.44 of each dollar of local income would have
been spent on locally provided goods and services. Conversely,
62Roger E. Bolton, Defense Purchases and Regional
Growth (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institute, 19bb),
p. 5.
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a smaller less diversified area would have had a 1.3 multi-
plier, equal to spending about $.23 of each dollar of local
income on locally provided goods and services. 63
The importance of the multiplier could be seen by
applying it to a hypothetical company. An electronic compo-
nent firm relying entirely on an outside marJ{et and employing
several hundred persons paid $2 million in wages and salaries
in a given year. The total impact of these wages and
salaries was not simply $2 million. If the firm was located
in a large metropolitan area, the total impact would have
been $3.6 million ($2 million in wages and salaries or
employee income times 1.8). If the firm were in a small
metropolitan area, the total impact would have been only
$2.6 million ($2 million in employee income times L 3) .
Actually the impact could have been greater in both cases,
if it were possible to isolate and evaluate all spending
rounds.
The most frequently used form of the multiplier
analysis used to analyze regional impact "Jas the "base
theory" or exogenous income theory. This theory supposed
that the only autonomous element of regional income to be
considered was that derived from exports outside the area. 64
63U.S., Department of Commerce, Economic Development
Administration, Industrial Location as a Factor ir~ Regional
Economic Development (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing
Office, 19b7 ), pp. 44-45.
64Ibid., pp. 46-47.
1 -.1
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In case, an area's total income equaled $125 million of
which $100 million were basic or exogenous and $25 million
were non-basic. To measure the income impact of a $1.00
increase in basic income, one would look at the ratio of
basic to non-basic income. In this case it would have been
4 to 1 ($100 million to $25 million). The addition of $1.00
in basic income would then add another $.25 of non-basic or
local income. 65 The formula should be:
Total income increase =
Increase in basic income X __......._.....----.1;:--:- _
Non-basic income
1- 'l'otal
Application of the multiplier analj-'sis to the Bay
or
$1.25 = $1.00 X
1-
1$25 million
$125 mIllion
L
Area was possible although limited, for estimates of the
percentage of basic employment or income \'iere available only
from tl'JO sources--a 1959 Department of CO:Iunerce study and a
1961 market analysis by the State of California. 66 The Bay
Area was obviously a large region in all respects, but the
diversity of the economy was not clear. The San Francisco-
Oakland SMSA was considered widely diversified, yet the San
Jose SMSA was rather narrowly diversified. Thus the choice
65Tiebout, Base Studl, pp. 59-60.
66Supra, p. 69.
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of a multiplier was not easily made. It was estimated,
using Department of Commerce data, that 51.7 percent of the
Bay Area manufacturing employment and 40.1 percent of total
Bay Area employment worked for basic industries or served
outside markets. The State of California analysis indicated
that 69.6 percent of the area's manufacturing employment and
34.5 percent of the total employment served outside markets.
Because of the basic nature of much of the manufacturing
industry in the region and the conversely local nature of
many of the nonmanufacturing industries, the letter figures
were used for the multiplier analysis of the Bay Area.
Application of the multiplier analysis to Bay Area
income between 1950 and 1965 using the constant non-basic
or local income percentage of 65.5 revealed an approximate
mUltiplier of 2.89. While this was obviously above the 2.0
national multiplier suggested by the Department of Commerce,
Bay Area economic studies have indicated some degree of
uniqueness in the region's structure. The exogenous portion
of the personal income was substantial at 34.5 percent;
however, the degree of self-sufficiency and interdependency
of the Bay Area was also very high.
The importance of the multiplier to defense-space
spending in the Bay Area was great (Table 31). For example,
in 1963 the estimated $216 million wages and salaries paid
as a result of defense-space sales by the region's R&D
industries increased to $62~ million when exposed to the
~tr;l~~ }?i.'\Y
~ri1EIJr~ 3J.
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multiplier. As a result, about 4.9 percent of the Bay Area's
$12.7 billion personal income was attributablp to research
and development by the DOD and NASA. The defense shipment
figure for 1963 by the Census of Manufacturers had revealed
that $1,083.2 million in Bay Area sales had gone to the
federal government. It was estimated that approximately
35 percent of the amount or $379,120,000 was funded into
salaries and wages in the region. 67 The multiple effect of
this income was then 8.6 percent of the Bay Area personal
income--about $1,095,756,800. The multiple effect of the
prime defense contracts let to the Bay Area as reported by
Walter Isard's research varied from 13.2 percent in 1960 to
3.1 percent in 1962 and 5.6 percent in 1964. The last two
Y2ars, however, included only the effect of nonclassified
contracts. The data collected from individual company
contracts let to Bay Area firms offered a higher total than
lsard's data for 1964, the multiple effect amounting to 7.5
percent of Bay Area personal income. Yet the 1963 total of
individual company contract data was less than the total
derived from Census data, the multiple effect reaching '7.2
as opposed to 8.6 percent of the region'S personal income.
The average multiple effect of data provided by all the
above sources, except R&D, amounted to 7.4 percent of Bay
67Estimated percentage based on data for the R&D
industry, supra, pp. 107-108.
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Area personal income--$9l7 million of $12,454 million. When
discounting sources from which only unclassified contract
data was available for 1962 and 1964, the average mUltiple
effect was 8.9 percent of the personal income--$l,095
million of $12,334 million--for 1960, 1963, and 1964. While
completely accurate data was not available, it was possible
to conclude conservatively that defense-space spending con-
tributed approximately eight percent of the region's personal
income. This percentage would have amounted to about $502
million of the $6,277 million Bay Area net buying power in
1955, $735 million of $9,198 in 1960, and $946 million of
$11,829 million in 1965. About $198.00 of the average per
capita net buying power of $2,478.00 for these years and
approxima tely $629.00 of the a ver"age household net buying
power of $7864.00 was attributable to defense-space spending
in the Bay Area.
The dependency of the Bay Area upon defense spending
was apparently not exorbitant, if ~he evidence analyzed is
accepted. The existence of defense-space R&D industries
in the region was noticeable and had a calculable economic
impact of around five percent of the regional personal
income. Analysis of prime contracts coming into the Ba.y
Area and the subcontract flow of those primes revealed
widely divergent reSUlts, yet the calculable economic impact
seemed to have amounted to about nine percent of the regional
personal income. It should be noted, however, that
J)'
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measurement of the economic impact of subcontracts let to
Bay Area firms from the outside was not made; for, unlike
the state as a whole, the subcontract flow out of the area
was not necessarily equal to the inward flow. Estimated
calculations at the state level, using the same criteria
used in appraising the economic impact of prime contracts
in the Bay Area, indicated that between 1960 and 1965
approximately 10.8 percent of the California's personal
income was attributable to defense-space spending. Yet the
criteria for the state level was undoubtedly not the same
as that for the Bay Area. While some comparative value
was evidenced, this percentage was misleading. The applica-
tion of a 2.0 multiplier to the average of prime contracts
entering the state revealed an impact equaling 17.9 percent
of California's personal income. Other sources indicated
even higher percentages. 68 Nonetheless, the calculable Bay
Area income dependent upon defense-space spending could be
termed significant, even without benefit of comparison to
another area. Certainly any comprehensive cutback of
defense-space income would be widely felt and no doubt
undesirable.
68Re~ional Effects of Government Procurement, p:22,
for examcle,Osuggested that the impact of defense-sp~ndlng
in Calif~rnia totaled $18.8 billion or about 35.9 percent
of the state's personal income.
VI. THE IMPACT OF DEFENSE SPENDING IN THE BAY AREA
"More than half of the new manufacturing employment
added in the San Francisco area between 1950 and 1960 was
defense related," according to a State Office of Planning
Report in 1965. 1 While not as substantial as defense
related industrial growth in the Los Angeles and San Diego
area, the impact in the Bay Area could not be discounted.
The areas of the fastest population growth were also those
with the fastest growth in defense-related industry. The
four counties with the greatest amount of defense spending
were Los Angeles, San Diego, Santa Clara, and Sacramento,
respectively. If Orange County and Los Angeles County were
considered together, these same counties led the state's
population growth, in the same order. 2 Since the growth
of the Bay Area, along with the other regions, was signl-
flcantly affected by defense-related industrial growth, a
reduction in defense spending could have similarly hurt
the area. Such a possibility presented real evidence of
the t~ue impact of defense spending on the Bay Area economy.
Various national studies have investigated the
lPhase I Studies, p. 33. This would equal, perhaps,
50,000 workers.
2Phase II Report, p. 174.
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impact of hypothetical defense spending reductions. In
1962, for example, the federal government re2~ased data
based upon a gradual reduction in defense spending. Over
a thirteen year period, from 1965 to 1977, defense expen-
ditures would have been reduced from $56.1 billion to
$10.9 billion. To compensate for anticipated economic
dislocation, the study proposed concurrent increases in
total United States contribution to international disarma-
ment programs, such as inspection and policing, from
nothing .to $7.1 billion and increases in NASA and the
Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) programs from $4.1 billion
to $10.9 billion. The overall reduction would have
amounted to $32 billion~-$14.8 billion during the first
three years, $6.8 billion during the second three years,
and $10.4 billion during the last seven years. 3 Application
of the same reduction and compensation to the Bay Area
would have resulted in approximately a 6.4 percent reduction
in the 1965 area personal income for the first three years--
about $323.5 million dollars of exogenous income. If
continued growth in other sectors of the economy were
retained, the reduction might not have been too harmful to
the local economy, but the loss of 6.4 percent of the
exogenous income (the personal income when the multiplier
3U.s., Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Economic
Impact of Disarmament (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing
Office, January, 1962), pp. 23 and 2'7.
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is applied) would have certainly retarded general growth in
other sectors. Over the thirteen year perioC the approxi-
mate 46.8 percent reduction in defense-related income
would have caused an estimated 13.4 percent reduction in
Bay Area exogenous and personal income--about $675.9 million
in exogenous income and about $1,959.7 million in personal
income. Compensation for this loss in other industries
obviously would have to be substantial and well-timed to
circumvent any serious economic dislocation .
.In a study by Wassi1y Leontief, professor of eco-
nomics and director of the Harvard Economic Research
Project, the impact of a 20 percent reduction in 1958
defense spending was calculated. Unlike the above study,
no compensatory spending in the arms control field was
calculated. Instead, a 1.8 percent increase in consumption
spending was estimated. Because of the product differences
between military and civilian goods and services and cor-
responding wages and salaries, ho~ever, the total wages and
salaries paid in production for the military were assumed to
have been 21 percent higher than those in civilian produc-
tion. Hence, a $7.6 billion (1.8 percent) increase in
civilian demand would have been necessary in offsetting
the $6.8 billion reduction in defense spending. California,
Leontief estimated, would have lost 1.85 percent of her
total employment positions, experienced a .54 percent
increase in civilian oriented employment, and a total of
--------------------------------------
":2 ,£==~_=_Z2Z21CW-J;. iE
2.39 percent of the state's workers would have been displaced
and have had to find new employment. Among the nineteen
regions studied, California was highest in the loss of total
Jobs and total displacement and lowest in the net increase
of civilian oriented Jobs. It was further estimated that
the state would have experienced a net loss of $267.5
million in non-household direct civilian labor earnings--
10.8 percent of the total. Additionally, an estimated
$322.59 million of the $11,198 million in labor earnings of
state civilian and military employees of the Department of
Defense would have been lost. A net loss of $590.1 million
out of $7,396 million direct labor earnings would have been
experienced by California--a loss of about 8.0 percent. 4
Application of the study's data to the Bay Area was impos-
sible, yet just the 10.8 percent loss in non-household
direct civilian labor earnings would have resulted in an
estimated loss of about $500 million dollars in 1958.
The impact of defense reductlons was, obviously,
very di£ficult to determine. The best gUide for estimating
impact was analysis of an actual reduction, and the Bay
4Vietnam Spending, II, pp. 689-90, 695-96, and 722.
A more recent study by Leontief, presented in Vietnam Spend-
ing, I, pp. 245-47, dealt with the effects of a $19 billion
cutback that might have resulted if the Vietnam conflict
had ended in 1967. California would have faced serious
economic problems, according to Leontief, experiencing a net
decline of 3.7 percent in total employment.
163
Area had experienced a reduction during the early 1960'5. 5
What has been called moderate to severe fluctuations in the
derense industry occurred nationwide between 1963 and 1964.
The development of nuclear weapons and delivery systems had
reached an advanced stage known sometimes as "overkill."
This development plus a change in international relations
ushered in the beginning of a de-emphasis in military
output; and, coupled with the signing of the 1963 partial
nuclear test-ban treaty, a defense spending decline was
6
experienced. According to the federal government, national
spending dropped off from a 1962 high of $53.3 billion to
about $50.0 billion during the succeeding three years.
Actual calendar year Department of Defense expenditures
dropped in 1964 to 49.3 billion from $50.1 billion, while
budget figures rose to $51.2 billion in 1964 and dropped to
$47.4 billion in 1965. 7 In California, awarded annual
contracts dropped somewhat as might have been expected. The
increase in California's contracts from the federal govern-
ment peaked at $5.9 billion in 1962 and began to drop the
next year to a low of $5.1 billion in 1964. The succeeding
5Unfortunately, thorough analysis of actual reduc-
tion experience was not available. Good information pertain-
ing to defense reduction experiences and attitudes in New
Jersey is in Small Business_9onv~rsion... Hearings, pp.
211-50, passim. Application of these findings to the Bay
Area, however, was impractical.
6Lindner, "Diversification Progr-ess," p. l.
7Infra, Table D, Appendix I, pp. 192.
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years then experienced the increase evident at the national
level, probably because of the greater United States involve-
ment in Vietnam. 8 While the decline was not extremely large,
according to bUdgetary and contract figures, the reaction
and results in the Bay Area as well as the nation were sig-
nificant.
Between January, 1963 and the end of 1964, approxi-
mately 30,000 engineers and scientists plus an additional
100,000 support personnel were laid off throughout the
United States. 9 In the Bay Area about 1,800 engineers and
scientists were laid off between January 1, 1964 and March
31, 1965--about 8.0 percent of the total in the region. A
total of some 6,000 Bay Area defense industry personnel were
dismissed, triggering the layoff of about 4,000 employees
in commercial companies. "The defense layoffs," stated
Professor Raj P. Loomba of San Jose State College, "seem red]
to have resulted in a chain reaction which caused engineer
i
"
and scientific layoffs by non-defense compan es. Defense
layoffs, he added, occurred primarily between Januar-y and
August, 1964; whereas non-defense firms dismissed 67.8
percent of those employees let go between September, 1964
and March, 1965. The statewide layoff total, according to
Loomba, amounted to 26,400 workers; however, a California
8Supra , Table 19, p. 113.
9Engineering Employment, p. 17.
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State Assembly report stated only 13,600 workers were laid
off. 10 Nonetheless, Loomba's findings were Llgnificant.
The lay offs in the Bay Area had created "consider-
able alarm," according to a San Jose Mercury-News publica-
tion. The period between 1959 and 1963 had been, continued
the pUblication, ". • • a period of extensive, seemingly
uncontrolled growth while government contracts were plentiful
and jobs abundant." However, in 1964, "•.• a plateau was
reached in which budget cutbacks meant fewer contracts. ,,11
The decline in contracts brought ".•. a fight for sur-
viva1," according to one anonymous electronics manufacturer.
"For us," said another electronics industry executive, "this
is the same thing as disarmament."12 There was simply not
enough business, and the loss was certainly great. Profes-
sor Loomba reported that 57 percent of those laid off w~re
earning $10,000 or more per annum. The loss of the salaries
of only the engineers dismissed in Sunnyvale totaled
$7,000,000 annually in take-home pay. When lay offs of
JOR. P. Loomba, "A Study of the Re-employment and
Unemployment Experiences of Engineers and Scientists Laid
Off in 62 Aerospace and Electronics Companies in the San
Francisco Bay Area during 1963-65," Proceedings of the
National Symposium on Stabilization of Engineering and Scien-
tific EmDlov~ent in Industry (San Jose, California: Manpower
Research'Gr~up, Center for Interdisciplinary Studies, San
Jose State College, 1966), pp. 9-10. For statewide layoff
f~gures, see Impact of Federal Spending in California, p. 12.
llMarket Memo, August, 1965, pp. 1-2.
12Mercur~, December 6 and 7, 1963.
!~
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support personnel were considered, the annual take-home loss
was about $20,000,000. 13
An unusually large number of contracts had been
coming into the Bay Area because of the quality and quantity
of engineers and scientists in the area, according to one
source, and the lay offs were forcing these talented workers
to leave the region. 14 Loomba, who questioned 876 of those
engineers caught in the lay offs, ascertained that 61.6
percent of the engineers obtained new jobs in the Bay Area.
While th~s percentage indicated some resiliency in the local
economy, he noted that the new jobs offered lower salaries
than those obtainable outside the region. Indeed, 26 percent
of his sample had to leave California to find re-employment.
While only 54 percent of the sample had to leave defense work
for new positions, 78 percent had to accept considerably
different types of work to be re-employed. Finally, it was
observed that 17 percent of those remaining in defense work
had to leave the state for re-employment, ,,~hereas only about
9 percent of those who switched to commercial work left the
state+5
13R. P. J~omba, An Examination of the Engineering
Profession (San Jose, California: Manpower Research Group,
Center for Interdisciplinary Studies, San Jose State College,
1968), pp. 41-42.
l4Engineerln~Employment, p. 19.
l5Loomba, ".'\. Study of Re-employment," pp. 20-22.
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Loomba concluded that it would not be difficult for
engineers and scientists to shift from defenF~ to commercial
work, as 54 percent of his sample had done so without re-
training. Furthermore, he suggested that, if more R&D
were done by commercial companies, the problem would be 'even
smaller. 16 Perhaps this observation is significant, yet
engineers probably did not anticipate leaving their field.
It seems true that engineers expected to move from company
to company quite frequently. In fact, an electronics engi-
neer in~erviewed by the'writer suggested that changing
companies frequently to work on worthwhile projects was
becoming more desirable, for the experience enhanced the
record of the individual. 17 In any event, suggested William
Redmond, head of the state employment agency, ". . . those
who remain unemployed are those who lack the educational
qualifications, are over the usual retirement age, or for
other reasons cannot be matched with specialized reqUirements
16Ibid., p. 26. Impact of Federal Spending 1n
California, pp. 19-20, seems to support the deficiency in
commercial R&D. It notes that in commercial enterprise
about 28 percent of the employees are administrative and
scientific, whereas 53 percent of the defense-space industry
employees fall into this category. See also, California,
Department of Industrial Relations, Division of Labor
Statistics and Research, Trends in Aerospace and Federal
Government Employment (Sacramento, January 28, 1964), P; 3.
17Robert B. Small, private interview held at San
Jose State College, San Jose, California, April, 1969. See
also the comments of Eugene Rittenhouse, President, Western
College Placement tssociation, in Engineering Employment,
p. 94.
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of job openings. ,,18 If this contention were true during
stable economic periods, how much it could ha.e been magni-
fied during unstable periods remained unanswered. At least
there had been some indication that specialized personnel
could find re-employment with some ease. The conversion
by companies from defense to commercial production was much
more difficult to estimate, as will be discussed further
in this chapter.
The actual Bay Area decline during 1963 and 1964 was
probably. less than had been feared at the time. Overall
manufacturing employment did seem to drop by 1,000 employees
between 1964 and 1965, and a decline was experienced in
several defense related industries (see Table B, Appendix
II). Yet population continued to grow, personal income
increased consistently from $11.7 million in 1962 to $14 .6
million in 1965, and net buying power also rose. Even Santa
Clara County experienced constant growth in these areas.
Nonetheless, the apprehension at even a slight decline was
significant. Fears were widespread that the 1964 decline
1n R&D contracts was very serious, since these contracts
were generally followed by production contracts. Hence,
the reductions in 1963 and 1964 might have had rather
18Engineering Employment, p. 28. Robert B. Small
concurred that the less competent personnel were those who
do not find quick re-employment or leave the field.
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long-range repercussions. 19
There were, in fact, some minor repercussions. A
slowdown in regional housing construction was attributed to
aerospace employ~ent losses, utility companies experienced
less than normal expansion, and the service and trade indus-
tries witnessed some decline in business. 20 A comparison of
the San Jose SMSA defense reductions to those experienced
by San Diego betw~en 1958 and 1962 appeared in a Bay Area
real estate journal in 1964. It suggested that, while a
substantial defense industry decline would cause losses in
construction and in the rest of the economy, "••. the
catastrophic loss of all types of jobs which is sometimes
feared would not occur."2l Indeed, by late-1964 the situa-
tion seemed improved, and by 1965 it was stated by one local
newspaper pUblication that ". • . a rebirth of Santa Clara
County industry is evident as it is once again receiving a
substantial share of available contracts • • those
announced in the San Jose Mercury and News have a combined
valuation of nearly $3.5 billion. 1122 Within another year it
19"Paradox in the West, II Federal Reserve Bank of San
Francisco: Monthly Review, March 1965, p. 59.
20Ibid.; and Loomba, "A Study of Re-employment, II
PP.· 10-11.--
21John W. Cone, 11Employment Trends in the San Jose
Metropolitan Area, II Northern California Real Estate Report
(3d Quarter, 1964), 29.
22Market Memo, August, 1965, p. 2.
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was announced that recruiters for the defense-space indus-
tries reported that qualified people were more difficult to
find. 23 The reductions had ended, and prosperity seemed to
have returned--if, indeed, it had ever ceased. The Governor's
1968 economic report unconvincing1y noted that the resurgence
had been caused by increased orders for commercial airplanes,
a greater demand for sophisticated weapons, and the enhance-
ment of United States involvement in Vietnam. 24 Speculation
as to the real impact of reductions would continue.
Over the years bbth pessimism and optimism were
expressed concerning the effects of defense spending changes
in California and the Bay Area. The vIall Street Journal
noted in 1965 that any economic slowdown in California would
be felt throughout the nation. The 1964 hou~ing slowdown
in California, fer example, was perhaps the main part of
the national slowdown. Cutbacks in defense spending to
California particularly hurt firms outside the state who
did their subcontracting with California firms; for example,
Baird-Atomic, Inc. of Cambridge, Massachusetts lost 400
------.--_.-
23Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco: Monthly
Revie~J July, 196~ p. 136.
24Report of the Governor, 1968, p. 27. Karl G.
Harr, Jr., president of the Aerospace Industrial Association,
not~d that "..• most of the rise is due to the sales of
commercial aircraft, II in Bank of California, Pacific Coast
M~rkets and Business, May, 1966, unpaginated. Beport of the
Governor, 1968, p. 32, notes only a 17 percent rise in com-
mercial aircraft construction employment as opposed to an 83
percent rise in government aircraft construction employment
between 1965 and 1967.
(~
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employees between 1963 and 1964 as a result of California
setbacks. 25 In California speculation was el'~n more fore-
boding. A 1963 San Francisco Federal Reserve Bank report
stated: "A sharp cutback in military and space expenditures
James Gillies of the University of
would have far-reaching effects on the Twelfth District
1126economy. •
California at Los Aneeles had noted even earlier that
"••• if the aircraft industry were to reduce its output
substantially, the results in the economy would extend far
beyond unemployment in that one industry. 1127 Leaning
toward the positive side of the issue~ however, Governor
Reagan suggested in 1968 that the aircraft industry was too
commercially oriented to suffer significantly from defense
cutbacks. Rather the smaller ordnance and electronics
industries would be most adversely affected. 28
Others, to be sure, were more optimistic. Sid~ey
Sonenblum suggested that the economy of California in 1965
was already shifting away from manufacturing. Even if a
defense reduction came, California was favored, he believed,
with "••• the facilities and manpower needed for production
in those sectors and industries which are likely to show
25The Hall Street Journal, January 12, 1965, p. 1.
26Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco: Monthly
Review, February, 1960, p. 33.
27Metropolitan California, p. 10.
28Report of the Governor, 1968, PP. 32-33.
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rapid growth in the future."29 Another optimist, Orville F.
Poland of the University of California, observed in 1963 that,
because of the diverse local economy, the Bay Area was not
" . . . highly vulnerable to the vagaries of the market."
Unlike Detroit, which has its automobile industry, and
Seattle with her aircraft industry, the Bay Area was flex-
ible. "However, the continued expansion of electronics and
other industry related to the space and defense programs
will increase their importance to the local economy." Can-
cellations and obsolescence could create severe dislocation
in the Bay Area. But he hastened to add that other indus-
tries were also growing. 30 John Rubel also joined the ranks
of the optimists in 1965, when he wrote that continued
stability in defense expenditures was most probable. W11ile
increases might not be at a high rate, the nation could and
probably would afford a high defense expend! ture level. 31
Finally, however, another note of pessimism was entered
about the same time by economist Robert Arnold, who suggested
that major economic adjustment would certainly have to occur
in the event of defense cutbacks. Nonetheless, he too
reverted to reassurance. "California is not likely," he
29Hirsch and Baisden, California's Future, p. 15.
30Poland, Economic Trends, pp. 4 and 24-25.
3l John H. Rubel, "Economic Implications of Changing
Federal Expenditures," in Hirsch and Baisden, California's
Future, p. 20.
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added, "to experience a precipitous decline in defense or
space spending .•.• "32
The rhetoric of optimism and pessimism, however, had
existed for some time and would continue. Meanwhile, the
usually vague and sometimes very real threat of defense
reductions prompted further discusslon. What should be done
to soften defense cutbacks when they do become necessary?
Several recommendations were made. E. J. Mosbaek suggested
that defense industries did not necessarily need subsidatlon
to withstand reductions. Unlike those industries subject to
sudden large shifts--agriculture, for example, with its
subsidies, and air travel, with its substantial mail cargoes--
the defense industry would most likely have accurate fore-
warnings to preclude the need for subsidation. 33 On the
other hand, the United States Arms Control Agency claimed
that three methods used successfully after World War Two
should be planned to offset cutbacks: tax reductions;
expansion of public civilian expenditures through schools,
urban development, and transfer payments; and lower interest
rates and reserve reQulrements. 34 With these views in mind,
32Robert K. Arnold, "Potential Source of California's
Future Growth," in Hirsch and Baisden, California's Future,
Pp. 21!-25.
33Mosbaek, "Reductions in Defense Expenditures," p.50.
34u.S., Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 7he 1
Economic and Social Consequences of Disarmament: U.S. Rep~y
to-the Inquiry of the Secretary-General of the United Nations
(WaShington, D. C.: Goverament Prlnting Office, March, 1962),
PP. 9-10.
--..
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Sonenblum suggested that tax
reductions or increased govern-
ment spending would make little difference on total employ-
ment in the nation as a whole. Yet, he said, ". . . it
makes a considerable difference in terms of types of skills
that will be reqUired, the types of goods and services that
will be produced, and the types of needs that are satisfied."
Tax cuts would be felt by l' dncrease consumer purchases,
reSUlting in a demand for new clerical, sales, and service
skills. Government civilian expenditures, however, would
make an impact in fields that would emphasize demands for
professional skills employed 1n the defense-related indus-
tries. Such fields might include urban renewal, education,
and pollution control. 35
other planning suggestions were on a different
level. Paul Crappuchettes of Litton Industries, for example,
recommended that the Department of Defense give extenSive
relocation assistance to those defense industry specialists
laid off by contract cancellations. Furthermore, DOD should
cease cancellations at its convenience. 36 Professor Loomba
35Hirsch and Baisden, California's Future, p. 13. A
committee of the California State Assembly concurred in 1965,
in l-mpact of Federal Spending in California, p. 21, that new
educational techniques; mass-transportation systems; applica-
tion of advanced technology to agriculture, resource develop-
ment, medical science, and other purSUits could easily
absorb the attention of the so-called aerospace industry.
36Paul 1,>1. Crappuchettes, "The Stabilization of Engi-
neering Employment by Correction of the Factors Producing
Instabili ty," Proceedings of the National Symposium on~~abillzation of Engineering and Scientific Employment in
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echoed this same view, adding that DOD h
s ould stop giving
short-range contracts So as to provide stability, and engi-
neers should organize to prevent sUdden lay off8. 37 Still
another suggestion came from Mosbaek, who proposed that
making data available to specific geographic areas would
place upon the residents of the areas the responsibility for
formulating the policies to meet reduction impact in their
areas. However, George Jensen rebutted Mosbaek. He recog-
nized that information on defense reductions was indispens-
able for planning, but would likely not be used by the
communities. 38
Varied and provocative were the recommendations for
limiting the impact of defense reductions. Attention was
focused on one of these which Frank Stedman perhaps best
introduced for Bay Area consideration:
The specialization in electronic components makes
the area far les5 vulnerable to shifts in government
procurement policy than areas with one large final
contractor. Many companies have such a broad range
of products that they can shift from one missile sys-
tem to another or f3§m military to civilian productio~with relative ease.
However, considerable debate raged about this view, because
Industry (San Jose, California: Manpower Research Group, ~
Center ror Interdisciplinary Studies, San Jose State Colleoe,
1966), p. 90.
37Loomba, An Examination, pp. 49-53.
38Mosbaek, "Reductions in Defense Expenditur;;s,fI
p. 52; and Jensen, "Defense Expenditures: A Comment, p. 81.
39Stedman, "The California Peninsula," p. 48.
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of dizagreement concerning defense-industry diversification
abilities. In fact, discussion of diversification was less
than positive.
It was often stated, by those claiming that the
growth of defense-oriented industries during the 1950's and
1960's was not a worry, that conversion to commercial pro-
duction had been proven easy at the conclusion of World War
Two. They contended that the same steps could easily be
taken again. Yet the situation was not as similar as might
have been supposed. Conversion after World War Two had
generally been a problem of reconversion--returning to the
production of previously produced commercial goods. TYJe
manufacturers knew that it was to be a short-run problem.
"Even so," noted the Arms Control Agency, "not all defense-
goods manufacturers succeeded 1n converting to non-defense
production after World vlar Two and the Korean conflict. ,,40
In contrast to World War Two and even Korean War defense
production, a significantly 18rger share of defense produc-
tion during the late-1950's and 1960's was performed by
highly specialized contractors. Many of their products
bore no resemblance to civilian items, and many of these
contractors had never experienced production problems in the
commercial market. As William Baldwin noted, "... for
m~ny of these companies, there [wa~ no reconversion problem
40President's Committee, Report, p. 11.
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as such, because they had never 'converted' from civilian
production in the first place."41 On Decembe~ 6, 1963, the
San Jose Mercury reported one Bay Area executive as saying
that the industry had been nurtured in an environment in
which reliability and quaIl ty were far more important than
price. "We're not equipped," he added, "to sell to the
commercial market where cost is a big factor.... "
Finally, comparison to the World War Two conversion experi-
ence was less than accurate because the latent consumer
demand resulting fr~m several years of short supply did not
exist during the 1950's and 1960's.42
Conversion was not considered impossible, but few
believed it would be easy. The defense industries would
have found it impractical to diversify internally, suggested
Governor Reagan in 1968. Rather, he continued, they would
have to convert through merger \'Iith and acquisition by
established commercially-oriented firms. Therefore, diver-
sification and eventual conversion would have been a very
gradual process. 43 Others suggested that conversion--even
41William L. Baldwin, The Structure of the Defense
!"1arket, 1955-1964 (Durham, North Carolina: Duke Uni~ersity
Press, 1967), p. 12, quoting Stanford Research Instltu~e,
"Industrial Adjustments to Shifts in Defense Spending, in
U.S., Senate, Committee on Labor and Public Welfare,
Selected Readings in Employment and Manpower (Washington,
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1964), II, 700.
42Impact of Federal Spending in California, p. 19.
43Report of the Governor, 1968, p. 52.
I
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diversification--would have to be gUided by government.
Senator William Proxmire of Wisconsin noted i~ 1967 that
defense industries would turn easily t ~ t IIo a sys ems analysis
approach in the fields of pollution, urban development, and
mass transportation. Such conversion plans did seem to hold
promise, yet Charles L. Schultze, Director of the Federal
Bureau of the Budget, replied that working with the multi-
tUde of local governments would be a major roadblock in such
pursuits. There would have been no single source for con-
tracts in these new fields, as DOD had been for defense
work. 44 Nonetheless, it remained an alternative to total
conlmercial conversion, and it was observed in 1965 that some
firms were turning tc these new noncommercial fie1ds. 45
Diversification was perhaps forced upon Bay Area
defense companies during the early 1960's as a result of
the contract declines of that period. In Lindner's 1967
study, ~t was observed that military sales had declined in
56 firms from 70 to 55 percent of total sales between 1961
and 1965. While the Bay Area firms still relied heavily
on the military market for over half its business in 1965,
Lindner's study revealed a fairly widespread trend toward
some diversification. As was noted earlier, however, this
diversification was not totally toward the civilian market.
44Vietnam Spending, I, pp. 60-61.
J~5Seymour Melman, Our D~pleted Society (New York:
Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 19b5), p. 213.
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While a 15 percent decline in sa~les t tho e military market
did occur, there was a seven percent increase in sales to
the space market and a one percent increase in sales to
other government markets. Thus diversification to civilian
markets--i.e., industry and consumers--amounted to seven
percent, and it was assumed that there was not an increased
trend in accepting defense-space subcontracts from the
industrial market. 46 In 1968 the San Jose Mercury pointed
out several diversification attempts in Bay Area defense
firms. The Lockheed Missiles and Space Company was di vers1.-
fying within the military market. In the non-military
market the firm was initiating projects in petroleum, educa-
tion, hospitals, and law enforcement. Philco-Ford had
started projects in sewage treatment, water systems, and
rapid transit; Sylvania Corporation was in highway planning
and water resources; and United Technology was working in
garbage disposal and pipelines. One of the earliest Bay
Area derense firms, Varian Associates, was observed to have
reduced military sales as a part of total sales from 80 per-
cent in 1963 to 40 percent in 1968. However, the article
added that the diversification, beginning as a result of the
1963 1 6 i
PI not substantial enough yet
- 9 5 recess on, was . . •
to provide any big hedge against future downturns in defense
46Lindner, "Diversification progress," pp. 38-42;
and supra, pp. 126-127.
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spending. !Ih7
Indeed, it was during the years immediately following
the 1963 to 1964 defense spending decline that serious ef-
forts were made toward meeting the threat of future cutbacks.
Perhaps the most significant step taken was that announced
by California Governor Edmund G. Brown at a symposium
concerning the state's future economic growth held at the
University of California at Los Angeles in November, 1964.
Brown seemed to have recognized the problem, when he ob-
served:
•.. 37 percent of our manufacturing industry is
concentrated In ordnance, aircraft, electrical, and
instrument production. All are vulnerable to cutbacks
and phaseouts in the federal government's space and
defense programs, as we have seen in the Navajo PEggram
in 1955 and the Skybol t program of two years ago.
B~own then propo&ed a program designed to utilize the tal-
cnts of the aerospace industry to solve social problems
facing California residents. The industry, he said, would
be given contracts by the state government to study trans-
portation problems, design a system to improve collection of
statistical data concerning diseases and educational require-
ments, study the problem of the criminally and mentally ill,
and research the problems of waste management. An Advisory
Panel on the Aerospace and Electronics Industries, composed
47Mercury, October 27, 1968.
48Edmund G. Brown, "A Systems Engineerl~g Approach
to Community Problems: A California Expe!~J..ment,' in Hirsch
and Baisden, California's Future, p. 41.
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of business, academic a d
, n government representatives, was
established during the same year to study the problems posed
by shifts in defense spending. Furthermore, Brown prompted
organization of a Seminar on Industry Planning to Meet
Shifts in Government Demand, which met in San Francisco and
Los Angeles for off-the-record discussions by union, busi-
ness, government, university, research, and civic group
representatives. As a result, important steps had been
taken by California to determine the capabilities of the
aerospace industry in applying its talents to nondefense
issues and in preparing for the impact of defense cutbacks
on the region's economy. 49 "Governor Brmin' s announcement, II
said economist Murray Weidenbaum, ". . • is the most signi-
flcant development that has yet occurred in the whole
defense adjustment field." 50
While Brown's program was designed to show the way
for further defense industry investments in civilian programs
and further government spending in this area, industry
balked and no government funds followed the initial con-
tracts. Frank W. Lehan, vice-president of Aerospace General
Corporation in El Monte, noted in 1966 that there were no
substantial follow-up funds; and since the defense business
49Ibid., pp. 42-43; President's Committee, Report,
PP. 41-42; and Engineering Employment, p. 9.
50 W id b "The Federal Government'sMurray L. e en aum,
Role in Defense'Cutback Adjustment," in Hirsch and Baisden,
California's Future, p. 37.
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picture had brightened, "..
• our industry has to do the
things that the country \'lant~ done. "51 P~ erhaps what Lehan
meant was that his industry had to engage in the enterprises
that brought a profit. In any case, funds dWindled, and
Governor Brown was reported to be in hopes of acquiring
federal money to continue the program. Furthermore, he was
reported to have said that, if he could win a third term
in office, the program could feasibly overcome hurdles
against it in the state legislature. 52 When Ronald Reagan
became governor, the program was all but cast aside. The
new governor announced in 1968 that industry people did not
feel that applying funds to solutions of social problems \'las
a good alternative for absorbing slack in defense-space
cutbacks. It was simply too difficult to sell such projects
to the community, so activity in these fields would remain
token. 53
Diversification without the government's assistance,
though, remained slow. As late as 1969, it was observed
that the larger, dominant defense firms were tending to hold
entrenched positions in defense work and that competitive,
184
formally advertised bidding for contracts 54was less frequent.
While the number of firms performing an overwhelming percent
of their work in defense-space programs was not extremely
large, even those large firms doing less than half of their
business with DOD and NASA conducted that work in separate
defense product divisions or departments. As far as the
problems faced, these divisions were almost the same as
purely defense-oriented companies. 55 The general trend in
the defense industry seemed to have been to delay diversifi-
cation. Melman suggested that, perhaps, senior management
and technical personnel in these firms did not really want
to consider conversion. Their lives had been spent becoming
specialists in the military market, and nowhere In the
civilian market did they see prospects of the billion dollar
sales that were possible under the relatively insured condi-
t ions of DOD and NASA. "These men," he added, "are unsure
of the occupational position and, to allay their doubts,
they have devoted themselves to seeking ways to extend the
milttary market. "56 Professor Loomba of San Jose State
College continued along this line of thought, noting that
many companies found little motivation toward diversification,
54U S Congress Joint Economic Committee, Subcom-
. ., ~ , Th r- i f
mittee on Economy in Government, Report: e Leonom cs 0
Military Procurement, 9lst Cong., 1st sess., May, 1~69,
PP. 4-5. -
55Melman, Our Depleted Society, p. 218.
56Ibld., p. 217.
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as an excess of company personnel were retired militar~
personnel or aircraft and misSl"Ie deSigners." Th• .• ese
individuals," he concluded, "are not capable of leading
t.heir companies successfully into commercial markets. "57
Consequently, the debate over diversification and the only
visible answer to the defense-industry's 1 bvu nera Ie position
in the economy seemed at a stalemate.
In California and the Bay Area, the problem seemed
partially recognized. Yet the hopeful program launched by
Governor Brown had fallen by the wayside. The non-standard-
ized nature of the defense-space industry's products, the
highly skilled and technological labor requirements of the
indust~J, and the contract-project nature of the industry's
market had all cr-ea ted powerful and mutually reinforcing
forces for high geographic concentration. California and
the Bay Area had experienced this very phenomenon.
The scientific talent which had grown in California
largely because of World War Two provided the leadership
making California a logical place for defense spending. The
industrial base in research and development, electronics,
57Engineering Employment, p. 22~ That many :etlre~
military personnel found new joOS in de!ense Industrles haa
been fairly well substantiated by government investigation.
For example, the House Armed Services Committee found in
1960 that "..• 72 leading military contractors employed
1 426 former hiah-rankinoa military officers [in 19591 I,C> ,,- 1including 251 former generals and admirals. Qu~ted in Car
Marzani and Victor Perlo, Dollars and .§.ense of Dlsarnament
(New York: Marzani and Munsell, Publishers, 1960;, p. 207.
rr·?
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and aircraft production provided the logical framework for
further defense spending. The i t ti
n erna onal scene after
World War Two seemingly provided the need f
or ever-increasing
expenditures. Between 1940 and 1950, the number of engi-
neers increased 89 percent throughout the nation. Yet in
California, this group of professionals, who were to be the
basic working group of the defense-space industry, increased
131 percent. Between 1950 and 1960, while the national
increase dropped to 64 percent, it grew in California to
147 percent. 58 Clearly, the growth of this professional
group illustrated the impact of defense-space spending on
California. Estimates placed the dependency of California
upon defense spending at somewhere around 20 percent of
the state's personal income, and in the Bay Area the depen-
dency factor was about 10 percent of the region's personal
income. Inconsequential change was seen in the future, and
virtually no fear of reduced defense spending was apparent.
While it was pointed out that the defense industries were
dependent on political decisions, it was also observed that
it was unlikely that defense spending would change. 59
As a result, the thirty years folloWing the outbreak
or World War Two had prOVided a most profitable period of
economic growth for California and the Bay Area. Hhlle
58Shapero, Howell, and 'l'ombaugh, Explora tory Stud~l,
p. 112.
59Po1and, Economic Trends, p. 24.
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somc~'1ha t a\'/are of tlle vulnerability of their industrial base,
re5idents of the Bay Area and much of the rest of California
did not seem to have considered the possible ramifications
of their reliance upon that base. Although there may have
been some consciousness of the problem in the Los Angeles
area, elsewhere the tranquility of life continued. Yet it
was apparent that Bay Area residents, at least, had some-
thing in common w~th their southern California neighbors.
The economic changes wrought by World War Two had added a
new chapter to the economic history of all parts of Cali-
fornia.
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~L·}L·;,'~·!S/: orr~ 8.n:-.uZll :..ve.lC1i'i.?~; {()r ~=~~U t·J.i:f 21'1- 'or Janu;.ry;
~',1' .1S'~ l:J:Ju aile! 1', ;,,-1905 t;l(~Y 3ro:; for ... 1;,1- Y j ~r 1 :or 1 5Y ey
are . 'or' Jl.l:ie.
TABLE B
r~SUR~D EMPLOY~·.E.\T IN THE SAN FRANGISICO BJ\Y f.,:1EJ., 1939-1965
'le-,;' .:'e11<ible, 35
I'; -::. J.~.• "~'l ii. L;l :;0 r
iD~ i-', 'J ,- 'J' 0-1v 11 t l'\e:CLl-:-2. te_
. c.;. ... ~ ~ , (, ~ ..,
!~~-." .. -.' • 11'~ rro 0'-'
..." oJ~':' ~ r; '. ,j'" ..... a _' I" _
th·?:" arp inte~'~'Ll'~; ~.:['~~ ""cs froI:1 :'hc
S'L~.~" :3~ :_C~) (~\I ~ ~r)
fFor some years after 1950 this ca~ ~6ury may i~lC1udc fi ... :iH'CS
for ordnance v:h:\.ch are estirnated in the ordnance cn tegory.
gPor tre year.-; 1939 throu~h 1944, this ('ategory inc1udl;s t:i1e
total fibures for 301ar.o and !';3.r.i.n. Coum;icG ?or the year 1945, 1 t
includes ~he total tor Solano County.
.-
~ 1952 1953 199+ 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959
, I 208,933 227,542 220,942 220,196 235,047 ~49,113 243,005 257,06',., 1,187 1,775 1,26in 1,804 2,300n 4,409 9,442 P 13,ootoJ}I 52,261 54,065 53,952 47,01.j.5 54,808 55,4 8 52,585 48, ~(llb b b b b b b
1 I 2,216 1,988 2,083 2,054 1,657 1,807 1,051 1,048, '792 9,241 9,104 9,5 Lf6 9,223 9,320 8,642 8,45
3,726 3,528 3,2270 3,831 3,581 3,119 3,150 3 40
5,132 4,667 4,231 4,572 4,851 4,769 4,616 5,76
~
:,,009 6,251t 6 ... 537 7,346 8,368 8,886 9,258 9,69:'
16,937 17,526 17,814 18,518 19,539 20,16 20,263 20,55~ I· 12,199 12,715 12,533 12,795 13,023 13,628 13,006 12,98F
t 13,223 12,735 13,120 13,215 12,851 12,755 12,050 11,961;I 1,313 1,619 1,326 1,42'( 1, 45L~ 1,43_ 1,823 2,07";1,148 1,299 1.218 996 1,012 979 998 8T'
7,924 8... 315 8,379 8,705 9,182 9,318 9,540 9,330
r, ' 8,575 13,952 11,920n 12,20Sn 8,961no 12,')8 12,951 14,495
18,853 20,465 20,567 I 21,500 22,355 23, J.8_' 22,100 23,959
1'(: '742 18,120 18,157 18,204 20,73l 22,O!.;{ 16,721 19,89~
11.951 13,1'(6 :i.2,60g 13,310 17,93- 22,2S -. 22,968 28,208
15,021 19,8'(6 17,185 16,414 15,525 17,20 ' 16,325 17,296
5,'714 8,967 7,658 4:934 If,6 r( 7,49-( 7' 575 1 () J f/7r~'L 1,754 3,070 3,340 2,198 2,680 3,303 2,285 3,1697,390 7,647 5,945 6,146 5,421 6 ... lLt2 6,037 !1,399
1,153 1,192 1,192n J.,466 l,701 n 2,or57n 2, 062 1 2,351
_ It,571 4, I.+- 34 l~ } 524 5,189 5,991 3 ... ~~.9:' ..., 1 t:" Jt -, ;;; ~[1:J, .y -J~o •. ,
1,317 1,797 1,793 2,064 2... 399 2,217 2,8~T.3:76;i
1,500 1,578 1,350 1,699 1,8rr 1,81'7 2,0]'( 2,.l~6
73,026 63,078 60,753 73,549 78,5h9 77 ,OT~ ! 76,699 I 80 933
83,~O3 8'r.~ 117 83 Lao 8'( ,893 93,969 100,859 96,432 97,189
217,880 202,381 217,960 23~ J li25 238,18}.+- 21+6,15 233,388 242,708
59,14] 59,991 59,888 66,891 63,989 66,000 65,860 67,h99
92,555 93,687 94,139 97,'774 103,595 108,41C . 117,528 133,'370, 503 lt85 472 :i2e 508 6:::< i 509 860
b b b.____~ b 86,6c6 i 83,361 8J.+,116~ ..
I 738,618 'r37 .. 656 740 1 707 I73'/ ,091818,1'17 552 .~~-:<'7 1829,411 , .s70 J 10lt725 ..8~679,334
fluc~uaticn~ not indicated.
Da~a not av~ildble c insufficient.
FCH the year-s 1939 through 191t6 J th.~t category was c 1a-ss1-
'Iron 3.nd Ster:l end 'lh~tr Products,"
For t}le Jt:.3.':'~ 1935! t;:l'()u~h 1946, thi~' catez.ory ,..:as cla~si
Nonr(~-,-.~ous :-wlf·ta.lD L1r;. ...J. '1~""jc.. J.r Pro,,:i ctR,~'
hFederal insta.llati ns and E\~C:"'r~al civilian el1lp1o:liT:e:1'c; '~tle
latter as covered lJy Title ,:V of th~ S·_ c l.:.d ~"; ·u:c·. :v .t". ':". T'.JLll
figure for Bay '\[' a 'oes not incl a8 r~C\~·p3.__ SG';c;t' .. '-:l(;'.n.., L;]:~lo'l ,':1'1,.
,f:nc ludes a 1l 'nanufac tU:::'11g i'or Marin C nty; a large amount
:,L 'Dleh war the ~~tpbuildin~ industry at Marin 8hi ya~d.
nEsti! .<.1\. ~( frum <... ta for other months and previous and suc-
"C~,:llg years.
o . igur_s 10:. due to tr de d ~., ute.
PData for the month of July.
qInclud~s a <mall number of other durable industries for the
Jose S;·!S~,.
Sour E' '3 :
't
TABLE C
:I iJSGRED Er'lFL"'YffI"SN1' IN THE SAN JOSE r-1E'rROPOLITJI.N [',rEA, f· 951-1965
961 1962 1963 196J.i 1965
-
,fJ73 87,891 90 ,271 j 89,353 50 ,00°1
. r-'3? 26,443 26,l166 21-1-,000e; ';:7,408
.' \.~ -
,1487 15,579 16,1131 16,334 16,ll00
b b b b b
b b b b b
498 516 565 632 b
553 591 710 650 700
382 410 417 546 b
s~38 1,703 1,671 1,70? } 5,000
,492 2,760 2., "-(71 2,95i.l
944 1,003 1,051 1,198 1,2006(' 87 b b b';}
3')1 380 464 494 b
b b b b b
-'")8 2,527 2,562 2,609 C-',800, ?)
(26 694 704 742 b
/)55 2,273h 2,379 2,466 2~500
7°°/ 6,864 6,534 7,338 8,7(;0J J./
J ':\7 i\ I 22,013 23,027 22,957 2!t J 000
,863\ 2,709 2,606 3,0?9 b642 887 1,056 1,183 b
i+og I 452 367 377 1,300
b 2_6,956 24,122 1 b
1
(-i33 712 758 826 b
86 126 11+7 124 100
7~8 17,883 20,507 19,721 19,900
c) 25 8,680 9,301 10,055 12,200
034 38,855 41,921 46,6i.l1 L",goo
',68 '(,647 8,484 9,252 9,700
3'(1 26,635 30,187 32,434 50,100
2 0 117 )90 229 b
S41,
.
5,020 5.652 5,756 7,700
•"'T~.: 58,638 201, 87 Ji 208.663 273,500i......v .
.,
L
fFederal instG.-ll<itions and Federal c .Ii t .d,an "'"lp1oymentj the
latter as covered by l:~le X T of the Soc~al :e~~rity Act,' Total fig-
ure for San Jose S~lliA d~es no~ include F~d~ra' oJvernment employment.
gEstimated frc~ data for other manton ,oct preVious and suc-
ceeding years,
hLow July figures becau"'e 0 '" trac.~ GJ,5 jLn;e.
ilncludes so. ' ordnance enployment.
. . . . . . .
aData for the month of Junej all o~her data for July,
bData not a 'ailab1e, insufficient, o~ no ~mployment
reported in category.
cSeasonal fluctuations not indicated.
dAlmo~t entirely motor vehicles.
, ~irr 1~ for ordnance
eThis c3tegory probably incluoes - b t__ es catC'f;orY,~ h 1',1 "'.o~e cars J are est ima ted in the o:"onance
\1/ ) ... C .'
Total
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing
Mineral Extraction.. , .
Co~1 ract Consrructton .. , .
Transportation & Utilities . ,
W.lOles11e & Rei.:ai1 Trade , , ..
Flnance, Ins\1rance, Real Estate
Service Indus tries . ,..
onclassif1able . . , , .
Federa 1 Government f . , ,
====1=n=d=U=S2=t=r=1=e=s=========~=10=J=5=1~-';;5=2=~=1=9~='~954 - ~55 19S6 19S7 l;~~~T~I~l~g~:ls~gla_1 ~~;~~
ManL~fucturing Industries. 28,372 ~),076 31,60~) 32~494 34,460 42,418 50,982 54,b21+ 58,294 73.29!!-1' 80
Ord ance & Accessories . . • . . b b b 800g, 1, 300g 2, ooog 4,306 9, UJ.j2 J 13,OOOe; 18 ~ 625,; ;,.::,
Food & Kindred Productc C 14,307 ,1."t,605 15,439 16,lSQ I 12,921 17,648 17,6h8 13,[,'53 9J 426 18,624-I}S
Tobacco Manufacturers . . . . b b b bib b b b b b
TextIle 1'-1111 Products . . . b b b b b b b b b b
pparel . . . . . . . . • • . . b b 3liO 315 361 42 1+ 458 031 1149 507
Lumb::!r & 'I'bod Products .... 1,150 1,047 1,036 96 Jth . 1,218 1,224 1,136· J.J-~91 },177 631
Fur;Ji turl,; & Fixtures . ,.. b b b b b 'u b b 396 46li
Paper & tIlled Products . . . . b b 319 372 658 1,218 1,03''"( 1,1Lt-J.+ 1,272 1,18rrPrintin~ & PublishilH .. , .. 1,187 1,250 l s 311 1,354 1,490 1,722 1,753 1,'~5r{ 1,516 2,S65
Chemicals & Products , ,.. 671 628 676 725 781 798 861 u58 824 893
Pet roleum & Coal . , , , , , . , b b b b b b b b b I
Rutbe r P)'o d~c t:3 b b b b b b b b b b I
Leati-ler & Products , b b b b 8 ~ 1.84bl 2.34b1" ?--..?.1-7:J 2, J' S,b6 ~'i:3)~4- I ,...StO'1C, CJc:::,r, &:. GJ.ass • , , 1,531 1,506 ! 1,481~ 1,7281 1, 3,)(; ~ , 't , -..: t ~ ~'... ."
Primrtry I'leta} Industries . , • , 2006 297
1
' 227 200b 258/"0 250
g
35'""( '/55 7'79
Fabl'icCl ed lllctal Products . ,. 1,620 1,l~~~ ],,509 1,526 [ 1,889 2,159 2,367 2,_69 2,648 2,709 j 2
l'taci1inery (:,Jonel C'1,rical) 2,458 2,8uo 2,61 JI- 2,551 2 .. 592 2,909 4,7Ll-i.l '-1,··~9 ~ 773 5,58'( I 5
EJectr:!cal .~-:\chinp.ry . , , I 4,07\bJb) 4'~2~~- \1 S,03U' 4,847 5,4::'31 7,14·1 9,697 10,':95 13,71U 16,83L~ 11 }tJ
d b ') 8-=<<"> 2,4Q2 3.11] -, ~J' .:>,1; 2,L,c;f"\ 2,,'"-':<'( I .;:'
'::,'ranf;port;.lLioD ~·,:u1~T1Cr.t 5($ ·-'·IO·JO::;o 20-0g ' 5oogl ~ ,..Iil r;~~) 7.-'S-)(; .:InGtr'ument~ Industries . b J - II.;: .... u '
6 00"" I 303 317 35° Ll05, J~ ~2 P2 i.oF5 .'.!":l'.l1sceJlan·;ol13 . . . ,,1,3-"~) 2, I .) - I 'f) ."- --'~ I
_
Otr:crc ..... ..,_. ._, ....E... "- t. \! 1" 3~2. 1 :617 2,100 2 ,43I:_ 891_~:18 !-5 .• 3F? 1.~ ~:nJ·;·kl
"1 --='-- - --',--- --
I 290 2'70 I 268 2 rr9 I 339 367 374 ,,)1 698 5S9 I
58 40 44 50 81 135 101 96 J.42 86
8,236 8,885 7,S7l lO,OlS 11,106 13,]95 13,176 14,)15 16,595 16,278 16,
5,032 5,501 5,363 5,3Jn 6,121 6,826 7, LI 21 7,..).14.\ ""(,J+79 8,316 ~
18,475 ig,8S2 21,)09 21,23? 23,494 25,853 29,399 28>~78 31,200 3~,275 ~6,
2,859 2,934 3,359 3,616 5,4]3 4,048 4,629 5,18J+ 5,510 6,JH7 I '6,
7,127 7,556 8,04-:> 8,251 9,830 11,019 ·)2,219 13,,}34 16,41) 19,9+5 I ;;'J"
80 89 )9 50 79. 81 95 33 200 171! I -~
b _~b~__~b~ b~~__~b~ ~b~_~3~6_4~7~_~3~'~ 4.~o 4.5~j. d.
70,529 75~2~~0~3~~7~7~,~7_1_8~_ 90,923 104,002 118 396 123 ~J9 136,533 158,735 -;~2'
jJune figures shown as estimate.
kDecpease fro", normal annual a verage of a roxl-
!lltUelY 20)500 caused by trade dispute. Include 0 d-
ne.ti1ce and accc ~ sories.
lIncludes a small number of other durable e;oo s
emp}o:lment.
Sources:
\·!:\G~.s PAID Ii: l\jAJOR L~0USTnIAL CROUPS AND S L"':C7.;D SUBGROUPS r T '1' g SA ,
DURING J 939 J J.;A4.. .,.;'49 J 199!, 1~:J9 AND 1. 64a
(In thou~a.d r ollars)
FRf I cr ..... c
193:.-
$ 205,090
b
13,124
11,708
814
27,912
2,614
8,730
6,228
b
b
==== -==~=====;=====--
1944 -- I .- l~S_4-.-:9,-o-__o_·--r-i_~--=l/~r ':::--_~---:l::.c;..:...-. __
$ 98SJ056-r J 6~1,95~ $ 990 9~7
5,4'7? I U 7 3 690
28,590 1 42,462 63,255
42,99c.. 'I 53.)4E? 76 163
1,928 ' 2,664 6,1 3
60,674 \' 4?,711 55,8]9
9,404 . 56.)979 96,4 2
55,677 I 49,7c} 8,~54
17,611t I 22,579 62,J+OJ
537 , 87)!: l7 , bT:- 811 , ,,} ';
b 2, 7'j' 1.1, ~ ../)
._-_..- --'---------
Manufac: uri..~_; '. "Jus trie:
Or"Jd~1(~1;{'2 l:'~ .' ~:cessorie~ .
Che~lcQ]s ~ :rodu.ts .
?pti'OlC'i.-'l 0, ,odl .
Rubber ~: ";....0 :'l:,·~. c:; • • • • •
Prl~,~apy '.'_"?1~·)1 .- f:8'J.stl'::'es c
F:-1b-"ic'·· " ~._) P j' ,t"d... J. __ ,.C,J vd. rcl. ...lc oJ •
Mach.l· "'r'-, i" '1" i "'Ct' ..,~ , -.'" )
• ~. .) \ ...._ ..... ~. ,I~. '-.. C J.
Elec trlc: _ . ::.(;~i nex'y _ .
'rr~n~n"r' -".' - n ..• ,' 0'" ta! ... , ~} I,. C. .. ., ,_ \...f 1.:..; ~ ... I' • '"':~ rl
111 <:1 t- >","'p 1'1; • 1 .,' ';t' -.', f-' ~_~ ~ I v~_) ~.,. "",.. ...... ........ _ ......
e r
a
,
".ic,nferro·\3 .,-,...·&1
;: <' :Iron and Steel an
bDa t.:~ "ot :lV3 :'lable or ln8L ffIc ient.
cFo! 1. '-.e year'::; 1939 and J SA4, this category was (' l' '" - .1. Pie
dFor t:l. years 1939 and ,1944, this category \'las c).:.l, "",'..fied a!'l
erne lu.- es tota 1 fj gures fo,,~ r·1arin and Solano Cou "It l.C~~.
fFigurcs are ta: 2n f'l'om flj,Uscel1aneouS ~4amlf'3cl,uri, .,
Sent da ta for -J. he aer-osp:".ce indu trJ.
TABLE E
BAY AREA PERSONAL INCOME AND 'NET BUYING POWER, 1950-1965
= =
1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 I 1958 1959
Personal Income (000): a
SMSAb .San Francisco-Oakland
·
$5,780,952 d d d d $6,528,781 $7,057,594 $7.443,727 $7 ,713,463 8,294,606
San Jose SMSA
· · · · · · · · ·
518,247 d d d d 889,600 1,016,861 1,152,019 1,297,836 1,5 110,16?
Bay Area . .
· · · · · · · · ·
5,299,199 d d d d 7 .418,,381 8.074,455 8,595,746 9,011.?99 9.e34 768
Net Buying Power: c I
San Francisco-Oakland SMSA:
Per Capita
· · · · · · · · ·
1,820 1,893 1,921 2,104 2,069 2,180 2,318 2,373 2,345 2,528
Per Household
· · · · · · · ·
5,575 5,909 5,856 6,252 6,238 6,570 6,995 7,167 7,099 7,732
Total (000)
· · · · · · · · ·
3,996,728 4,341,294 4,479,185 5,008,171 5,119,810 5,461,863 5,934,900 h,141,070 6,185,834 6,630,874
San Jose SMSA
Per Capita
· · · · · · · · ·
1, 1.~07 1,465 1,724 1,771 1,737 1,837 1,953 1,999 1,9b6 ,134
Per Household
· · · · · · · ·
4,433 4,941 5,665 5,676 5,645 5,969 6,346 6,497 6,390 6,937
Total (000)
· · · · · · · · ·
415,348 457,557 565,339 615,898 666,057 816,013 956,962 1,050,487 1,113,058 1,308,244
Bay Area:
Per Capita
· · · · · · · · ·
1,613 1,679 1,822 1,613 1,679 1,822 1,937 1,903 2,008 2,135
Per Household
· · · · · · · ·
5,004 5,425 5,760 5,004 5,425 5,760 5,964 5,941 6, 69 6,670
Total (aoo)
· · · · · · · · ·
4,412,076 4,798,851 5,044. ')24 4,412 076 4,798,851 5,044,524 5,624,069 5J~867 6,89 1 , 862 7,191,277
1960 1961 1962 1963 1961.1 1965
$8,511,917 $9,007,501 $9,550,190 $10,254,626 $10,961 ,194 $11,736,845
1,776,654 1,964,695 2,206,812 2,452,646 ' 2,672,053 2,887,985
10,288,571 10,972,196 11,757,002 12,707,272 13,633,247 14,624,830
2,728 2,633 2,673 2,823 2 953 3,090
8,479 7,986 8,130 8,554 8,962 9,360
"7,660,774 7,582,187 7,034,307 8,159,745 8,702,853 9,361,267
2,300 2,359 2,392 2,489 2,607 2,733
7,396 8,229 8,318 8,614 9,014 9,413
1,537,'707 1,687,679 1,687,683 2,056,913 2,234,585 2,467,999
2,514 2,496 2,532 2,656 ' 2,780 2,911
7,937 8,107 8,224 8,584 8,988 9,386
9,198,481 g,269,866 8,721,990 10,216,658 10,937,438 11.829,266
aCal1fornia, Department of Finance, Ca1iforn_~ S
Abstract, 1964 (Sacramento, 1964), p. 174-78, for ye~r--~~'
Abstract , 1968, p. 55, for years 1960-1965.
bIncludes Solano County
cOakland Chamber of Comn~rce, Research De.arlment, 1961Handbook: Comparative Data, Bay \rea Cou ties (Oakland, California:
Oakland Chamber of Commerce, 196,), p. 3; San Jose ~ercury- ews,
Market Memo: Current Trends an ?rosEec s nero San Jo and
the at 10n (San Jose, Ca i ornia, July, 1~68), u ar. ina. ted; ('ales
Management, May 10, 1951, pp. 13) and 179; . ay 10, 1952, P . 174
and 218; May 10, 1953, p. 181 a a 252; ay 10, 1954, p • 198 and.
280; May 10, 1955, pp. 168 and 2~6; ~2Y 10, 1956, P). 185 and 292,
May 10, 1957, pp. 136 and 248; 13.y 10, 1958, pp. 150 and 25l l;
May 10, 1959, pp. 126 and 245; J11y 10, 1960, p. 95; ,ay 10, 1961,
p. 90; June 10, 1962, p. 609; Ju~e 10, 1963, PP· 195 and 562;
June 10, 1964, p. 122; June 10, 1965, p. 120; and June 10, 1966,
p. C-17.
dData not available.
T 1
1\.
B.
y Ar
1
APPE DIX III
Y REA AiUFACTURI G MARKETS
lon of Total Em loyment to Initial
. c or and Local Industries and
rec an Indirect Employment to
c or , by Broad Industry Groups:
a c co-OaKla d Metropolitan Area,
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Sales to ajor Markets by 46
ay ,rea Industries, by Size,
, and 1965
.a e 5 ue lonnaire
200
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DISTRIBu'rr O~ OF
TABLE A
TOTl\l. EMPLOyrVlENT TO INJTI.L" DE~lI\ND SECTORS AND LOCAL INDUSTRIES AND TOTAL m.RECT AND
I NDIHECT E!v1PLOYi"1E.1T TO t-'!.H\ND SECTORS, BY BROAD INDUSTRY GROUPS:
SAN FHA:~CISCO-CooKLAND .vIETROPOLITAN AREA, 1959
(Percentages in pa~entheses; Employment in thousands)
== =='=================--~=--­- =-=======Tr==========-====_
Total
23.0
(100.0)
19.5
(84.8)
2.
(10. C
1.2
(5.2)
Initial Markets .
To ta 1 . . . . . . .
Direct Employment . . .
I ndi rec t r:mp lOY1::~ n t . .
A~riculture, Forestry,
Fisheries & Mi~inG:
1 To: Demand Sectors and Industry GrouDs~ -- All I17r~m: Pri va te Govt. B\lsiness Housing Current Go 'It. IndustryJ ndus t. ry G~'OUI1~~ 1Export EXl?ort COnSUR~l' Invest. Invest. Govt. Invest. __ -.9roups
I
, IManufacturin~: I
Initial ~j'3rket8 .... I 96.9 I 20.2 I 5.2 -- I 2.2 .7 (6LLO 203.8
( 47 . 5 ) ( 9 . 9 ) (2 . 6 ) - - ( 1. 1 ) ( . 3) 31. 4) ( 100 . 0 )
99.9 20.2 5.2 -- 2.3 .7 -- 165.3
17 . 6 I 4. 3 -11.9 3.0 . 5 1. 3
L
J - 38. 5
117.5 24.5 7.1 2.8 2.0 -- 203.8
(57.6) 1(12.0 (3.4) (1.6 1.0. -- 1(100.0)I ' .
I
71.8(100.QL
71.8
(100.0)
71.8
19.0
(26.5)
19.0
(26.5)
19.0
36.3
(50.5)
36.3
(50.5)
36.3
o
14.8
(20.6)
14.8
o
14.8
(20.6)
o
o
--
o
.6
1.7
o
1.7
(2.4)
1.7
(2.4)
o
o
2.2
5. l~
'I'o ta 1 . . . .
Direct Employment .
Indirect Employment
Direct Employment .
Indirect Em!J10yment 9. ~ 0 I 0 .1 I -- I -- I 12.24.21 .1 .2 .2 .1 -- 10.8
Total 1 7.6 .6 I 111.1 .1 -- I. 23.0
------- I (33.1) i (~.3 (.4) -- t (100.0)
Contract Construction: \
Initial r'1arkets .... I
I I 1 I I
79.0(100.0)
51. 7
27.3
79.0(100.01
65.9
(83.4)
3.0
3.0
( 3.9)
.1
( .2)
.5
.2
.7
( .91 0
5.8
5.8
(7.3)
2.8
2.8
_(3.5)
.3( .4)
34.2
b.• 7
38.9
J49.2
.5
( .6)
.5
2.0
2.5
( 3.2)I l---r- ----, 1-
12.2
( 15.4)
16.5
8.8
25.3
1_(32.0)
Initial Markets .
Direct Employment . . .
Indirect Employment . .
Initial t>1arkets
'rotal ...
Wholesale Trade:
Transportation, Communica-
tion, & Public Utilities: I
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BAY AREA MARKETS QUESTIONNAIRE
James C. Williams
215 Milbrae Lane, #7
Los Gatos, California 95030
Dear Sir:
I am a graduate student in History at San Jose State College
currently working on a master's thesis tentatively entitled'
"The Impac t of Federal Spending in the San Francisco Bay Area,
1940 - 1965."
Because ~f understandable classifications on information per-
taining to defense and space contracts, it has been difficuJt
to obtai~ reliable information by which a substantiation of
the partial dependency of the Bay Area upon federal spending
may be made. Before moving on to a consideration of political
and philosophical implications which may result from such an
area dependency, study of the economic aspect must be com-
pleted. Therefore, a current area survey of markets will be
helpful 1n supplementing other available information.
I would greatly appreciate your help in completing the attac'.ed
sheets and returning them in the enclosed self-addressed enve-
lope. Since this project is concerned with the Bay Area a~ a
whole, replies will be treated confidentially. A total taou-
lation will be mailed to you upon completion of the thesis.
Sincerely yours,
James C. Williams
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BAY AREA MARKETS QUESTIONNAIRE*
OTE: This questionnai
establl hment(s) of YOU~ef~PPlles only to the sales of the
Bay Area (see definitions).rm located in the San Francisco
1. Please describe briefly thyour establishment(s): e major groups of products of
IN THE FOLL01H G QUESTIONSPLEASE DISREGARD THIS FACT'A~~ ~~~I~ELL TO WHOLESALERS
WHOLES LER SELLS YOUR PRODUCT. ATE WHERE YOUR
2. First, consider your total sales this past
year as going to two types of customers:
(2a) those located OUTSIDZ of the San
Francisco Bay Area plus all sales
to the federal government.
(2b) those located INSIDE of the San
Francisco Bay Area.
Estimate your sales between these groups:
(2a) Percentage sold OUTSIDE plus federal
government . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
(2b) Percentage sold INSIDE ....•..
Percentages
Total 10'0%
3.
4.
Taking a typical dollar of sales this past
year estimated in 2a (outside plus federal
government), how would you distribute this
dollar of sales among the following groups?
( 3a) sales to the federal government . . .
( 3b) sales to other than federal government =--..,---.....-.""""""""Total 10(9%
Taking a typical dollar of sales this past
year estimated in 3a (sales to federal
government), how would you distribute this
dollar of sales among the following?
1
4a) sales to Department of Defense ....
4b) sales to NASA ..•.......
4c) sales to Atomic Energy Commission =-..,---~~~Total 10(5%
~Response to Item noS. 2-8 was so inconsistent as to
render the results insignificant. Consequently, these
results are not included in this paper.
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5. Taking a typical dollar of sales this past
year estimated in 3b (outside of the San
Francisco ~ay rea and excluding the federal
government" how would you distribute this
dollar of sales amoniS the following areas?
( 5a) sales to the Los Angeles-Long Beach
area . • . . . . . • . . . . . . .
( 5b) sales to the rest of California (omit:
ting sales to Los Angeles-Long Beach
and San Francisco Bay Area) .....
(55~) sales to the rest of the United States
( ) sales to foreign nations . . . • ... =T-'-ota-=l~l~OO%
6. Taking a typical dollar of sales this past
year estimated in 2b (inside the San Fran-
cisco Bay Area), how would you distribute
this dollar of sales among the following?
(6a) sales DIRECTLY to consumers (people)
which do not go through retail outlets
(66b
c
) sales to s ta te and local governments .
( ) sales to San Francisco, Bay Area firms
of capital goods; i.e., machinery and
equipment ., . . ., . . . . . .
(6d) sales to San Francisco Bay Area firms
of non-capital goods .....•... Total lO()"'p
Taking a typical dollar of sales this past
year estimated 1n 6d (non-capital goods t~
local firms) hoW would you distribute thlS
dollar of saies among the following San
Francisco Bay Area industries?
1
7a agricul tural industries .•...•.7b construction firms . . . . . . • . . .
7c retail firms . . . • . . . . .•...
7d manufacturing firms ~d'r~ai ;state' .
7e finance" insurance, a ...
f1rms. . . . . . . . . . .
(1f) other (please specify) ----.-.-.-.
. . .
7.
8.
Total
1 dollar of sales this past
Taking a ty~lcai 7d (to manufacturing firms),
year estima~ed l~trlbute this dollar of sales
how would yoU d i San FranciSCO Bay Area
among the follow ng
ind stries '? ••••Ordnance products . • . . . . . ., ..,
Food and tobaccO products • . . . • : • . .
Textile mill productS. t pr;d~ctS' ....
A parel and other garmen except furnitureL~mber and wood products,
(continued on next page)
. . . . . .
foundries,
(8 c .
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12. In order to give some idea of the size of the
establishment(s) covered by this questionnaire
would you please indicate the approximat~ ,
number of people you employ: . . • . . . . .
Area definitions --
San Francisco Bay Area includes Alameda, Contra Costa,
Marin, San Francisco, San Mateo, Santa Clara, and
Solano Counties.
Los Angeles-Long Beach Area includes Los Angeles and
Orange Counties.
Other definitions --
Sales is the total dollar volume of your firm's sales.
Capital goods includes machinery and equipment, with a
life of more than one year, used to produce other
products.Non-Capital goods includes all other products, excluding
capital goods.
APPE:mIX IV
BAY AHT-:!, D?FE;~SE-SPACE CONTRACTS
Table
A. Dcren~e 3~d Space Cor1tracts Let to Bay Area
Ft~'1:~ by 1""lo-Dlgit Standard Industrial
C13~slflcatlon (SIC), in FY 1960, FY 1962,
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B. :'!l1,Y Area I:'efer'se-St=-ace Contractors: Bay Area
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TABLE B
AREA IIJ'RFENSE-SPACE C00JTRACTOHS: BAY AREA AND NATIONVlIDE DOD CONTRACTS LET I SELECTED YEI.RSBAY I'. r""'
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360 1900m
500 1000 'f
1491 102
781353f4,400,000
35,000
34,056,SR6
791,784
2,399,661
4 15091 000
$ 619,300
300,000f
3,900,000
600 1000
131759, 759~1
6751 000
125,000f
71 000 ,000f
19,211,197
1713341517
1 12651 686
g
182 1000
99,997 f2 1000,000
1319161597h
51 100 ,000f
76,000
30,000
1231 000
783,000
10,000
771,000
215,000
167,000
435,000
594,000
1,011,000
554,000
47,000
696,000
1, J~45,000
22,052,000i
8,775,000
43,026,000
2,748,000
698,000
1,657,000
481000
29,2631 000
1491 000
3,226 1000 1 1104 18205371 414 ,000 406 1166,125
-- 2951727,900
7571 000 --
26,3l 5f320 1000
$ 1,937,000
25.6j
l24.0
314~~:i I
I
I
I
3lCS.l
219.0
100.S1
316. ~/i.
$ 195.,'
i
92. ~l~ I
1,005.81 I
16 ~;,j I
190. (I
1,750.E!1
418.01
151. 7
180.51
""11.
1 '; ," h.( '--. -
8.7
287.21
11n.4
108.9~
1,036.2
124.4
202.3
$ 216.3
210.01,l~91!.4i
14 ok
../
239.41
49.0
445.5
294.9
$ 15.1. 2
199.0
212.3i
1,074.2i
198.0 i1 J 540.7
87.0
. It. 4k
-- 'I
--
J.55.5
• _\I
.-
J!65.6.
406,6
60.4
35.0.
1,00'(,9 1
$ 117.4
88.0
1,424.3i
333.0
$65.8
88.0
39.8i883.3
304.9
408.0
1,178,5i
Sources:
Aerospace Indu;tries Association of America, Inc.
Aerospace Fact. and Fi3ures (Fallbrook, California:
Aero PUblisher~nc., 1~63), pp. 42 and 85, and:
editions for 1~66, pp. 98-99, and 1967, pp. 98-99
California, Debartment of Finance, California
Statistical Abttract, 1966 (Sacramento, 1~65T,
p. 150j Congre(sional Quar-ter1y Service, Legisla-
tors and the LGbb§ists (Washin~ton, D.C.: Congres-
sional Quarter,y ervice, 1964), p. 26, and 2nd
ed., 1968, PP. 56, and 58-59; Defense Industry
Bulletin, January, 1965 and succeeding editions
through June, J965; Missiles and Rockets, July,
1964, and SUCCCeding editions through June, 1965j
Seymour Melman, Our Depleted Sociely (New York:
Holt, R1nehart, and Winston, 1~65), pp. 330-42;
U.S., Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Eco-
nomic Impact of Vietnam Spending, Hearings:-befor-
the Joint Economic Committee, 90th Cong., 1st
sess., 1967, I, p. 276; and U.S., Congress, House~
Committee on Appropriations, Department of Defe~~
Appropriations for 1958, Hearings, before a sub-
committee of' t;,e Committee on Appropriations,
House of RepreGentat1ves, 85th Cong., 1st sess.,
1957, I, pp. 76_77.
$61.1,
323. 4 I
295~;:; I
290.0
25.9
963.1
11070.8
~ -
$56. J~
Ill.2
91 11,0
276,9
898.5
392 ..6
IIO~ =~'I
-_...~ I
...-
\
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- - _. Nationwide Contx.,.cts (000) _q . Bay Area Contracts1~:;8 t 19.:i2...j 1960 ~ 1961 ~ lyb2 ~ 1963 j 1964! 196) 1963 I 196h
I
I
I
66.2
316.5
$57.8
103.2
~(83.4
755.1
515.0
502.0
61+5.0
JL 305.0
3,308.0
$ 370.0
434 .0 1237. 0
__ I __
l,406~'O I ~7o~i.
1
1-' - ~_I.Y_ -_.\
I ==~. == 11'
__ I --
. .
. . .
. . . .'
. . . .
Comoanya ~50-55
r.;;-}\ P·.2.SCC 18 tes . . . . . . . . . .
M, Rosc~blatt & Sons, Inc .....
r,ij,e l'O\'Ja ve E 1 (' C t 1'0 nic s • , • • • •
Philco Cor~ora~ion (Sierra Ops--Co--
n tea t ions &: Elec t ronic s Divis ion· I •
Philco Corooration (Western Develo
£l1'::nt Letbor[1to),'ies) .
Prc"'~.si.o.\ In~;tr'J.-nen'Cs .
Q.ll'tr;ll.,~ rllQllstr~ps, Inc.
R~dlatio~ ~t S\..an~orj
~~ 0. :)rt.. }~ -:: c: ri :; \) n: :.,' :l :r~! . . ~ . . • . .
r~ 0 :./ (, 8 .L ; l:1 t j"",,' :-7't ':: t j l. :-j J 1 rA': • ..,
St·'L.l~ OJ.l COi~t~'~1rlY ••••••••
S t)'2 t'ry ··Pc :'d CO Y')Or'S. t i O~~ , • • • •
Stnnd~~d 011 of Califor:1la
Stanfol~d g(:~i(~arGn I:lstl'Lute ...
bNationwlde contracts primarily tolTextro~1 Inc.
cNaLioffiltde contracts primarily tolFairchi1d-Hiller
CorporaUon.
dr~alionwlde contracts primarily to Kaiser Industries
Corpora tion.
erJationwlde contracts primarily tol U:1ited Aircraft.
fFieurc shown is for subcontracts.
gOther contracts of undisclosed va~ue not Shown.
hIncludes $2,000,000 in subcontracbs.
ilncludes contracts let by NASA.
JFigure shown went to California besea operations
only.
kNAS A contracts only.
lIncludes $150,000 in sUbcontractsr
mIncludes $69,000 in subcontracts.
nInc ludes $550,000 ln subcontrac t •.
American Jlandard (Adv~nccd Tech-
noJor,y L.:1boratoI'ies) .
I\n'pcx Cor;)ora 1; J.O'1
A~ pJ ~e~l Teclln.,.l]o,..:,y, . r.;c:
Bee h "c 1 Cor~,()ra \., iO:1
B(: c kr:'~lt1 r ns l r~l;nC'n l s
C-E-I-R, Inc
Clevlle Cor~~r2~i~n' .
Dalrno ViCLo;~ Con:"any (Divisi..on of
T (' x l 1'0 n , I 11" • ) G • • • • • • • • •
Dt'<1eon CO:'I)OP<lliO:1 .
El t cJ -t'lcCouJ 10l:,~:1 •
~ -'"} - (~ -, + • rLn',r i ,;.,' dy~'(cms, J.r~c.
Fi<C Cor;"Jl"1.Llcn ....•.
1"a1 1'l'hU d r:'lr:,c'ra &. Inst.rument Cor-
!'0i"Jt Lr;:, (.;Clfl.i.C:O:1J'Jcto:, Division)
GC:1c:r;d :'.L'ctrie Cor:lj.)orly .....
00,pr(11 ?L'Ccisi:::>n, lnc. (L5.nk
J ndu.stri0s) .
Gt'flcl'Cll 'TE'Jer;'IO::C: & Slectric C01'P01'~
l ion (::; y J Ifa ,1 1..1 E 1 e c t 1'1 c Pro d u c t s ) ,
GJ (. b 211 ,~' ~ G C i:, t e s . . , . . , . , .'
}I e ~! 1 C \., \., -. ~' .. c k a I'd . . • • . • • • • .,
H1JJ.~r I'l'i~craf'\.. Corporation ,
Houst:::>~ ~earles3 Corporation ,
IBf·l • • • . • • • • • • • • • • •
Ilck COl'po~atio~ (Vidya Division)
K8 i:..;ep ;. eJ:'CJs pc:ce &: Elec t ronic sCarp
Kals8P l':!1t~t:lE'er3 . . . . . • •
Arthur D. Little, Inc .....
L i i.. t:) n I '-j du s t l' t e s, I :1c . .,.
Lo..::~:lJced .':'. i l'C raft Corpora t ion . • I.
1~ck~2ed Missiles & Space Division
S~anford University . . . .
S lo 1 t e, I rIC. • • • • • • • • • • • • •
TRG, Inc. .....• __
Technology Operatio~s, Inc. -_ 63.8 ... - -- -- -- -- 74.3 -- I 17 000
Thompson-Ramo-\·JoolrJ.dge, Inc. __ __ -- -- -- __ __ __ __ 8051000
Tracerlab, Inc. ,
United Aircraft Corporation, Inc. '66- 8 517 4 6r 5 5 ' 6 81 81 66 1 6 t,1(United Technology Center)e .•. , 1.~,465.0 .1.1 53.2 . C • p9 . 578. 2.1 75.<; 52,254,000 4,465,992g
University of California ... ~ • .. l -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --. 12,222,000 3,215,632
Varian Associates . . . . . . . . . . -- -- ... - -- -- -- -- -- --, 2,649,000 2,565,000n
'Watkins-Johnson Company . . . . . . . -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- ( 2,991,000 2,03Q,5000
'Westinghouse El:ctric Corporation .. 1,190.0 269:~ 23S:~ 257:~ 307:~ e49.1~1. 322.6 236.9 260.9 , 31,023,000 11,421,160P
WorldJ\1r",mys, .lnc. -- " - -- -- -- -- -- 9,707.615
aSome companies listed have limit operat10ns in °Includes $1,941,000 in subcontracts.
th~ Bay Area, and some are no longer 1 ated in the area. .
PInc1udes $360,000 in subcontracts.
Pettit,
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